

AGRICULTURE AND THE GENERATION PROBLEM

Agrarian Change & Peasant Studies



BEN WHITE

AGRICULTURE AND THE GENERATION PROBLEM

Advance Praise for *Agriculture and the Generation Problem*

This little gem of a book explores the vexed question of the apparent global aversion of young people to becoming farmers. Richly illustrated with historical and contemporary examples, it demonstrates the complex links between class, gender and generational relations in agrarian households and communities, that are necessary to proper understanding of their generational reproduction.

— Henry Bernstein, Emeritus Professor of Development
Studies at the University of London

What will happen to tens of millions of rural youth in Asia and Africa who can't march off to the city to find jobs, but whose pathways into productive farming futures are blocked? Ben White brings a wealth of insight, conceptual clarity and empirical depth to this urgent question. Highly recommended.

— Tania Li, Dept. Anthropology University of Toronto

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Ben White

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Series Editors' Foreword

Ben White's *Agriculture and the Generation Problem* is the tenth volume in the Agrarian Change and Peasant Studies Series from ICAS (Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies) and College of Humanities and Development Studies (COHD) of China Agricultural University. The first volume is Henry Bernstein's *Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change*; followed by Jan Douwe van der Ploeg's *Peasants and the Art of Farming*; Philip McMichael's *Food Regimes and Agrarian Questions*; Ian Scoones' *Sustainable Livelihoods and Rural Development*; Marc Edelman and Saturnino M. Borras Jr.'s *Politics of Transnational Agrarian Movements*; Henry Veltmeyer and Raul Delgado Wise's *Agrarian Change, Migration and Development*; Peter Rosset and Miguel Altieri's *Agroecology: Science and Politics*; Jennifer Clapp and Ryan Isakson's *Speculative Harvests: Financialization, Food and Agriculture*; and Walden Bello's *Counterrevolution: The Global Rise of the Far Right*. Together, these ten books reaffirm the strategic importance and relevance of applying agrarian political economy analytical lenses in agrarian studies today. They suggest that succeeding volumes in the series will be just as politically relevant and scientifically rigorous.

A brief explanation of the series will help put the current volume by Ben White into perspective in relation to the ICAS intellectual and political project. Today, global poverty remains a significantly rural phenomenon, with rural populations comprising three-quarters of the world's poor. Thus the problem of global poverty and the multidimensional (economic, political, social, cultural, gender, environmental and so on) challenge of ending it are closely linked to rural working people's resistance to the system that continues to generate and reproduce the conditions of rural poverty and their struggles for sustainable livelihoods. A focus on rural development thus remains critical to development thinking. However, this focus does not mean de-linking rural from urban issues. The challenge is

to better understand the linkages between them, partly because the pathways out of rural poverty paved by neoliberal policies and the war on global poverty engaged in and led by mainstream international financial and development institutions to a large extent simply replace rural with urban forms of poverty.

Mainstream approaches in agrarian studies are generously financed and thus have been able to dominate the production and publication of research and studies on agrarian issues. Many of the institutions (such as the World Bank) that promote this thinking have also been able to acquire skills in producing and propagating highly accessible and policy-oriented publications that are widely disseminated worldwide. Critical thinkers in leading academic institutions are able to challenge this mainstream approach, but they are generally confined to academic circles with limited popular reach and impact.

There remains a significant gap in meeting the needs of academics (teachers, scholars and students), social movement activists and development practitioners in the global South and the North for scientifically rigorous yet accessible, politically relevant, policy-oriented and affordable books in critical agrarian studies. In response to this need, ICAS has launched this series. The idea is to publish “state of the art small books” that will explain a specific development issue based on key questions, including: What are the current issues and debates in this particular topic and who are the key scholars/thinkers and actual policy practitioners? How have such positions developed over time? What are the possible future trajectories? What are the key reference materials? And why and how is it important for NGO professionals, social movement activists, official development aid circle and nongovernmental donor agencies, students, academics, researchers and policy experts to critically engage with the key points explained in the book? Each book will combine theoretical and policy-oriented discussion with empirical examples from different national and local settings.

The series is available in multiple languages in addition to English, namely, Chinese, Spanish, Portuguese, Indonesian, Thai, Japanese, Korean, Italian and Russian. The Chinese edition is in partnership with the College of Humanities and Development of the China Agricultural University in Beijing, coordinated by

Ye Jingzhong; the Spanish edition with the PhD Program in Development Studies at the Autonomous University of Zacatecas in Mexico, coordinated by Raúl Delgado Wise; Fundacion Tierra in Bolivia coordinated by Gonzalo Colque; the Portuguese edition with the Universidade Estadual Paulista, Presidente Prudente (UNESP) in Brazil, coordinated by Bernardo Mançano Fernandes, and the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) in Brazil, coordinated by Sergio Schneider; the Indonesian edition with Insist Press, Yogyakarta coordinated by Laksmi Savitri; the Thai edition with RCSD of University of Chiang Mai, coordinated by Chayan Vaddhanaphuti; the Italian edition coordinated by Alessandra Corrado at the University of Calabria; the Japanese edition with Kyoto University, coordinated by Shuji Hisano of Kyoto University, Koichi Ikegami of Kinki University, and by Sayaka-Funada-Classen; the Korean edition with Research Institute of Agriculture and Peasant Policy and coordinated by Wonkyu Song; and the Russian edition with the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), coordinated by Teodor Shanin and Alexander Nikulin.

Given the objectives of the Agrarian Change and Peasant Studies Series, one can easily understand why we are delighted to have as Book 10 the work by Ben White. The first ten volumes fit together well in terms of themes, accessibility, relevance and rigour. We are excited about the bright future of this important series!

*Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Ruth Hall, Max Spoor,
Henry Veltmeyer, and Ye Jingzhong*
ICAS Book Series Editors

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The Generational Dimension in Agrarian Change

We were out on the platform behind the house spreading our wet clothes to dry when one of the daughters of the house began to pull out bundles of garlic and arrange them in the sun.

“Who do they belong to?” I asked casually.

“That one belongs to my mother, those belong to my older brother, those belong to my sister, these here are mine, and those belong to my father,” she replied. “Mother and father work together. Today they are weeding her garlic. When that is finished, they will weed his.”

This was my introduction to the economic autonomy of household members, each of whom created personal property through his or her work. They also created relations of kinship and care by entering into exchanges with others.

— Lauje, Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, in the early 1990s
before the cacao boom (Li 2014: 59)

When Antonio was 13 years old his father agreed to give him a small plot of land in return for his help in the fields. Antonio chose to sow peanuts and he bought the seed by selling a goat that he had been given on his birthday a few years previously. His younger brother, Javier, helped him plant the seed and Antonio agreed to give him the harvested peanuts from five lines of the crop.

— Highland Bolivia (Punch 2011: 156f)

Son: Papa, the land you have given me to farm is useless. It is not fertile at all. It's all covered with *Jus*.¹

Father: Yes, but you never think to send me anything better. How many years have you been farming here? And what crops have you sent to me? Don't you know that I also have to eat from the land? If you want another plot then you will have to take it on a share basis.

Son: Papa, that is not right. I am your son, so how can you give me a land on sharecrop basis?

Father: Yes and I am your father so you should have been sending me something to eat.

Son: It's not right. If that is the case then I am leaving and going to my mother's people.

— Asewesa, South-Eastern Ghana, 1983
(Amanor 2010: 117–18)

The young men say they destroyed the foreigners' pineapples because of the old men. For example, if an old man who manages family land leases out most of this land, the children have no land to cultivate to provide for their needs. Don't they have to eat? When the old men receive money from the Burkinabes, they use it for their own needs, they do not give any to the young men and the latter become vagrants who roam the city.

— Young Abure men in Côte d'Ivoire, who sabotaged the pineapple crop on land which their elders had leased to Burkinabe "foreigners" for commercial farming, leaving them without land (Kouamé 2010: 137)

These four examples depict different relationships between older and younger generations in agrarian communities. The aim of this book is to explore these generational dimensions. The main focus is on peasant or smallholder farming communities, although I also

pay some attention to agricultural wage workers in both smallholder and corporate agriculture.

Despite predictions that they are destined to disappear, smallholder farms or family farms are still estimated to number more than 500 million worldwide, and they comprise more than 90 percent of all the world's farm units. Depending on how they are defined, smallholders farm 50–75 percent of the world's agricultural land, while the other two types of farming units (corporate farms and large private farms) occupy 25–50 percent (Graeub et al. 2016; Lowder, Skoet and Raney 2016). At least 475 million of these farms are smaller than two hectares. About one-tenth of smallholder farms are in Africa, 7 percent in Europe and only 4 percent in Latin America. The great majority, almost three-quarters (about 364 million), are in the Asia-Pacific region: China, India, other South Asian countries, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands (Lowder, Skoet and Raney 2016: 21, 27).

Will this pattern of smallholder farming continue? Globally, smallholder farmer populations are ageing, and in some regions many smallholders appear to have no successor. One aspect of the problem is young rural people's turn away from farming, their apparent aversity to farming futures having been noted in many regions (see, for example, Proctor and Lucchesi 2012; White 2012; Cuervo and Wyn 2012). Another, less recognized, issue is about how and why many rural young men and women, even if interested in farming, are confronted by the increased narrowing and sometimes complete closure of access to land and/or other barriers to their entry into farming. This points to the need for attention to the dynamics of the transfer of agrarian resources and opportunities between the generations in rural communities. This intergenerational dimension and related tensions are common themes in studies of European agrarian history (see examples in Chapter 4) but are relatively neglected in contemporary studies of agrarian change. Research about sub-Saharan Africa is a possible exception, but here too intergenerational relationships and tensions have received less notice than class and gender relations (Sumberg et al. 2012). However, as this book makes clear, the concept of generation is an essential tool for analysis if we want to include a time dimension in our understanding of the intersecting dynamics of class and gender relations

in rural communities. All those with an interest in the future shape of farming and the fate of future generations in rural areas should take generational relations seriously and give them more attention in research and in policy debates.

The book is organized as follows. In the next part of this chapter I argue for the importance of its key themes by considering agricultural futures, the gloomy prospects for rural youth employment and the possible generational crisis in smallholder farming. The last part of the chapter introduces key guiding concepts drawn from the interdisciplinary fields of agrarian studies, generation studies and youth studies. Chapter 2 casts a generational lens on major agrarian transformations in world history, with extended examples of colonial transformations, socialist transformations and post-socialist transitions, commoditization and “green revolutions” in smallholder farming, historical and contemporary land grabs and agrarian reforms. Following this broad-brush chapter, the focus narrows in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 explores what we know about rural households, their developmental cycles, the dynamics of life-course progressions from childhood to youth, adulthood and old age, and the relationships of autonomy and dependence between the generations. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at the diverse ways in which agrarian resources are transferred — or in some cases, not transferred — between the generations and the conflicts and tensions, both inter- and intra-generational, that often arise in these succession processes. The final chapter looks to the future, building on the previous chapters to unpack the common assertion that “young people are no longer interested in farming futures” and related “agriculture in peril” narratives. It also looks at the experiences of young rural men and women who do want to be farmers and the many constraints they encounter. Young people’s lack of independent access to agrarian resources, I argue, has long been a major factor in their out-migration and apparent aversion to farming, while at the same time not precluding their later return to the village and to farming when resources become available through savings or inheritance.

A Crisis of Social Reproduction?

It is not easy to be young in the labour market today. (ILO 2017a: 26)

The International Labour Organization (ILO) report *Global Employment Trends for Youth* (2017a) lays out the contours of the world's youth employment problem. Young people's unemployment rates in low- and middle-income countries are generally around 10–15 percent — about three times as high as the adult rates — and rising. Education does not solve the problem: youth unemployment tends to correlate positively, not negatively, with years of education. For those young people already in work, the quality of employment remains a major concern. Rates of “working poverty” — those who are employed but whose incomes still fall below the poverty line — are around 30 percent in “emerging” and 70 percent in “developing” regions; they are higher in all regions for youth than for adults, and in South India and sub-Saharan Africa they are over 50 percent (ILO 2017a: 19). Working youth are more likely than working adults to be employed in the informal economy; available jobs are increasingly casual and precarious, while all research on young people's aspirations finds — as we will see in the final chapter — that they aspire, above all, to secure, salaried jobs. And all these problems disproportionately affect rural youth. Rural young people experience longer delays in their school-to-work transitions, and they are 40 percent more likely to be in casual work without a contract, than their urban brothers and sisters (3, 5).

