The exit problem in credit projects
The exit problem occurs when individual borrowers fail to repay their loans to credit projects, and when projects themselves are consequently left with a declining pool of funds to lend. Frequently donors allow this situation to continue and bad debts accumulate until they are obligedto cease lending altogether, when a sudden 'hard exit' from the programme occurs. This article describes a proposed design for a wholesale lender, funded by international donors and lending to local credit projects, which would allow client projects either to increase their borrowing incrementally
or to withdraw gradually according to the success of their lending record. By following certain clear rules it is hoped that difficulties could be anticipated and dealt with early on and the hardship of a sudden ejection from the credit programme avoided.This article raises some interesting
points in the form of a proposal. The editors decided to publish it, in spite of the fact that the system has not yet been tried out anywhere, because it deserves discussion among a wide readership. We would therefore particularly welcome any comments you have upon the system described.
to cease lending altogether, when a sudden 'hard exit' from the programme occurs. This article describes a proposed design for a wholesale lender, funded by international donors and lending to local credit projects, which would allow client projects either to increase their borrowing incrementally
or to withdraw gradually according to the success of their lending record. By following certain clear rules it is hoped that difficulties could be anticipated and dealt with early on and the hardship of a sudden ejection from the credit programme avoided.This article raises some interesting
points in the form of a proposal. The editors decided to publish it, in spite of the fact that the system has not yet been tried out anywhere, because it deserves discussion among a wide readership. We would therefore particularly welcome any comments you have upon the system described.
Measuring the trade-off between outreach and sustainability of microenterprise lenders
Von Pischke, J. D.
Journal of International Development, Vol. 8 (1996), Iss. 2 P.225
https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1328(199603)8:2<225::AID-JID370>3.0.CO;2-6 [Citations: 44]CREATING A SUSTAINABLE SUPPLY OF FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE RURAL POOR: A CHALLENGE FOR THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS PROFESSION
Graham, Douglas H
Agrekon, Vol. 34 (1995), Iss. 4 P.138
https://doi.org/10.1080/03031853.1995.9524801 [Citations: 3]- Development impact bonds: learning from the Asháninka cocoa and coffee case in Peru
- Trade-off between outreach and sustainability of microfinance institutions: evidence from sub-Saharan Africa
- Value chain development for rural poverty reduction: A reality check and a warning
- Impact assessment of commodity standards: towards inclusive value chains
- What is cocoa sustainability? Mapping stakeholders’ socio-economic, environmental, and commercial constellations of priorities