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Empowered to default? Evidence from BRAC's micro-credit programmes
This article investigates whether the acquisition of greater skills, resources, confidence and social position through repeated micro-credit borrowing might reduce the effectiveness of mechanisms which promote repayment. The idea is motivated by new data from BRAC's (Bangladesh RuralAdvancement Committee) Rural Development Programme, in which repayment appears to decline with repeated borrowing. In lending without physical collateral, group-based finance (GBF) uses alternative 'collateral', such as obligation to peers, which is socially based. GBF relies partly on high
administrative inputs (for group formation, and for weekly visits by fieldworkers), and substantially on the borrowers' lack of alternative sources of credit and social powerlessness. If so, repayments will be undermined if repeated borrowing empowers by enriching and individualizing borrowers
(through 'individual empowerment'), or improving access to alternative credit (through 'social transformation'). This is particularly important where groups have been formed simply to supply cheaper credit. The BRAC experience suggests that a micro-credit intervention, based strongly on incentives
for individual self-enrichment alone, eventually undermines the social forces inducing repayment by changing the incentives and costs associated with honouring the financial contract.
This article investigates whether the acquisition of greater skills, resources, confidence and social position through repeated micro-credit borrowing might reduce the effectiveness of mechanisms which promote repayment. The idea is motivated by new data from BRAC's (Bangladesh Rural
Advancement Committee) Rural Development Programme, in which repayment appears to decline with repeated borrowing. In lending without physical collateral, group-based finance (GBF) uses alternative 'collateral', such as obligation to peers, which is socially based. GBF relies partly on high
administrative inputs (for group formation, and for weekly visits by fieldworkers), and substantially on the borrowers' lack of alternative sources of credit and social powerlessness. If so, repayments will be undermined if repeated borrowing empowers by enriching and individualizing borrowers
(through 'individual empowerment'), or improving access to alternative credit (through 'social transformation'). This is particularly important where groups have been formed simply to supply cheaper credit. The BRAC experience suggests that a micro-credit intervention, based strongly on incentives
for individual self-enrichment alone, eventually undermines the social forces inducing repayment by changing the incentives and costs associated with honouring the financial contract.
Advancement Committee) Rural Development Programme, in which repayment appears to decline with repeated borrowing. In lending without physical collateral, group-based finance (GBF) uses alternative 'collateral', such as obligation to peers, which is socially based. GBF relies partly on high
administrative inputs (for group formation, and for weekly visits by fieldworkers), and substantially on the borrowers' lack of alternative sources of credit and social powerlessness. If so, repayments will be undermined if repeated borrowing empowers by enriching and individualizing borrowers
(through 'individual empowerment'), or improving access to alternative credit (through 'social transformation'). This is particularly important where groups have been formed simply to supply cheaper credit. The BRAC experience suggests that a micro-credit intervention, based strongly on incentives
for individual self-enrichment alone, eventually undermines the social forces inducing repayment by changing the incentives and costs associated with honouring the financial contract.
The Effects of Microcredit on Women's Control over Household Spending in Developing Countries: A Systematic Review and Meta‐analysis
Vaessen, Jos
Rivas, Ana
Duvendack, Maren
Jones, Richard Palmer
Leeuw, Frans
van Gils, Ger
Lukach, Ruslan
Holvoet, Nathalie
Bastiaensen, Johan
Hombrados, Jorge Garcia
Waddington, Hugh
Campbell Systematic Reviews, Vol. 10 (2014), Iss. 1 P.1
https://doi.org/10.4073/csr.2014.8 [Citations: 35]Non-linearities in returns to participation in Grameen Bank programs
Menon, Nidhiya
The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 42 (2006), Iss. 8 P.1379
https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380600930705 [Citations: 10]From Microfinance to Inclusive Financial Markets: The Challenge of Social Regulation
Johnson, Susan
Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 41 (2013), Iss. sup1 P.S35
https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2012.734799 [Citations: 17]Tabs navigation
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