Today's young people are more endowed than any previous generation with formal education, with “human capital.” However, the over-supply of secondary and tertiary graduates on the one hand, and the rapid advance of job-displacing technologies in almost all sectors on the other, mean that this is the generation for whom, more than any previous generation, human capital theory most obviously does not work. Why? For this generation of rural youth, human capital theory's underlying premise — that education increases employability — is not supported by their actual experience (Bessant, Farthing and Watts 2017: Ch. 5). They are increasingly faced with the reality

that while you cannot get a skilled or semi-skilled job without the relevant diploma, in overcrowded — and nowadays often shrinking — labour markets, having the diploma does not get you the job unless you have other means to open doors, such as personal or familial networks and contacts and relevant work experience, which poor and rural youth are less likely to have.

Young people's already gloomy employment prospects are made even more uncertain by the rapid pace of technological change, as cost-saving innovations are primarily net labour-saving investments. Mechanization in agriculture and other manual work and automatization of clerical, communications, sales and service-sector tasks are likely to proceed rapidly in the coming years; some 50 percent of all currently existing activities have the potential to be automated with already existing technologies (ILO 2017b). Labour-saving technologies in theory have the potential to reduce working hours while maintaining employment through work-spreading (as predicted by John Maynard Keynes 1963 [1930]),² but this does not happen in actually existing capitalist economies. And for the new jobs created by technological progress, poor and rural youth are less likely to have the education, skills and networks needed to transition from old to new jobs. Technological change, then, on the one hand offers the utopian prospect of automated, sustainable food systems immune to the impact of climate change, but on the other it offers the spectre of mass unemployment — leading to new questions. How will the redundant workforce, with no income from labour, provide for themselves? And how will the shrinkage of the labour market impact an economy that is reliant on mass consumer demand, which in turn has historically been fuelled by incomes earned in labour? (Shepon, Hendriksson and Wu 2018: 3).

In the coming years, mass youth unemployment (including educated youth unemployment) and under-employment will be structural, chronic and permanent features of most economies. There are countless examples of the growing problem of (relatively) educated un/under-employed young men and women in today's world. This has led some authors to speak of an extended period of "elusive" or "emerging" adulthood between biological youth or adolescence and (social) adulthood (Durham 2017) and also to characterize this

period as one of “precarity” (Bessant, Farthing and Watts 2017). The high rates of youth unemployment worldwide point to an emerging and chronic state of “relative surplus population.” To avoid any misunderstanding, “relative surplus” here is not about too many mouths to feed in the Malthusian sense, but about the redundancy of labour: the failure of the economy, in its present form and with present policies and technological advances, to absorb the labour of the whole available workforce (Li 2009, 2017).

Agriculture, particularly smallholder farming, is still by far the largest single source of adult and youth employment and livelihoods in Africa and Asia (but no longer in Latin America). It accounts for 35 and 44 percent of all employment in Asia and Africa respectively, with a much higher share in rural employment (ILO 2017a: 42). It is therefore important to consider the prospects for rural youth employment and livelihoods in agriculture and related sectors, but also to ask: what do young rural men and women want, and how do they envisage their futures?

The widely reported aspirations of young rural men and women to non-farming futures are said to predict a crisis in the world’s smallholder agriculture, as sons and daughters of farmers don’t want to be farmers. This “agriculture in peril” narrative makes a too-easy logical jump from reported aspirations to actual or likely futures (Leavy and Hossain 2014; White 2012). As we see in Chapter 5, the assumed crisis of succession in smallholder farming needs rethinking in most countries; research data on young rural people’s aspirations, and older farmers’ hopes and fears about succession, are not reliable indicators of actual futures (Chiswell 2014).

Finally, fears of a crisis of social reproduction in smallholder farming are fuelled by the fact that all over the world, farming populations are ageing, and in some countries, many farmers appear to have no successor. In Africa the average age of farmers³ is reportedly now around 60 (FAO-IFAD-CTA 2014: 2); in many Asian countries it is around the mid-50s (Rigg et al. 2019).⁴ This trend is generally assumed to be linked to young people’s aversion to farming. However, there are other plausible explanations, which have not been explored in research. For example, Table 1.1 shows the shifting age structure of Indonesian and Australian farmers over a thirty-year period.

Table 1.1 Changing Age of Smallholder Farm Heads,
Indonesia and Australia

	Australia		Indonesia	
	1981	2011	1983	2013
Under 35	28%	13%	25%	13%
35–54	47%	37%	57%	54%
55 and above	25%	50%	18%	33%

Sources: Australia: Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012), Indonesia: Central Bureau of Statistics (1983 and 2013).

In both countries, with their different economies and farming systems, in a single generation there has been a halving in the proportion of farm heads under 35 years of age, and a corresponding doubling of those over 55. The most commonly assumed explanation is that this shift is due to the reluctance of farmers' sons and daughters to take over the farm, so that farmers have to continue farming into old age. But it may also be because farmers are now living and/or staying healthier longer and are unwilling or unable to hand over the farm to the next generation, so that the next generation have to wait longer and longer before getting their share of the property.

In Romania for example, where two-thirds of smallholders are over 55 years old and only 7 percent under 35, there has been a large-scale exodus of rural youth, and only 26 percent of farms are passed on through intra-family succession. Is this exodus a cause of the succession problem, or itself caused by it? In fact, many ageing smallholders simply cannot afford to stop, and when they do stop, they tend to sell or lease out the land, rather than passing it on to their children, to supplement meagre pensions.

Ageing peasants are actually unable to retire or take subordinate positions because they rely on the income from their farms, and the Romanian pension is not enough to survive. ... Elderly peasants who rely on their farms for their future financial income are more likely to lease or sell their land than to pass it on to a family member, because they need the money

for their savings or to supplement the pension. This often results in land grabbing and consolidation as agribusinesses take advantage of older peasants desperate to sustain themselves. (Eco Ruralis 2016: 15)

Are young potential farm successors reluctant to start, or are they unable to start because their parents are unwilling or unable to stop? The two interpretations may have different relevance in different countries and regions, and their policy implications are quite different. Or is there a more complex dynamic at work, as Jonathan Rigg, Monchai Phongsi, Buapun Promphakping, Albert Salamanca and Mattara Sripun argue, requiring us to reconsider the way we think about ageing and occupational change in smallholder farming contexts (Rigg et al. 2019)? We return to these questions in Chapter 4.

Frameworks and Guiding Concepts

In this book, I use a general political economy framework in which the dynamics of social reproduction are central. I bring together the perspectives of critical agrarian studies and critical youth/generation studies. “Critical” means, here, the exercise of judgement and is not always negative; it means simply taking nothing for granted and carefully applying reason and evidence in the determination of whether a claim is true (Moore and Parker 2009: 3). It means interrogating mainstream and popular assumptions and, where needed, proposing and pursuing new ways of questioning in the hope of providing better understandings, which, in turn, can become the basis for action.⁵ Combining these two fields of critical study puts us in a better position to understand the intergenerational dynamics and related tensions that we see almost everywhere in rural communities.

Agrarian Political Economy

Agrarian studies helps us to better understand and compare the structure and dynamics of rural societies, the past and possible future trajectories of the agrifood sector, and in particular the underlying and continuing debate on large-scale versus small-scale agricultural futures. A political economy approach in agrarian studies aims to study and compare “the social relations and dynamics of produc-

tion and reproduction, property and power in agrarian formations and their processes of change, both historical and contemporary” (Bernstein 2010: 1), as well as the special characteristics of smallholder farming (van der Ploeg 2013). At the micro level it helps us to understand the developmental cycles of smallholder farm households and the logic of smallholder survival in capitalist contexts.

Key concepts in the analysis of agrarian structures and their dynamics include “commodification,” agrarian “labour regimes” and labour processes, “agrarian differentiation” and “class formation,” and the “social divisions of labour” related to these processes. These are the abstract concepts which prompt us to ask — and help us to understand the answers to — the concrete, down-to-earth questions with which agrarian structures can be analyzed and compared: “who owns what? who does what? who gets what? what do they do with it?” (Bernstein 2010: 22) and “what do they do to each other”? (White, Hall and Wolford 2012: 620).⁶

“Commodification” is the process that results in the elements of production and reproduction being produced for, and obtained from, market exchange, making them subject to its logic, disciplines and compulsions.⁷ “Agrarian differentiation” is the tendency, driven by commodification, of petty commodity producers (smallholders) to divide into classes of capital and labour (Bernstein 2010: 125), although the division rarely emerges in such clear-cut, polarized form. It involves the emergence or sharpening of differences between groups in the agrarian population, as some embark on trajectories of “expanded reproduction” (accumulation) and others experience a “simple reproduction squeeze,”⁸ leading to loss of assets. Differentiation, thus, often involves some groups becoming richer than others, but the core of the concept is not growing inequalities in themselves but the changing *relationships* between groups, as value created in the agricultural labour process is then appropriated and distributed among different groups (White 1989: 19–20). Examples would be the emergence of asymmetrical landlord-tenant and employer-wage worker relationships in new agrarian labour regimes.

Agrarian “labour regimes” are the “different modes of recruiting/mobilizing labour and organizing it in production” (Bernstein 2010: 127), and the social and political conditions which make it possible

to enforce these relationships. “Social divisions of labour” are (for purposes of this book) “the activities of different categories of people according to the positions they occupy in particular structures of social relations, notably ... class relations ... and gender relations” (Bernstein 2010: 129); I expand this definition to include generational relations. It also includes both the direct production of goods and services, and the production and maintenance of life itself. This is further discussed at the end of this section when we come to the key idea of “social reproduction.”

Social divisions of labour therefore involve dimensions of class, gender, generation and sometimes other factors, and their intersectionality. “Intersectionality,” as an analytic tool, gives us a window on the interaction of multiple forms and relationships of subordination, inequality and identity, e.g., those based on class, gender, ethnicity and generation.

When it comes to social inequality, people’s lives and the organization of power in a given society are better understood as being shaped not by a single axis of social division, be it race or gender or class [or generation], but by many axes that work together and influence each other. (Collins and Bilge 2016: 2; for intersectionality in relation to childhood/youth, see Alanen 2016)

Considering gender and generation means looking at how these relations and tensions play out, not only in (small-scale) farming households, but also in different locations in agrarian labour regimes, and at different points in agro-commodity chains. Women and men, adult and youth, and male and female children may be direct producers on their own account (as we saw in the first two examples at the beginning of this chapter); unpaid family workers in family farms (including contracted farms) or on the farms of others; local or in-migrant wage workers on the farms of others (larger farms or industrial plantations); actors (own-account, unpaid family workers, wage workers) in the upstream and/or downstream entities in agro-commodity chains; consumers of food and other agricultural products that they have not themselves produced, or providers or

receivers of care and food in households where one or more members are involved in agricultural production (White, Park and Julia 2015).

In emerging commodified agrifood systems, class relations intersect and combine with other social differences and divisions, so that alongside class-like dynamics and tensions, the reproduction of agrarian communities is both a gendered and a “generationed” process. Differentiation processes in smallholder farming and incorporation in large-scale corporate farming (and resistance to it) are both shaped by historical and existing gender and generational relations, inequalities and divisions of labour.

Besides individual actors and agrarian classes, basic building blocks within these agrarian structures include agrarian households. These often combine distinct and only partly overlapping units of production, consumption and accumulation, which include the possibility of surplus transfer mechanisms between household members based on hierarchies of age and gender, as well as labour transactions within households, as we have seen in the Indonesian and Bolivian examples at the beginning of this chapter (White 1989: 22; Guyer and Peters 1987). Households are also “moving targets” which require a dynamic perspective on their “developmental cycles” — their formation, expansion, dispersal, fission and replacement — and their changing age and labour composition in the course of these cycles (Chayanov 1966a [1925]: Ch. 1; Fortes 1966; White 1980: 16–22). We return to this in Chapter 3.

Finally, what do we mean by “peasant farming,” “family farming” and “smallholder farming”? In his landmark book *Peasants*, Eric Wolf pointed to surplus transfers from small-scale cultivators to dominant rulers in a hierarchical society as the defining mark distinguishing peasants.

Peasants ... are rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn ... Thus, it is only when a cultivator is integrated into a society with a state — that is, when the cultivator becomes subject to the

demands and sanctions of power-holders outside his [*sic*] social stratum — than we can appropriately speak of peasants. (1966: 3–4, 11)

In similar vein the historian Rodney Hilton (1975), in his classic study of the English peasantry of the middle ages, argued that a precondition of the existence of “peasantry” as a class is the existence of other classes who live off the surplus produce of peasant labour. Subsequent authors have built on this point. De Sainte-Croix’s study of class struggles in the ancient Greek world includes the following points drawn from Hilton and further modified.

1. Peasants possess, whether or not they own, the means of agricultural production; they provide their own maintenance from their productive efforts, and collectively they produce more than is necessary for their own subsistence and reproduction.
2. They are not slaves, and are therefore not legally the property of others (although they may be serfs)
3. They may be freeholders or tenants (paying rent in money, kind or shares, and combined or not with labour services)
4. They work their holdings essentially as family units, primarily with family labour, but occasionally with restricted use of slaves or wage labour
5. They support superimposed classes by which they are exploited to a greater or less degree, especially landlords, moneylenders, town-dwellers, and the organs of the state to which they belong, and in which they may or may not have political rights. (1981: 210–11)

In *Peasants and the Art of Farming*, Jan Douwe van der Ploeg takes a different focus, distinguishing peasants not from pre-peasant, “primitive” cultivators (in Eric Wolf’s terms, half a century ago) but from capitalist farmers, a distinction in which the goal or logic of farming is central. He defines “peasant agriculture” as “forms or modes of farming in which coproduction based on a self-controlled

resource base is central and within which wage labour is (almost) absent. Enlarging the value added per object of labour is an important internal driver for its development" (2013: 134). The key point here is that peasants aim to maximize, not capitalist profits based on property and surplus value extracted from labour, but value added and labour income, the total and indivisible "family labour product."

Van der Ploeg puts his finger on one key basis of smallholder, "petty commodity producer" survival in broader capitalist contexts, which Karl Kautsky and Alexander Chayanov had also highlighted a century earlier. The Kautskian and Chayanovian peasant petty commodity producer "does not live from the yield on his property but from the yield of his labour" (Kautsky 1988 [1899]: 170), and this "family labour product" cannot be decomposed analytically. "Since there is no social phenomenon of wages, the social phenomenon of net profit is also absent" (Chayanov 1966b: 5). As van der Ploeg puts it, "labour, within the peasant farm, is not wage labour. And capital is not capital in the Marxist sense (i.e., it is not capital that needs to produce surplus value to be invested in order to produce more surplus value)" (2013: 15). The "surplus-transfer" dimension would apply to some, but not necessarily all, of van der Ploeg's peasants as defined in this way.

I should explain why I prefer and use the term "smallholder" rather than "peasant" or "family farmer" in this book, although in a book that relies mainly on research done by others, I have not been able completely to avoid the term "peasant." But most world languages do not have two words to distinguish "peasant" and "farmer," making for unnecessary contortions in translation. And although smallholder farms are overwhelmingly also "family" farms, some are not, and there is no essential reason why a smallholder farm must be a family affair. It could equally be owned and run by a single person or, in a minority of cases, by a couple of (or a few) friends, and in a larger number of cases, the farm may be run by a man or a woman who does have a family but whose spouse and/or children have nothing to do with the farm operation. "Smallholder," in this book, refers not only to the size (area) of the farm unit, but also to the manner, style and scale of its operation, where owner or tenant farmers themselves manage and work on the farm, often

mainly with the help of family members but not ruling out the use of hired workers.⁹ It can thus encompass both a half hectare or a two hectare farm in an Asian, African or Latin American country, and a 100 or 200 hectare farm in Canada or The Netherlands, depending on the manner in which the farm is owned, managed and worked. Smallholder farm households may be — and often are — subject to surplus appropriation and exploitation by superimposed non-farming classes, but this is not always the case and therefore I do not believe it should be part of the definition.

One important aspect of smallholder farming households and their survival in today's world is their "pluriactivity."¹⁰ Besides involvement in crop and/or livestock production, one or more household members may be active in non-farm activities, either locally or through periodic (cyclical or life-cycle) out-migration. This pluriactivity — and in cases of periodic migration, plurilocality — is an important key to the survival of smallholder farming in both rich and poor countries. It is also one of the conditions which young people today see as essential to possible farming futures, as we will see in Chapter 5. Farm and non-farm activities can both feed on and feed into each other; for example, when agrarian resources are used to finance a household member's migration or a local non-farm enterprise, or when savings accrued in non-farm activities are used to invest in expanded agrarian resources or to provide working capital for agricultural production.

Linking these features of agrarian households and communities to their intergenerational dimensions is the concept of "social reproduction," which is one of two core concepts underpinning the analysis in each chapter of this book (the other is "generation"). Among various possible definitions of social reproduction, I find the one suggested by Karen Wells best suited to our purposes: "the material and discursive practices which enable the reproduction of a social formation (including the relations between social groups) and its members over time" (2009: 78). The concept helps us to see how agrarian households and communities reproduce themselves both from day to day and over seasonal and generational time spans, and the continuities and discontinuities in these processes. The heart of the concept is the idea that human labour is at the centre

of the reproduction of households, communities and societies, and that this labour includes not only the production of marketable goods and services but also the production and maintenance of life itself — sometimes called “reproductive work” — as parts of a single, integrated process (Bhattacharya 2017). This enables us to think of, and study empirically, the different time-frames and the different levels of social reproduction and the divisions of labour involved: the day-to-day and generational reproduction of households; the reproduction of agrarian households from season to season and their paths of expanded reproduction, simple reproduction or simple reproduction “squeeze,” and the reproduction of whole communities and their class and gender structures from generation to generation.

Generation Studies and Youth Studies

Generational perspectives focus our attention on the generational dimensions of social reproduction. They help us understand the lives of those we study, in particular their changing positions and relationships in agrarian structures along the life-course from childhood to youth, adulthood and old age. They also help us understand young people’s paradoxical (apparent) turn away from farming in this era of mass youth un(der)employment (Cuervo and Wyn 2012) and the problems faced by those who do aspire to farming futures.

“Generation” is used with many different meanings, in everyday, social-science and policy discourse. It sometimes refers to relationships bounded by kinship descent, in which one’s generational position — as someone’s (grand)“child” or (grand)“parent,” “nephew/niece” or “aunt/uncle” — is a permanent location, regardless of current biological age or even whether those involved are living or deceased. It also can refer to the life-course phases of, for example, childhood, youth, adulthood and old age and the transitions between them. In 1928 Karl Mannheim introduced another key notion of generation in his essay “The Problem of Generations.” For Mannheim generations or “generational units” were loosely but not strictly age-based groupings which, besides their similarity in age, also shared a social, cultural and particularly political historical experience and defined themselves in terms of that common experience. Not all

demographic cohorts will emerge as “generations for themselves”¹¹ in this sense (Huijsmans 2016: 11–18; Mannheim 1952 [1928]).

While each of these understandings of generation is useful — and some appear in later chapters — the key idea of generation underpinning this book is of generation as *relationships* between individuals and groups in society based on their “social” age or life-course status. Generation in this sense — like gender and class — is a relationship, not a “thing.” Like gender — and like “age” and “sex” when we go beyond purely biological markers — it is socially (and culturally and politically) constructed. In plain language, you are a “child,” “youth” or “adult,” “junior” or “senior” — regardless of your biological age — if society recognizes, defines and treats you as such. This relational understanding helps us to understand how agrarian changes may restructure “generational social landscapes” and vice versa (Huijsmans 2016: 4) and how generational relations (like gender relations) are relations of unequal power, established and reinforced by the social practice of “generationing.”

Generationing ... serves as an exercise of power. This power is not only discursive but also material, shaping people’s economic contributions and access to resources ... It shapes people’s identities (intersecting with other relationships including gender and class), is lived by individuals and groups and has material effects. Inevitably, generationing is contested. (Ansell 2016, 315)

In contexts of “patriarchy” (in the original meaning: the structured power of men over women *and* of old over young generations) and “gerontocracy” (the structured power of old over young generations), intergenerational power relations may have a decisive influence on the social reproduction of agrarian communities. These relationships and related generational inequalities in land rights, decision-making and voice have been largely overlooked in studies conducted from a classical agrarian political economy perspective. We thus need to take a relational approach in studying young people’s experiences with farming and rural life, the social organization of relationships between younger and older generations, and the role of

these relationships in the social reproduction of agrarian communities (Archambault 2014; Berckmoes and White 2016).

The generational replacement of agrarian households involves not only the renewal of their members but also the intergenerational transfers (or the blockage of such transfers) of land and other agrarian resources, including agricultural knowledge and skills. To understand how young people are included in or excluded from entry into farming, we need first to understand the ways in which access to agrarian resources is structured in different societies and also the ways in which the intergenerational transfer of these resources is regulated, with or without tensions and contestations. These transfers may involve both inter- (vertical) and intra- (horizontal) generational tensions. This is the focus of Chapter 4.

Generation studies and youth studies clearly overlap in subject matter and approaches, but they are not the same. The social study of youth, and of childhood, as fields of study in their own right have developed rapidly in the past three decades, with their own journals, competing frameworks and debates (Huijsmans 2016: 3, Tisdall and Punch 2012). But not all studies of childhood and youth are “generational” in the sense explained above. For example, some approaches in youth studies adopt what we may call a focus on youth as “becoming” and others on youth as “being.” The “becoming” focus is reflected in human capital theory and in parental and social expectations of youth: future-oriented, viewing youth as a state of “growing up,” of preparing for and progressing towards (a hopefully successful) adulthood. While no doubt sharing this perspective to some extent, much of youth studies focuses more on the fact that young men and women are also busy “being young”: enjoying youth in the here and now, striving to be successful youth (especially in the eyes of their peers), sometimes desirous of “positional goods,”¹² such as smart phones, motorbikes and designer clothes, and sometimes engaging in what the World Bank (2006) likes to call “risky behaviours.” These two perspectives are complementary, reflecting two faces of childhood and youth which co-exist in tension with each other. Youth studies may also, but do not necessarily, incorporate a focus on young people’s relationships with the adult world, which is a core element in a generational approach.

While lawmakers and statistical agencies have little choice but to define the life phases (childhood, youth and adulthood) by biological age, the age-based categories in common use by United Nations agencies — “child” as 0–17 years, “youth” overlapping with “child” as 15–24 years — are of little use as analytical tools. In their national youth laws and youth policies, different countries define “youth” in widely differing ways. “Youth” starts at age 12 in Mexico, 13 in the UK, 16 in Indonesia and 18 in Bolivia; it ends at age 19 in the UK, 29 in Mexico, 35 in Tanzania and 40 in Malaysia.¹³ These politically established boundaries in turn have little relation to the ages at which the same countries’ laws define various common markers of transition to adulthood, such as the age of criminal responsibility, the end of compulsory education, and the minimum age for admission to employment, for marriage and for the right to vote. In Malaysia, for example, the minimum age of marriage for girls is 16. A woman married at age 16 could thus be a mother by age 17, and if her daughter follows the same pattern a grandmother by age 34 or 35, but still legally a “youth” until she is 40 years of age. If a young teenager wants to commit theft or murder, it would be better to do this in Bolivia, where the age of criminal responsibility begins at age 16, and certainly not in India or Indonesia (ages 7 and 8 respectively). In short, both normative ideas about youth and the actual experiences of young people differ greatly between societies, between social groups within societies and within societies over time.

Youth studies also sees “youth as identity” (Jones 2009: Ch. 3), mindful that young people are not only young, they are young men or women (gendered) and also in most rural contexts “classed,” often also “ethnicized,” sometimes also dis/abled or divided by other markers like religion.¹⁴ Youth and generation must therefore be seen as “intersecting” (as explained above) with other important social categories and therefore embodying multiple identities (Hajdu et al. 2013; Jones 2009; Nayak and Kehily 2013; Wyn and White 1997).

The state of youth may be said to have experienced both prolongation and contraction in recent decades, as social adulthood is in some ways postponed and in others accelerated. In most low- and middle-income countries — and in many richer ones — young people remain enrolled in education longer than their parents did,

and their average age at first marriage is rising, as is also their age of entry into labour markets; these are the three key indicators conventionally used by researchers and policymakers as markers of the transition to adulthood (Durham 2017: 3). But at the same time, particularly through the spread of internet and social media, young people no longer rely on adults (parents, teachers, religious or other community leaders) for their knowledge of, and links to, the outside world, and they engage with globalization and modernity independently of parents or other adults and often in ways that parents and teachers barely understand.

Youth studies also sees “youth as actors” in social, economic and political renewal, rather than as passive objects of adult control and socialization (Jones 2009). Following Mannheim (1952), while “the older generation tends to act as a conservative force, ... each new generation has a radically fresh contact with prevailing conditions that leads towards novel solutions and new trends” (Spencer 1990: 20). At the same time, actor-oriented approaches need also to understand the power of structural environments which limit young people’s agency and room for manoeuvre; like all other social groups they exercise “constrained agency” (Long and van der Ploeg 1994).

Finally, and linked to ideas of young people as actors, one aspect of generational relationships involving youth is the relationship between young people and the (nearly always) adult professional researchers like myself who study and write about them. Youth studies provides an important reminder of the need and the right of young people to be properly researched (Beazley et al. 2009). This means that we need to ask ourselves: will young people be objects, subjects or participants in research? Will our ideas about their situation, experiences and relations with the adult world be obtained directly from them or by proxy from adults? Young people are quite capable of becoming key actors in the process of research if we are willing to do research “with” them rather than just “about” them. In this book, which is based mainly on already-available research, these ideal standards cannot be applied. It is possible, however, to give young men and women “voice” by letting them talk in concrete examples and quotations, wherever the sources allow. I have borne this in mind in the chapters which follow.

Readers may be surprised by my frequent use of extended examples of individual cases. This is partly a response to the point just made, that we should try to let the people about whom this book is written talk to us. It also reflects my belief that concrete illustrations more effectively bring readers in touch with the realities that we are talking about. The examples that appear in each chapter are intentionally drawn from both the global North and global South.¹⁵ Despite the huge differences in agrarian histories, farming technologies, scales and practices between rural communities in such countries as Canada, Burundi, China, Ireland and Indonesia, there are also some surprising similarities in the problems of generational farm succession.

Notes

1. *Jus: Euphorbia heterophylla*, a problem weed which is difficult to get rid of and indicates poor soil.
2. Keynes predicted that by the year 2030, thanks to continuing technological advances, we would all need to work only seventeen hours per week without any loss of productivity, welfare or employment.
3. “Farmer” here means the principal farmer, not the entire farming labour force.
4. With some exceptions at both ends: Vietnam 37, India 48, Japan 70 (Rigg et al. 2019).
5. See for example the way in which the Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies website defines “critical agrarian studies” <http://www.iss.nl/icas_about.html>.
6. The fifth question captures the relational and political side of the property and labour regimes, labour processes and structures of accumulation which Bernstein’s four questions explore.
7. This definition combines those given by Bernstein (2010: 124) and van der Ploeg (2013: 132).
8. The term is from Bernstein (1981).
9. For the distinction between “size” and “scale” in farming, see van der Ploeg (2013).
10. Authors use a range of terms to describe this phenomenon, including occupational multiplicity or diversity, livelihood “bricolage,” diverse and multi-sited livelihoods, diversification for survival (Rigg et al. 2019: 9).
11. The analogy is to “class in itself” vs. “class for itself” in Marxist class analysis.
12. Positional goods (in economics) are goods whose value to the owner

lies mainly in the fact that others do not have them.

13. The examples in this paragraph are taken from <www.youthpolicy.org> (hosted by the German NGO Demokratie & Dialog e.V.), a useful knowledge hub on international youth policies and issues.
14. Paraphrasing Alanen (2016: 159) on intersectionality of childhood.
15. For want of a better term. The alternatives “developed/developing countries,” “first/second/third world” and “minority/majority world” are even less satisfactory.

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Generationing Agrarian Transformations

In their long histories, agrarian societies have experienced many changes in labour regimes and corresponding social divisions of labour and relations between genders and generations. This chapter explores the generational dimensions of different types of agrarian transformation, mainly using extended examples. I pay particular attention to the changing ways in which — and the terms on which — older and younger generations are incorporated in or excluded from access to agrarian resources and livelihoods. This is not always easy, as few studies of agrarian transformations have paid more than passing attention to the generational dimension. I have chosen cases for which there is at least some information available. We look in turn at colonial transformations, socialist and post-socialist transformations, large-scale land grabbing and dispossession, commodification and “green revolutions” in smallholder farming, and agrarian reforms.

Colonial Transformations

To control and profit from agriculture in the colonies, colonizing powers required access to land and labour. The colonial appropriation of indigenous people’s lands was achieved in various ways. These included the taking over of land rights from defeated local rulers and the introduction of Western concepts of property that legitimized the expropriation of land and wealth. Translated into colonial property laws, these ideas rendered all “untitled (but traditionally occupied and used) lands as unowned, and the state, by default, their legal owner” (Alden Wily 2012: 752). This frequently justified the declaration of all “waste” lands — the name wrongly given to lands not under continuous settled occupation and cultivation — as property of the colonial state. In this way indigenous peoples living from foraging, hunting and/or shifting cultivation were deemed unfit to

own property in the emerging, often racialized, regimes of ownership (Bhandar 2018).

Labour regimes, as explained in Chapter 1, are “ways of recruiting/mobilizing labour and organising it in production” (Bernstein 2010: 127). Colonial labour regimes may be divided into two broad categories: “forced” labour and “(semi)-proletarian” labour. Forced labour includes chattel slavery,¹ the imposition of tribute or tax in kind on land-holding peasants, compulsory labour service by peasants and indentured labour. (Semi)-proletarian labour, requiring the partial or complete separation of producers from the means of production, includes combinations of debt bondage and wage labour, marginal peasant farming and wage labour, peasant (petty commodity) production, and complete proletarianization as in the classic plantation form (Bernstein 2010: Ch. 3). Most of the major colonial commodity crops — like sugarcane, coffee, cotton, cocoa, rubber, tea, tobacco and spices — have been grown with more than one, and in some cases with all, of these different labour regimes, at different times and in different places.

Different labour regimes implied different modes of insertion of the labour of young and old, male and female in the colonial economy and different prospects for coming generations. As land was enclosed and cultivators were pushed back into marginal farming on unfertile lands, the combination of peasant poverty and gerontocratic structures often created a pattern of temporary (circular or part-lifetime) migration of younger men and women to work as semi-proletarians in the settler economy. This was the major manner of labour recruitment into the farms, mines and settler households of southern Africa, as shown in the following example from Zimbabwe.

***Patriarchy, Migrant Labour
and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe***

The two major ethnic groups in colonial Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were the Shona and the Ndebele.² In the early colonial years of the late nineteenth century, patriarchal age- and gender-based relations among both groups were the basis on which white settler farmers and other employers gained access to labour. The basic social and economic unit was the “homestead,” a cluster of several

houses. In each house lived a married man (the head or senior male), his wife or wives, their unmarried children, and sometimes also his married son and wife and children, captives and pawns.³ Chiefs made grants of unused land to homestead heads for the extension of their own farming or for their married sons. Men and women cleared the land, the men using hoe or (in some cases from the early twentieth century) plough, and women and daughters the hoe. The bulk of the remaining farm work (planting, weeding and harvesting) was done by women and girls.

Livestock husbandry was also important for domestic consumption, as a medium of exchange and as an object of male accumulation. "With cattle a wealthy man could acquire additional wives and produce additional children. He could lend cattle to a poor man and acquire, in exchange, a pawn or the pledge of the poor man's daughter in marriage" (Grier 2006: 43). Cattle herding was mainly the task of young boys and male adolescents. But not all young herders had a prospect of access to the cattle they herded for the purpose of future bride wealth and marriage.

Control over and rights in children were central to the construction of "senior" and "junior" status. Men might be married with children but still of junior status if they had not paid their bride wealth, and in such cases it was a senior male who could claim control over the labour of their wives and unmarried children. Seniors could determine when and with whom their daughters married and collect the bride-wealth payments, and could determine whether and when their sons married by making (or not making) bride-wealth cattle available. The hierarchical relations between seniors and the various categories of juniors — junior adult males, wives, unmarried children, pawns and captives — were "fraught with tension and conflict, which were often expressed in the form of the flight of young people from the rural areas and their entry into the migrant labour force" (34).

As the colonial settler economy expanded, young men left to work in personal or domestic service, as carriers, miners and farm workers. Some were encouraged by their fathers to go out and earn for the family, but many left independently, welcoming the chance to escape from patriarchal control at home. One main source of

conflict between fathers and daughters was arranged or forced marriage; many girls fled to towns, farms and mission stations to escape marriage and other arrangements whereby senior males effectively sold their labour to other men. Tensions between fathers and sons revolved more around the fathers' control of the means of production (land and cattle) on which they worked, and of reproduction (access to wives, through cattle). Many young men were attracted to migrant labour opportunities by the possibility of gaining some autonomy in their lives and altering power relations within the household with the prospect that they might one day be able to pay their own bride wealth. At the same time, progressive dispossession of native farm and grazing lands and the marginalization of peasant farming on shrinking and infertile reserves pushed the junior members of peasant households into seasonal or circular migration for work on white farms and in the mines. Labour migration of youth, particularly of young men, created problems of control and discipline in both urban and rural areas.

As economic conditions worsened for peasant families during the late 1910s and 1920s, labour tenancies on white-owned farms were replaced by permanent and casual wage labour in many areas. Africans of both genders and all ages then began to seek wage work on nearby white farms. They were often subject to new piece- and task-work systems of labour organization in tobacco, cotton, rice and (from the 1930s onward) tea and coffee farms and plantations. Under the task-work system parents could appropriate the wages of children, who were not individually paid; penalties for failing to complete tasks in the set period of time gave parents a strong incentive to take children with them to the farms. Older children, particularly boys, were likely to rebel and roam around on their own, seeking employment and independent incomes on farms where their parents did not work.

From the 1930s to the 1950s a new form of recruitment of juvenile workers appeared in the form of "farm schools" or "earn-and-learn" schools, in which children and juveniles spent part of the day in the classroom and part in the fields. These schools (day-schools for the children of adult workers, boarding-schools for those recruited independently) were found both on corporate estates and somewhat

later on family-owned farms; the first large boarding school was opened on the estates of the Rhodesia Tea Company in 1930. The schools were on the one hand, a response to African demands for education and on the other, a way of recruiting labour: “Many parents chose the farms on which to work on the basis of whether there was a school for their children” (163). The pupil-workers received free primary education, uniforms, rations and often a small wage. In this way, large farms and plantations could employ large numbers of children without the need for passes or labour contracts, as they were classified as “pupils” rather than “workers.” By the early 1960s there were more than six hundred registered farm schools and hundreds more for which officials had no records. These schools presented rural children with “a Catch-22 situation: they went to school with the hope of escaping unskilled, low-wage manual work when they grew up, but had to perform such work at school in order to get an education” (194).

Many earn-and-learn schools remained in existence into the twenty-first century. “In an ideal world,” wrote Michael Bourdillon and colleagues in 2010, “such schools would not exist. In the world we have, they provide the best available opportunity for many children to receive an education. ... The pupils are very clear on why they are at the school and are aware of both the advantages and disadvantages it holds out for them” (111). In 2012, under international pressure from various anti-“child labour” organizations, the earn-and-learn system was formally discontinued, and within one or two years, most estates had abandoned the earn-and-learn option. Without alternative provisions, this has left many children in worse conditions than before and in a new Catch-22 dilemma; without work they cannot afford to be in school, and if they work they are banned from school (Shumba 2015; Mutanda 2016).

Land, Labour and Generational Relations in Colonial Indonesia

In some colonial regions, labour regimes involved complex interrelations between large-scale plantations and mines in the state-owned “waste” lands and the heavily taxed peasantries in densely settled lowland regions from which the plantations drew their labour force.⁴

Young people were the main targets of plantation labour recruitment, particularly those in the lower (landless and near-landless) strata of the peasant sector. An example of these interactions is the former Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), where young men and women from the lower layers of differentiated agrarian communities, first in China and later in Java, were the focus of recruitment efforts for the plantations of Sumatra.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the different regions of Java were highly stratified rural societies based mainly on different rights to land and labour. These divisions were variable and often complex, but we can speak of three broad agrarian classes: first, a substantial mass without land rights, both itinerant free labourers and those attached in servile relationships to landed peasant households; second, a large mass of peasants — often internally differentiated — with rights to land but with heavy tax and labour obligations attached to those rights; and finally, village officials, who in addition to their own holdings, controlled part of the village land in lieu of salaries, plus rights to the unpaid labour of the landholding peasants to cultivate it.

Landholding, at least in the densely populated lowland regions of permanent cultivation, was most frequently based not on outright ownership but on some form of use-right granted by local rulers against an obligation to perform labour services for both local community and higher authorities. Use-rights to land were often periodically rotated among landholders and these rights were not necessarily hereditary; unfortunately, almost nothing is known about the ways in which young adults were included in, or excluded from, the allocation of land rights. In many regions there were groups called *bujang* (literally “bachelors”), involved in circular migration in search of livelihoods, and this migration sometimes led to settlement in new areas where land was available. The peasant population was highly mobile, and “people moved for many reasons: to escape the burden of compulsory labour, to take up wage labour, to escape harvest failures ..., to open up new agricultural lands, to flee oppression by local officials, or to seek opportunities in the growing towns and cities” (Ricklefs 2007: 18).

Men’s involvement in agricultural production and in fulfilling

labour obligations to local and regional rulers was seasonal and fluctuating, while women's work both in agriculture, handicrafts and small industries, and in domestic labour involved them in a more constant regimen of work. Juvenile household members were also involved in work of many kinds:

Children from a very early age, even five or six years old, participated in productive labour or at least released their elders for it, making themselves busy with such tasks as agricultural labour, guarding fields against birds and other pests, household chores and looking after cattle. By the time children were in their early teens, they were fully engaged in the work cycle of the village — clearing, land preparation, harvesting, water carriage, firewood collection, weaving. (Elson 1994: 10)

One consequence of these gender and generational divisions of labour was that adult men had more time for leisure, which they occupied “in rest, in opium smoking or chewing ... , various forms of gambling, in entertainments such as cockfighting, wrestling, football, top-spinning and kite-flying” (9–10).

Colonial extraction in Java was based first on forced cultivation (1830–1870) and from 1870 onwards on a combination of heavy taxation of the peasantry and export-crop plantations employing “coolie” wage labour, which was largely drawn from landless and near-landless groups in peasant communities. The forced cultivation system basically involved an intensification of the rulers' rights to peasant labour and produce, now geared up to fulfil the demands of both local and colonial rulers (303). One 1851 report from an indigo-growing region estimates that peasant cultivators spent 176 days per year cultivating and delivering indigo, another 76 days working in the local factory and another 60 days in *corvée* labour (labour due to local rulers in lieu of taxes, usually for construction and repair of roads and other infrastructure). This made a total of 312 days of unpaid labour per year per adult male (88); a heavy price to pay for the right to farm and one which obviously placed a premium on the labour-time of women and junior household members to provide the household with a livelihood. The boundary line between child

and adult — as far as labour obligations to community and state were concerned — seems to have been around fourteen years. Many boys and girls below this age, however, were already married, and access to juvenile labour was one of the reasons for this, as newly married men were expected to spend at least a few years, sometimes longer, in their parents-in-law's extended-family household.

Unlike the plantations of Java which drew their workers largely from the surrounding villages, the plantation companies in Sumatra needed to import hundreds of thousands of initially southern Chinese and later Javanese workers, housing and feeding them in estate barracks and binding them with indenture contracts⁵. Under the "coolie contract" system, workers were recruited for a fixed term and subjected to a harsh penal code, under which running away or refusing to work were subject to imprisonment, fines and/or extension of the duration of contract. The plantation companies initially preferred imported Chinese workers for their diligence and skill, but their recruitment costs were high, and by the turn of the twentieth century recruiters turned to rural Java. Mushrooming recruiting agencies in Java advertised the guaranteed delivery of "strapping healthy young men and women" at modest cost, and "labour recruiters descended on Javanese villages luring the young, poor, and even the landed with tales of gold, land, and high wages. Many were simply enticed by 'free' cash advances, and only later were they to learn that these were to be deducted from their monthly earnings" (Stoler 1985: 29). Young women coolies, who made up about 10 percent of the labour force, earned wages only half those of men and were often forced to prostitute themselves to the large population of single male coolies; they were "part of the bait that was used to allure male workers to Deli, and part of the palliative that was supposed to keep them there" (32).

Despite various tactics to ensnare the contracted coolies in debts and persuade them to renew their three-year contracts, each year thousands returned to Java, and in 1911 new legislation phased out indenture and penal sanctions, so that workers could no longer be coerced to remain on the estates. During the last decades of colonial rule recruitment practices shifted towards the recruitment of young families and, therefore, a labour force that would reproduce itself.

In Java at the beginning of the twentieth century, rural children and youth were involved on a large scale in both peasant and plantation agriculture and non-farm work. In rural crafts and small industries, the very low earnings — much less than prevailing agricultural wage rates — meant that all family members had to participate in production to attain a survival income for the household. The hand-woven pandanus hat industry in Tangerang (West Java) produced about ten million hats each year for export, using labour from the impoverished smallholder and landless households in surrounding villages: “In households with no other income sources than hat weaving, all are compelled to help, including very young children and one finds even the tiniest children, still dependent on mothers’ care, already fellow-slaves in the struggle for their daily food” (Pleyte 1911: 59).

At this time, in the first years of the twentieth century, only about one in two hundred Javanese children attended formal school of any kind. With the introduction of the so-called “ethical policy” in 1901 and gradual establishment of village schools from 1907 onwards, some village children had a prospect of education, but by the time of the 1930 census, still only about one-third of Javanese children went to primary school. They attended for only three years and for two and a half hours each day. In Sumatra, the plantation companies made some half-hearted attempts to establish company schools for coolie children, but found that the boys who had learned to read and write tried to leave the estates and find clerical or other jobs elsewhere.

After the ILO introduced its first “child labour” convention in 1919,⁶ the Netherlands government, as a member of the League of Nations, found that it was obliged to apply the convention to its colonies. In 1925 a new ordinance was approved by the Volksraad⁷ regulating child employment and also the night-time employment of women in “industrial establishments.” In 1928, after visiting several villages where tobacco growers lived, Labour Controller Raden Iskandar concluded that banning children from the tobacco packing sheds would not mean they would be hanging around idle.

The young child can look after little brothers and sisters, whose working mother might otherwise have to hire help for this; the

girls can cook rice and vegetables, clean the house and yard, bring meals to the parents [in the fields], gather firewood that otherwise would have to be bought, look for wild vegetables in the fields; the boys can graze the animals or ducks, cut fodder, help their fathers in all stages of rice and tobacco cultivation; many children can earn money selling snacks, serving in foodstalls, or running errands for neighbours. (in de Kat Angelino 1929: 140)

These remarks offer an interesting stereotype of gender divisions among the young and also underline the point that colonial child labour regulation and its enforcement apparatus were not intended to keep children away from the world of work, or from agricultural production, or even from earning money, and certainly not to push them into school — which is hardly mentioned in de Kat Angelino's report — but only to ban them from the world of industry and large-scale, formal sector agro-processing in enclosed buildings.

Socialist and Post-Socialist Transformations: China and the Soviet Union

The twentieth-century socialist revolutions in Russia, China and various other countries led to fundamental changes in structures of access to agrarian resources and livelihoods, in labour regimes and in intergenerational relations.⁸ Agrarian structures in pre-revolutionary Russia (prior to the First World War) and China (prior to the Second World War) were similar to those in other poor rural regions of Europe and Asia. The majority of the population were engaged in household-based agriculture or agricultural labour in differentiated communities including larger and smaller (owner or tenant) farmers and landless labourers. Children and young people grew up in patriarchal households in which their work was an important factor in household survival or prosperity (as we will see in Chayanov's model of the Russian farm household developmental cycle in Chapter 3).

Towards the end of the nineteenth century Russian village youth were often engaged in migrant labour, which drew thousands of young men, and increasingly in the early twentieth century young

women, away from their villages for much of the year. Their contacts with factory and urban life encouraged more assertive behaviour when they returned to the village for the winter festivals. These gatherings “reflected and (towards the end of the century) confronted social differentiation, wealth and status within the village,” as seen in the various “mocking songs, often composed by young peasant women, which discussed economic conditions in the village, corruption among local officials, the rich (*kulaki*) and especially farmers (*khutorianine*) who consolidated their holdings and withdrew from the peasant commune following the Stolypin agrarian reform of 1905–06” (Frank 1991: 716–18).

In China, around the time of the outbreak of civil war in the late 1920s, there was no large class of landless workers, nor a class of very large landlords, but a large, differentiated mass of peasants cultivating smallholdings, about half of whom owned their land while the others were tenants or part-owners/part-tenants on the land of petty local or absentee landlords. The correlation between farm size and family size — found in many countries (see Chapter 3) — was positive and strong in both Russia and China. Consider the results of a survey in Ting Hsien in the 1920s, dividing households into three roughly equal groups by landholding size (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1 Farm Size and Household Size, Ting Hsien, late 1920s

Size of farm	Percent of households	Average Household size
Under 10 mu	33.7	4.7
10–29 mu	32.4	6.4
30 mu and above	33.7	9.6
Average		6.9

Note: One Peking Standard mu is just over 600 square metres (0.06 ha), or 0.15 acres. Source: (Tawney 1966 [1932]: 72 f.n. 1)

Almost two-thirds of peasant households were extended, including relatives beyond the (husband-wife-children) nuclear family. In this patrilineal society, women did not inherit land. Young men, on

marriage, generally remained in the three-generation patriarchal household (Buck 1930: Ch. 9). The family's land remained in the control of the patriarch so long as he lived, and adult children did not gain substantial familial authority even after marriage; they remained subordinate to their parents (and married women to their parents-in-law), particularly their father, until death or disability caused him to relinquish power (Naftali 2016: 23–24).

In both Russia after 1918 and China after 1949, the new revolutionary regimes paid immediate attention to education and new ways of reproducing young generations. In Russia, the new regime quickly established new schools and child health programs, abolishing corporal punishment and forbidding employment below age 14. Communist ideology held that problems of childhood and youth resulted from imperfect social arrangements, poverty and class inequalities and that the state should play an active role in rearing the new generation. Work in school gardens, workshops or factories was a part of school curricula.

Schools organized productive activities ... and the youth groups certainly called on children's work in harvesting grain, helping take care of veterans, making toys and a wide variety of other activities. The goals were to aid the state — not the family economy — while not interfering with the primary educational mission, and to teach the children both relevant skills and the nobility of work itself. (Stearns 2006: 87)

In Russia as in other socialist countries, the introduction of children and youth to productive work was seen as integral to education, not as antagonistic to it. This view — which is well supported by available research — contrasts with the blanket prohibitions on children's employment seen in successive ILO Conventions on Minimum Age for Admission to Employment and campaigns of well-meaning activists for “work-free childhoods” (Bourdillon et al. 2010).

In the Bolshevik project, “youth had to be made communist in every aspect of their daily lives — work, leisure, gender relations, family life,” but there were great disparities between these aspirations and the realities of youth (Gorsuch 2000: 1–2). The Komsomol

(Communist Youth League), founded in 1918, had twice as many members as the Communist Party by the end of the 1920s. By 1926 peasant youth formed close to 60 percent of the membership, and some urban Komsomol leaders were concerned about its expansion to embrace both peasant and worker youth. However, given the vastly greater numbers of peasants than workers, Komsomol members were only about 6 percent of peasant youth compared to more than half of working-class youth (42–48).

Despite changes in law and rhetoric on gender equality in economic, marital and civil rights, the persistent culture of gender difference was a significant factor preventing young women's active participation in Komsomol activities, and some parents, particularly peasants, forbade their daughters to join the Komsomol as it removed the girls from adult control (97–98). Fedor Belov, who was 13 years old at the time of the great post-collectivization famines of 1932–33, provides a glimpse of changing conditions on a relatively successful *kolkhoz* (Soviet commune) in Western Ukraine (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1 A Commune in Western Ukraine

Before the 1918 revolution, the village was dominated by a landlord who owned 10,000 hectares of farm land and 2,000 hectares of forest, 300 oxen, 200 horses and over 100 cows, a brickyard, a lumber mill and several grain mills. Following the chaotic years of the 1914–18 war, the October revolution and ensuing civil war, the land was redistributed with households receiving on average 6 to 7 hectares. There followed several good years with most households producing grain surpluses, and peasants were able to improve their holdings with new buildings, farm implements and growing numbers of cows, horses, beehives, water and windmills. Starting in 1928 the Committee of the Poor and young members of the *Komsomol* began the process of “dekulakization” — the expulsion of prosperous peasants and transfer of their land, inventory and grain surpluses to the commune — with fathers and sons often marching together. The first collective farms were set up, and by the time of the great famines the majority of peasants had been absorbed in collectives.

In the collectives the bulk of the land was held and worked communally, but each peasant household retained a house, a small plot of land and perhaps some livestock. They derived income partly

from their own plots, and partly from their days of obligatory work in the *kolkhoz*. Every adult from age 17 was expected to earn 130 labour-days per year in the collective, and children aged 12–16 50 days. The *kolkhoz* also had to provide a certain number of able-bodied young workers to industry, and young boys and girls to the FZO (Factory Workshop Training) and RU (Trade Schools). The availability of able-bodied young workers in the household — both to earn labour-days in the commune and to work on the household's own plot and livestock — was a major factor in the household's relative prosperity or poverty. With one-third of boys and two-thirds of girls aged 10–16 in school, many households suffered a shortage of labour. In the years of recovery after the famines, a “strong” household would have at least two able-bodied members, a cow, one or two pigs, fifteen to twenty chickens, several swarms of bees and a working homestead plot of a little more than half a hectare. It could sell part of its produce in the market and might even be able to buy such luxuries as a radio, bicycle or gramophone. A “below-average” household, in contrast, would usually lack an able-bodied or young man, and would have little besides the homestead plot and a few chickens. A woman in such a household told Belov:

So you want to know how I live? Just look at me and my four children and everything will be clear to you. My husband was killed at the front. I had a son who was just beginning to help me; they took him away to the Factory Workshop School and left me with four hungry mouths to feed, four children to clothe and send to school ... Yesterday a commission came to the house to collect the taxes ... I suggested that they take the children instead of the taxes, but they refused. (Belov 1956: 178)

In China after 1949, the new regime was determined to construct a new society different from both Western models and the Confucian tradition. Patriarchal controls and the culture of conformity and respect for the aged were seen as responsible for many social problems. Already in the 1930s, in areas controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, land and marriage laws had been passed aiming to give poor women economic independence, equal rights to land and freedom of choice in marriage.

The land reform of the late 1940s and early 1950s granted land titles to women as well as men, and young women were active in

land reform campaigns. However, women's land titles were often turned over to the male family head. "Thus, radical policies concerning gender and land were not generally implemented, or else were partially implemented in a manner not disruptive to household status hierarchies" (Jacobs 2010: 84–85). Residence remained patrilocal, and women joined the production teams at marriage. Under collectivization (1952–1978), the individual's remuneration depended on a combination of the work-points they earned and the collective's overall production result. But various studies conclude that women earned roughly 20–30 percent less than men, due to the gendered valuation of different tasks. Despite these continuing inequalities, the work-point system offered some advantages, and visibility, to women's and girls' work (91).

Education programs placed strong emphasis on curtailing family influence. Huge efforts were made to provide schools (including nursery schools and kindergartens) and to mobilize youth groups, which played important roles as a source of labour in agrarian and other collective enterprises and in political work (Stearns 2006: 89–90). During the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, however, both secondary and tertiary education were severely disrupted (Zhou and Hou 1999: 12–16).

In both Russia and China, socialist reforms and policies weakened structures of patriarchal control in rural society, besides providing the new generations with education, health care and work. School children combined learning with work, which took on a collective character. Despite the huge inefficiency of the collective farms and related famines in both countries, land collectivization did away with the intergenerational perpetuation of inequalities based on land inheritance.

The post-socialist trajectories of Russia, China and other former socialist countries in the past three decades have diverged. In China and Vietnam, for example, transitions from collective to household-based farming, with land tenure based on collective ownership and periodically redistributed individual use-rights, have resulted in relatively egalitarian communities of smallholder farmers. Every individual household member was given a land allocation, which was then credited to the household. These allocations were to be

readjusted every few years to ensure continued equity of holdings. In China however, with the Land Administration Law of 1998, the term of use-rights was increased from fifteen to thirty years; although enacted in gender-blind fashion, this new rigidity has been detrimental to women and has increased female landlessness, especially among young married women, who move to their husbands' village and may have to wait for decades for a re-allocation of land (Jacobs 2010: 94, 101).

As discussed in Chapter 3, rural households and villages in China may develop a "hollowed out" character as young adult women and men migrate to urban employment, leaving grandparents and children in the village. Changing family forms — the growing numbers of both nuclear family households and of "hollow" two-generation grandparent-grandchildren households — have affected authority relations between children, parents and the elderly. Susie Jacobs notes:

Fathers have weakening authority over sons ... as a result of previous household fission. [The hierarchical relationship between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law] still exists, but the nature of this relationship differs within nuclear family settings. Daughters-in-law are still expected to help their mothers-in-law with work, but relations are now more reciprocal, and mothers-in-law may also be asked to assist. The main help given is with childcare, but occasionally assistance with other work — for instance at planting or transplanting time — may be requested. (2010: 99)

In many parts of Russia, in contrast, smallholder farming has not become the dominant form of agricultural production; the promise of rapid economic transformation and creation of "people's capitalism" through privatization proved illusory, and while former collective enterprises might have changed juridical forms, large-scale agriculture remained prevalent (Vorbrugg 2019: 7). Long after de-collectivization, "agriculture is still dominated by the privatized successors of the *kolkhozes* and *sovkhozes*. These large farm enterprises ... occupy the majority of the land and remain the major commercial producers" (Visser 2010: 277). Many of the largest

agricultural companies were originally food-processing or commodity-trading companies which later bought up land and other assets from bankrupt former collective enterprises to ensure their supply base (Vorbrugg 2019). By the early 2000s less than 5 percent of all agricultural production originated from smallholder farms. Agrarian policy remained focused mainly on the large farm enterprise, and it was thought “unlikely that uncontrolled concentration of property in the hands of the *élites* ... will diminish any time soon” (Visser 2010: 287). Those operating household plots continue in a kind of forced symbiosis with the large farm enterprises, keeping a low-paid job in the large enterprise as a means of access to subsidized inputs as well as social services (282–83). Their complaints about the new corporate farm enterprises focus mainly on their failure to keep their promises to improve local socio-economic conditions, the general devaluation of agricultural assets and labour and the disintegration of the institutional and infrastructural conditions to revive agriculture (Vorbrugg 2019). These depressed rural conditions, together with growing consumerism, have provoked large-scale migration of rural youth to the cities in search of better jobs and living conditions.

Moving to the city is an appealing alternative for many young people, but harder to realize for others, who stay due to their attachment to place and people, responsibilities towards elderly family members, or a lack of opportunities elsewhere ... Subsidiary farming, enterprise support and land rent provide a livelihood minimum within low-budget economies, but not in a city. Not infrequently, people return to a village after unsuccessful attempts to settle in a city. In short, people cannot easily rid themselves of the relative disadvantage of agriculture and rural political economies by leaving. (10)

This points to the continuing importance of rural land and family ties for younger generations, despite the devaluation of rural life, if only as fall-back when other alternatives are not available.

The rapid changes taking place in countries experiencing socialist transformation, and their partial reversal during post-socialist transitions, underline the importance of state policies and of larger

political and economic forces in shaping the life course of young people, and intergenerational relations.

Land Grabs and Corporate Farming

From large land grants in ancient Egypt and the Roman Empire to the European enclosures, colonial plantations and most recently corporate land grabs, powerful regimes have allowed, encouraged or themselves engineered the dispossession of smallholders and forest users and the emergence of large-scale landholdings, worked by enslaved people or serfs in the pre-capitalist era and by wage workers or contract farmers under capitalism. Karl Marx, writing on the English enclosures, noted that “land grabbing on a great scale⁹ ... is the first step in creating a field for the establishment of agriculture on a great scale. Hence this subversion of agriculture puts on, at first, the appearance of a political revolution” (1977 [1867]: 470).

Dispossession of smallholders for large-scale farming, plantation agriculture or grasslands may make some provision for smallholders in terms of reduced land allocation, but this is frequently not enough to make a living. It also makes no provision of agrarian resources for the next generation, forcing the dispossessed and most particularly the younger generation into wage labour, either locally or through mass out-migration. This is the process known as “primitive accumulation,” by which non-capitalist social formations are transformed into capitalist ones through the separation of workers from direct access to the means of production and the conversion of land into private property and capital.

While some studies on the gendered dimensions of large-scale land acquisition have appeared in recent years,¹⁰ they remain scarce compared to the explosion of research on other aspects of land grabs. Even less attention has been given, by both researchers and activists, to the generational differences and tensions in rural people’s engagement with dispossession and corporate farming.¹¹ Here we explore one historical and one contemporary case: the Scottish highland clearances, and land grabs for oil palm expansion in Indonesia.

European Enclosures: The Scottish Highland Clearances

In Europe the end of the Middle Ages (late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries) saw the first attacks on peasants' ancient rights of use and joint possession of common lands. Reaching its height in the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, "enclosure" involved the abolition of peasant rights to common grazing lands and other collective rights and the institution of the right to enclose land and cultivate it (through tenants or wage workers), i.e., a large increase in private property in land (Mazoyer and Roudart 2012: 337).

The Scottish "clearances" in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries offer a good example of the final stages of this process. In the highlands and islands of Scotland there were large numbers of small tenants on sub-livelihood holdings, paying rent to a larger and relatively wealthier lease-holding farmer-tenant. These impoverished highland crofters were themselves the product of earlier highland "clearances" in which large landowners had done away with common grazing and arable fields and in many cases forced inland farmers to move to crofting communities in coastal areas, replacing their farms with extensive cattle or sheep grazing systems or vast game parks populated with deer.

These dispossessions, which reached their peak in the 1820s, often left the older generation of crofters and cottars hanging on, despite the onslaught on their land and livelihoods, but still reluctant or unable to leave. The next generation, however, were not willing to accept these straitened conditions and were encouraged — and sometimes forced — to migrate to urban employment in the south or to North America. And in a final saga of dispossession, crofters were simply ordered to leave their houses and farms, which were then converted to grasslands (Davidson 2004; Devine 2006).

In 1883 the Napier Commission's inquiry into the conditions of the crofters of the highlands and islands of Scotland published more than 3300 pages of verbatim testimonies from a variety of actors and observers, both landlords, large tenant farmers, local schoolteachers and clergymen, as well as impoverished crofters and dispossessed workers. The 73-year-old crofter Duncan McDonald of Argyll, in the Scottish Highlands, recalled the saga of dispossession and depopula-

tion in his community, whose population had been reduced to a few shepherds and a farm manager:

When I was a young man there was a laird who was an object of praise for his conduct towards the tenantry and the poor. When that man died the estate was bought by another who promised well, but he remained a good proprietor only for a short time. He deprived us of our peat ground. Then, it appeared, it was his intention to put [live]stock of his own upon the whole estate. ... There have been over 400 or 500 souls there; and over the whole tract there are now only three shepherds and a manager. ... He was sending us away one after the other, and he himself gathering stock which he placed on every place as it became vacant ... When he got the whole place under grass instead of under crops, then he stocked it all, and the people were all away by that time. Those who had the means to take them to America went there, and some went to the large towns. The poorest became labourers to him at 1 shilling a day for the men, and 6 pence for the women¹² ... If they would not go to work for him on these terms, he threatened to pull down the houses of the poor about their ears. (interviewed August 13, 1883, Napier Commission 1884, Vol. III: 2324–2325)

The crofts were designed to provide only a part of the crofters' subsistence needs, forcing them to combine farming with fishing, kelp-harvesting or various forms of wage work to avoid destitution. They were often located on the poorest and most barren soils. As with contemporary dispossessions in many parts of the world, one complaint of the crofters was the drastic deterioration in their diets, as their farms no longer provisioned them.

- Is there a scarcity of milk much more so than prevailed in former times?
- Yes, and of butter. We have lost the butter entirely of late in comparison with the day I have seen.
- Are you obliged to give your children tea now to make up

to some extent for the loss of milk?

- Yes. (John Matheson, crofter, aged 68, Isle of Lewis, interviewed June 6, 1883, Napier Commission 1884 Vol. II: 976)

Another matter I want to lay before you. Whereas my father and grandfather lived upon milk and butter, and flesh and meal, I live upon meal, hot water, and sugar. My father had a croft of £5, and such was the produce of it that not only did we not buy anything, but we were scarcely able to consume the produce at that time. (Malcolm McPhail, crofter, aged 65, Isle of Lewis, interviewed June 6, 1883, Napier Commission 1884, Vol. II: 963)

No land was made available for young couples wanting to marry, forcing them to move out.

There are in the village a large number of young men, married and single, all of them fishermen and naval reserve men, who are compelled to be a burden on their parents, because they cannot obtain land to cultivate, or even a site for a house. There is, for instance, one married man, who built a miserable bothy [a simple one-room hut] on his father's lot, and he had no sooner done so than his father was intimidated by the factor [the person charged with managing large estates] that if his son remained on his lot he (the father) would be forthwith evicted. This is but one instance of very many, and this is all caused by the factor hemming in the people on all sides, to make room for sheep farms. (Angus Patterson, crofter, aged 58, Isle of Lewis, interviewed June 5, 1883, Napier Commission 1884, Vol. II: 957)

Gender and Generation in Contemporary Land Grabs: Oil Palm Expansion in Indonesia

The impacts of, and responses to, corporate land acquisitions in different parts of the world are both gendered and “generationed.” Available studies point to generally negative outcomes for women due to existing inequalities and power asymmetries in access to

resources, voice and more general vulnerabilities (for example, Julia and White 2012; Tsikata and Yaro 2014; Levien 2018). The same applies to many large-scale contract-farming schemes, such as the rapidly expanding oil palm ventures in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In one example from West Kalimantan, Indonesia, land in customary tenure (in which women had their own use-rights to land) was first claimed by the state, then allocated to plantation companies and part of it re-allocated to contract-farmer households as two hectare monocrop oil palm plots; although there was no formal gender restriction on who should be the smallholder participant or what should be the gender of the household head, in practice only the male “head of family” is registered as the smallholder (Julia and White 2012).

Tania Li explored the impact of corporate oil palm expansion in Indonesia on the long term, intergenerational dynamics of dispossession and the linked problem of displacement from opportunities to find decent work. She notes that “the experience of a generation born into conditions of land scarcity is different from that of a generation living on a plantation frontier when new opportunities open up.” Plantation expansion often leaves the original landholders in place, tucked into enclaves on which farmers — like the Scottish crofters — may be able to continue some kind of farming on a reduced scale; the real squeeze begins a generation later, when land in the enclave proves insufficient for the needs of young (would-be) farmers.

[One] reason villagers might agree to release land goes to the heart of intergenerational dynamics. Oil palm companies, alert to the risk of upsetting customary landholders and creating a media spectacle, seldom engage in evictions and they do not take over *all* the villagers’ land. Instead, existing settlements are “enclaved,” left intact surrounded by some farm land. The land may be enough to let the current generation continue to farm as before, or at least to tap their rubber trees and harvest their fruit, though rarely enough to maintain swidden rice production....

It is only later, when the enclaves prove too small to accom-

moderate the needs of the new generation, and surrounding forestland is full of plantations, that customary landholders experience the “grab” as a permanent and complete loss of access to the possibility of farming. As one elder in my research site in Kalimantan explained, “when the company came we thought our land was as big as the sea.” But more companies came. Now his children and grandchildren are landless. They are marooned in a sea of oil palms in which they have no share, and no means of gaining a share, since the price of land in the enclaves and residual pockets of non-plantation land is far beyond their means. (2018: 59)

Intergenerational injustice is “hard-wired” in current practices of large-scale investment in oil palm. Both official discourse and local people’s aspirations embody “cruel optimism” (Berlant 2007) about improved future livelihoods and welfare, infrastructure, smallholder incomes, jobs and education for their children. But these hopes quickly fade as company jobs favour outsiders in all except the lowest-paid and most menial work. Longer-term security in access to land is particularly uncertain, as future land inheritance rights have effectively been surrendered in the letters of agreement which local landholders had to sign. Despite court rulings that recognize customary rights to forest land, these letters state clearly that the land being surrendered and compensated is “state land,” i.e., after the conclusion of the company’s concession period the land will return to the state, with no guarantee of any future return to the use-rights they previously enjoyed (Elmhirst et al. 2018).

A generational perspective thus adds another powerful reason to the argument of Olivier De Schutter (UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food 2008–2014) that large-scale land deals should be seen as the “last and least desirable option” (De Schutter 2011) because they close off the smallholder option, not only for today’s farmers but also for members of the next generation, who face permanent alienation from land on which they, or their children, might want to farm, and in the absence of livelihood opportunities elsewhere (White 2012). However, seen in a longer-term perspective we may not be correct to view the current waves of dispossession and

alienation as “permanent.” In all historical cases of dispossession and large-scale farming except the latest ones, subsequent regimes have opted for economic development and social peace by breaking down these holdings in favour of more efficient smallholder farming (Mazoyer and Roudart 2012). This justifies a focus in research on past, present and hopefully future movements to “grab land back” for new generations of smallholders through local or state-led agrarian reforms, which we will discuss at the end of this chapter.

Commodification and “Green Revolutions” in Smallholder Farming

Kasar was the last person I stopped to visit as I hiked down from the Sulawesi highlands in 2006. He was in terrible shape. His bamboo house was rickety and in danger of collapse. The condition of his son, aged about twelve, was even more alarming. Terribly thin and visibly exhausted, the boy was moving heavy sacks of kapok, the tree crop his father had planted on the hot, dry land he previously used for tobacco. “I tried to plant cacao,” Kasar said, “but this land is not good for cacao and it is the only land I have. Kapok grows OK, but the price is too low.” Even if he cut down his kapok trees, he didn’t have enough land to revert to food production and he couldn’t borrow land for food, as he had in the past, as everyone’s land was full of [cacao] trees.

Kasar was painfully aware that he had no way out, and no future for his children ... I feared that the boy lifting the sacks might not survive. Their house was in the foothills about a one-hour hike from the nearest school on the coast, but unlike his father who hiked up and down to school in the 1970s the boy was so ashamed of his ragged clothing he dropped out at grade three. (Lauje uplands, Sulawesi [Indonesia] after 20 years of cacao “boom,” Li 2014: 1–2)

After exploring the generational impacts of large-scale, radical transformations through large-scale capitalist land grabs, it is good to remind

ourselves that the majority of the world's rural people have felt the embrace of capitalist relations not through sudden episodes of mass dispossession, but through quieter and sometimes almost unseen local processes in which capitalist relations emerge and subject peasants to their dull compulsion. These, rather than spectacular "land grabs," may indeed represent the way in which agrarian capitalism has most commonly developed in history. The commodification of land, labour, farm inputs and produce, and the commodification of subsistence which often accompanies it, set in motion processes of "intimate exclusions" (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011: Ch. 6) and "everyday" accumulation and dispossession. As explained in Chapter 1, classic agrarian political economy calls these processes the "cumulation of advantages and disadvantages" and resulting "differentiation of the peasantry" (Lenin 1960 [1899]) into classes of large proto-capitalist farmers, middle and marginal farmers and landless workers. The classic twentieth-century example of these processes is the "green revolution" in wheat, maize and rice production during the Cold War years.

Green Revolution

"Green revolution" commonly refers to the programs of state-supported intensification and commodification of smallholder food-grain production in Latin America and Asia, in particular during the Cold War years of the 1940s–1970s. Intensification programs were introduced in wheat and maize in Mexico, followed by wheat in India and later rice throughout non-communist Asia. Bilateral (US) and later international (World Bank) agencies, in cooperation with philanthropic donors (the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in particular), supported research and the provision of new inputs and technologies. These included improved hybrid seeds, artificial fertilizers and pesticides and in some cases farm machinery, physical infrastructure (irrigation and farm-to market roads) and institutions (research institutes, extension services, small-farmer credit and price supports). In the already-differentiated peasant societies of Latin America and Asia, characterized by landlordism, widespread landlessness and internal differentiation among peasants, these programs sometimes operated in combination with, and sometimes replaced, anti-communist land reforms (Patel 2012).

What has green-revolution commodification and intensification meant for the shape of smallholder communities and intergenerational dynamics within them? One important dimension is the impact of the new technologies themselves. Mechanization (of land preparation, planting or harvesting) can relieve the work burden on smallholders and in turn the pressure on younger household members to stay in the village to help in farm work. Conversely, for those landless households depending on agricultural wages, mechanization can mean the erosion of young people's capacity to earn money locally. Changing technologies can also mean shifts in the gendered division of labour; for example, as the sickle replaced the finger-knife in rice harvesting in Java, and the harvest — previously exclusively done by women — became open to men and women harvesting together (White 2000). The new technologies also mean a new configuration of the generation and transmission of agricultural knowledge, as cultivators increasingly depend on state research institutions, agribusiness companies and extension services for the needed new knowledge of seed qualities, pest control etc., which previously were the arena of local knowledge passed from (male or female) farmer to farmer and from one generation to the next.

But “green revolution” is more than a matter of new technologies and agricultural knowledge systems. It is, in essence, a particular (and as already noted, partly Cold War driven) moment in the longer process of deepening of commodity relations among smallholders, subjecting them to the “disciplines and compulsions” of market exchange. Green revolutions, then, are instances of a more general process of commodification of smallholder farming.

Generational Impacts of Smallholder Commodification

The first and most important implication of smallholder commodification for intergenerational dynamics stems from the emergence, or sharpening of existing processes, of agrarian differentiation. Agrarian structures based on commodified smallholder farming — when land rights are private and transferable — are inherently unstable, due to the in-built mechanisms of land concentration and agrarian differentiation, which many authors from Lenin onwards have described (White 1989). These internal processes of class differentiation limit

or block smallholder options for some while expanding them for others. For example, a study of rice-producing villages in Java after more than four decades of “green revolution” found that due to the skewed landholding structures, the great majority of young men and women have either no prospect of inheriting land or no prospect of acquiring a farm while still young. Those who come from wealthy land-owning households may look forward to inheriting and owning land, but mainly as a source of income through rent; few have an interest in farming it. They typically go to university or some other form of tertiary education and aim for a future in a secure, salaried job; their parents also have the resources to get them into these jobs (Akatiga and White 2015).

The past decades of commodification of rural economy in Asia, Africa and Latin America have seen many other changes in rural communities as they become relatively less agricultural and less self-contained (Bryceson, Kay and Mooij 2000). Pluriactivity and mobility between places and sectors (especially of young people) are not new but certainly more important than in the past. Land-based surpluses may be used to finance non-farm activities and also migrations, and the proceeds of these movements between places and sectors may in turn be re-invested in land, livestock or agribusiness ventures. And for those who can afford it, investment in children’s education provides the promise of mobility out of physical labour and often out of the village. For the landless and near-landless, non-farm work, whether in the village or outside, is often a crucial supplement to sub-livelihood incomes from farming or farm labour.

Young people’s pluriactivity and plurilocality — their growing mobility between places and sectors — in turn influences patterns of class reproduction. Class reproduction in settled farming communities has historically been largely determined by inheritance of land rights, but the connection between land and class in rural structures today, while it may not have disappeared, is weaker and more blurred than in the past. What does this mean in terms of the changing agrarian structures in which new generations of rural men and women find themselves? Philip Kelly explored the trajectories of class reproduction between older and younger generations in a Philippines peri-urban village (see Box 2.2)

Box 2.2 Class Reproduction in a Philippine Peri-Urban Village

Better transportation, improved education, employment in local industries and overseas migration, and the influx of new migrants to work on farms, in factories or as domestic helpers have meant “a significant change in the economic and social fabric of the village” (Kelly 2012: 231). Average farm holdings remained the same at about 2 hectares and most farmers were tenants, paying rent to absentee owners. But the proportion of the village labour force working in agriculture as primary occupation has declined from 50 to only 14 percent and industrial wages have become a key component of village economy, particularly for young women.

Thirty years ago, one might have expected to find a process of class reproduction that involved intergenerational passages from tenant farmer to tenant farmer, or from landless labourer to landless labourer, or perhaps from overseas worker to overseas worker. Now, however, the class possibilities for the millennial generation are quite different — a growing local economy; an enormous expansion of industrial employment; improving transportation, communications and educational infrastructure; and increasing numbers of residents going overseas. (238)

This all has implications for the class trajectories of the new generation. Beneath the general trend of upward mobility, parents’ class positions in the agrarian economy may no longer determine the opportunities and trajectories of the next generation, but still influence them. There is a positive correlation between the educational outcomes of the earlier generation (which were in turn linked to agrarian class status) and those of the next.

We [now] see agrarian classes reproducing themselves into other sectors that involve quite different class relations.... But the starting place in agrarian class processes does appear to be significant in shaping the class outcomes of the millennial generation. Who ends up with what kind of education and in which kind of work is shaped by the family’s class background in agrarian production. While agrarian production is no longer an important basis for class processes, positions and performances in the millennial generation, this generation got to where they are in part because of the advantages or disadvantages that such a class background bestowed. (248)

If the forces of agrarian differentiation are so in-built in commodified smallholder farming, why has the process in most countries and regions not continued relentlessly into states of “polarization” propelling the next generations into two and only two agrarian classes, large capitalist farmers on the one hand and a landless proletariat on the other? Why have smallholder farms survived at all? To understand the continuing existence and dynamic of smallholder farms in differentiated and commodified rural communities we need to explore both their “centrifugal” and their “centripetal” tendencies, and the resulting “simultaneous occurrence of opposing trends” (Shanin 1972: 76). The centrifugal trends are Lenin’s “cumulation of advantages and disadvantages,” which produces the large landowner and labour-hiring farmer classes on the one hand, and landless and near-landless semi-proletarians on the other, and the emergence of wage relations between them. But this co-exists with various countervailing centripetal “levelling” tendencies, which can include the partitioning of larger holdings through inheritance, the merger of marginal holdings, the emigration of members of the wealthiest and/or the poorest strata, and pluriactivity, which enables the continued existence of sub-livelihood holdings: “The total differentiation-process in a peasant society will be the net sum of the centrifugal and centripetal terms” (117–19), and may be expected to differ between regions due to different local conditions and variable opportunities for sectoral and spatial mobility.

The early twenty-first century saw calls for a “new green revolution,” particularly in Africa, where the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has received substantial funding from the Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. This time, however, in keeping with the age of neoliberal economic policy, state and World Bank support are much less prominent and agribusiness capital more centrally involved (as reflected in Monsanto’s presence on the AGRA board).

The kinds of state support that the original Green Revolution demanded were no longer thinkable uses of [World] Bank funds ... the idea that development assistance might be used for input subsidy, cheap credit or marketing boards had be-

come almost comic within the community of development economists. (Patel 2012: 34)

Generational Dimensions of Land and Agrarian Reforms

Land reforms generally are efforts to correct historical distortions in the allocation of land ownership and use-rights.¹³ These distortions have resulted from the kinds of transformations we describe in this chapter: colonial land grabbing and dispossessions, enclosures, local differentiation processes and landlordism, and previous reforms themselves (such as some forms of socialist collectivization). Land reforms are thus one means of “grabbing land back” for smallholder farming in orderly, state-regulated ways. Land reform objectives also tend to include a broader macro-economic aim of enhancing farm productivity, and reformed land tenure structures are usually expected to promote agrarian transition (whether to capitalist, modernized smallholder or collective systems).

While some historical land reforms have taken land from the poor and given it to the rich, the generally accepted definition of “redistributive” land reform limits it to programs that are intended and likely to redistribute land ownership from large landowners to small farmers and landless agricultural workers (Griffin, Rahman Khan and Ickowitz 2002: 280; Lipton 2010). Most frequently, land reforms have aimed to establish or consolidate a large and solid class of viable, market-oriented and surplus-producing “middle peasants” by imposing maximum ownership limits, redistributing excess holdings to the landless or land-poor and converting tenancy into ownership rights. The post-Second World War reforms carried out under United States influence in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea are typical “success stories” of this model. But it was also the model for the first stages of socialist land reforms (prior to collectivization) in the Soviet Union, China, North Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba and Ethiopia (Lipton 2010: 192–94). Ajit Ghose, summarizing these experiences in the early 1980s, observed “a revitalization of the peasantry is a necessary first step ... irrespective of the nature of the new system: whether it is a capitalist, modernized peasant economy or a collective system.... The immediate task of agrarian reform is

to establish the peasantry as the principal actor on the rural scene” (1983: 17).

In the English language it is common to distinguish “land reforms” (which have the limited aim of altering structures of access to land) from “agrarian reforms,” a more comprehensive approach which besides land reform aims to promote access of smallholder beneficiaries to the various physical and monetary inputs and institutional support (knowledge, credit, markets) which they need to increase productivity and enhance sustainable livelihoods. The land reform vs. agrarian reform distinction is problematic for at least two reasons. First, as Erich and Charlotte Jacoby noted half a century ago, the distinction is untranslatable in many world languages — “land reform in French is *réforme agraire*, and in Spanish *reforma agraria*” (1971: xiv–xv). Second, any successful land reform is necessarily accompanied by the supporting measures mentioned above, if they were not already in place. The notion of “agrarian reform” better serves the purpose of emphasizing the inadequacy of redistributive land reform by itself in bringing about lasting, structural change in the rural economy and society.

Many studies have documented the importance of women’s access to land resources in their own right and the persistence of gender discrimination in land rights policy and practice.¹⁴ The United Nations’ 1979 Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), now ratified by 187 of the UN’s 193 member states, firmly establishes women’s right to “equal treatment in land and agrarian reform as well as in land resettlement schemes” (Article 14(g)). But agrarian reforms have themselves often affected women detrimentally.

State-codified, individual forms of land allocation and resettlement often annihilate women’s customary rights to land. Household-based models of land reform and resettlement programs — which in practice assign titles not to “households” but to “household heads” — usually exclude married women as beneficiaries of redistribution or subsume them under the husband’s title (Jacobs 2010: 43). Gender relations, thus, are affected centrally by agrarian reform policies. “Land reforms are not democratic unless women achieve rights, autonomy and better life chances within them” (192).

Research on the generational dimensions of agrarian reform is still in its infancy. As knowledge of these dynamics progresses, it is likely that we will find a pattern in which young rural women and men are important actors in struggles for locally initiated agrarian reforms or for the implementation of state-led reforms, but find themselves relatively excluded, on both gender and generational lines, as beneficiaries. Just as feminist-informed analysis and policy need to be brought to bear on issues of gender and land rights, generational analysis is needed to understand how land reforms — whether state-led and top-down, or based on local struggles and initiatives — often neglect and exclude younger men and women as potential beneficiaries and future farmers. In one example, Martua Sirait describes the struggle of peasant farmers on “state forest” lands in Ciniti hamlet (Garut District, West Java). Dispossessed of their holdings in 1982, they engaged in seventeen years of struggle to reclaim their land, and finally in 1999 the National Land Board distributed land titles to 458 farmers. Returning to Ciniti some ten years after the land redistribution, Sirait found:

One consequence of this process was that the tillers involved in the reclaiming process were already approaching middle age when they finally received the land. Only a few of the beneficiaries ... passed the land on to their sons and daughters (the second generation). Most retained their control and cultivated the land, or sold a portion of the plots, providing their children with money to pursue their studies or work outside of farming. This tension over the land was felt more strongly in relation to the third generation (grandsons and granddaughters) who were entering productive age Their grandparents either sold the land and gave the money to their parents, or still retained the land and have planted monoculture rubber that is not yet ready to be tapped. This generation feels excluded from the land redistribution program due to the age barrier and their exclusion from work opportunities in the hamlet. (2015: 135)

In several sub-Saharan African countries colonial schemes to transform communal into individual land rights, such as Kenya's

“Swynnerton Plan” in the 1950s, led to many negative outcomes, including the undermining of both women’s and young people’s rights to land (Njoh et al. 2017). These examples put the finger on the problems of all agrarian reform efforts that hinge on the provision of individual property rights in land (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2008; Bromley 2008). Individual titling does not protect the new owners against loss of land rights. By making it easier both to sell land and to use it as collateral on loans, individual titling makes poor people more vulnerable to dispossession. It promotes the speculative purchase of land, increasing its market value, and thus puts acquisition of land out of the reach of smallholders and new generations. The interests of women and of rural youth are more likely — though not guaranteed — to be protected when reforms adopt the principle of collective/community ownership and secure individual use-rights, which as we have seen was the basis of the allocation of land in post-collective China and Vietnam. It is also the principle advocated by Brazil’s landless workers’ movement MST — although only partially implemented, as most beneficiaries want individual rights — and by the global confederation of peasant movements La Via Campesina. In the current climate of growing agrarian inequalities these are important considerations for all those interested to initiate and support a new wave of twenty-first-century agrarian “grabbing land back” reforms.

This chapter takes us some way to understanding the generational implications of “great transformations,” but still leaves us with many questions. As noted in the introduction this is partly a problem of sources, as most of the huge body of research on agrarian transformations has only touched on generational dimensions in passing, if at all. In particular, readers may feel that the cases we have looked at tell us little about the changing internal dynamics of rural households and the processes by which agrarian resources are transmitted — or fail to be transmitted — between the generations. In Chapter 3 we focus on the generational cycles of agrarian households, and in Chapter 4 we take a closer look at the intergenerational transmission of agrarian resources.

Notes

1. In chattel slavery the enslaved individuals are considered complete property and their descendants automatically enslaved.
2. Unless otherwise referenced this summary is based on Grier (2006: Chs. 2, 3 and 4).
3. Shona girls and young women could be pawned by their fathers. If a poor man did not have cattle to pay a fine, to exchange for food or to pay tribute to a patron he could exchange a daughter for a loan of grain, cattle or other items. The pawned daughter then lived with and worked for her father's creditor. If the debtor did not redeem the pawn, the creditor could either marry her himself or marry her off to someone else in exchange for bride wealth (Grier 2006: 62).
4. Unless otherwise referenced this section is drawn from Elson (1994), Pelzer (1978), Stoler (1985), White (2004) and White (2018).
5. Indenture: a labour contract which binds the worker for a specified period (in this case, normally three years). Recruitment frequently involved payment of cash advances (or remission of debts), free passage to the destination and a promise of free repatriation on completion of the contract.
6. ILO Convention no. 5 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Industrial Employment (1919).
7. The colonial "People's Council" in Batavia (now Jakarta).
8. Unless otherwise referenced this section is drawn from Stearns (2006) and the author's earlier summary of these cases in Bourdillon et al. (2010: 55–58).
9. "*Die Landsdiebstahl auf grosser Stufenleitr*" (Marx 1867: 443).
10. See for example Tsikata and Yaro 2014 for Uganda, Julia and White 2012 for Indonesia, White, Park and Julia 2015 for six African and Asian cases, and Levien 2018 for cases from England, the Gambia, Indonesia and India.
11. Two recent exceptions are Li 2018 (discussed later in this chapter), and Senties Portilla 2018 (discussed in Chapter 5).
12. 12 pennies (pence) = 1 shilling
13. Parts of this section are drawn from White et al. (2014)
14. See particularly Agarwal (1994) for South Asia; Deere and de Leal eds. (2001) for Latin America- and Jacobs (2010: Ch. 8) and Tsikata and Golah (2010: Ch. 4 and 5) for cases from sub-Saharan Africa.

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Growing Up Rural

In all human societies the workshop of social reproduction is the domestic group. It is this group which must remain in operation over a stretch of time long enough to rear offspring to the stage of physical and social reproducibility if a society is to maintain itself. (Fortes 1966: 2)

As we have seen in Chapter 1, besides individuals, agrarian classes, gender and generation, *households* are basic building blocks in agrarian communities. This chapter explores the developmental cycles of agrarian households, the dynamics of life-course progressions from childhood to youth, adulthood and old age, and the relationships of autonomy, dependence and interdependence between the generations.

Households

Households are often complex structures. Even when they appear superficially as standard “nuclear family” households (a married couple and their unmarried children only), they may combine distinct and only partly overlapping units of production, consumption and accumulation. Defining “household” is therefore less simple than it may seem at first sight. “Sharing a dwelling,” “pooling income and produce,” “cooking together” or “eating together,” “working together,” “owning property together” are all possible criteria, but the boundaries of units so defined may differ. While the group of people who live under one roof, own and work a farm together, share income, cook and eat together may often coincide in terms of membership, the need to separate these dimensions of “householding” analytically is seen in situations where they do not coincide. This is shown in the following examples of Dayak long-houses in Kalimantan, Indonesia (Box 3.1) and patrilineal housing compounds in the Tiv village of MbaGor, Nigeria (Box 3.2).¹

Box 3.1 A Ngadju Dayak Long-House in Tumbang Gagu, Upper Mentayan River, Kalimantan (Indonesia)

A long-house is a single structure, but those living under its roof do not comprise a “household.” The long-house contains different apartments (dwelling units) and some of these contain more than one “householding unit.”

Seventy-six adults and children live in the long-house, which contains six separate apartments (dwelling units) but eleven householding units (*kabali*), each with their own possessions, consumption budgets and agricultural operations, including labour exchanges. *Kabali* means interchangeably “cooking-pot,” “vagina,” “married couple” and “household,” suggesting that matrifocality and shared consumption are both elements in Ngadju Dayaks’ understanding of householding.

Each [*kabali*] has separate sets of sleeping mats, individual paddy stores and, in the kitchen, different ovens and larders. They keep their clothes-chests and larders padlocked (and sometimes booby-trapped) so that those with whom they share their dwelling or apartment do not have free access to their property. They dine at different sittings.... But, most importantly, households are independently responsible for the support and welfare of their members. Each manages its own swiddens and gardens and has individual responsibilities for decisions concerning the methods it adopts and the occupational relationships members establish in production. (Miles 1976: 71)

Box 3.2 Kyagba’s Housing Compound in MbaGor, Nigeria

The 78 people who live in this compound belong to a single, extended, patrilineal, polygynous “family”: 16 married men, their 40 wives and 22 resident unmarried children. There are 34 dwelling huts, each with its own cooking hearth — so, not each of the 40 wives runs a separate “home.” The compound’s 28 yam fields are divided into six “farm clusters,” each claimed by a married man, although each individual plot (“farm”) is claimed by one of the married women. The whole compound works together on various tasks, but many kinds of smaller groups of both men and women are formed for specific production tasks.

If [one] asks a woman weeding a farm "whose farm is this?" she will say "it is mine."... If however one asks this woman's husband "whose farm is this?" he will say "it is mine." In order to get any further information we must ask "for which wife did you hoe it?" or "who is your compound head?" If we ask the compound head whose farm it is, he will reply "it is mine." To get more precise information one must ask "for which woman did you hoe it?" or "which of your youngsters hoed his wife a farm here?" In these answers are found the cluster of rights in a particular farm. (Bohannon and Bohannon 1968: 81)

The rights of individuals and groups to agricultural produce are complex but clearly defined in this arrangement of nested householding units.

A woman has rights in the farm: she owns and controls most of the produce which is grown on it; she has corresponding obligations to feed her husband and her children from the produce of her farm. Her husband also has rights in the farm: he made it for his wife with the help of some of his kinsmen, millet or beniseed grown on it belongs to him, he will eat from it and pay his tax from it. The compound head has other rights in the farm: he allotted it to the husband for him to make his wife a farm there. (Bohannon and Bohannon 1968: 81)

The relationships between household members (intra-household relationships) include the possibility of surplus appropriation mechanisms between them based on hierarchies of gender and generation, as well as wage and tenancy transactions within households (White 1989: 22; Guyer and Peters 1987), as illustrated in various examples in the following chapters.

Developmental Cycles of Agrarian Households

Households are moving targets; their composition and structure change as members move in and out (through birth, death, marriage and migration) and as each member grows older and moves through the generations. This means we need a dynamic perspective on household "developmental cycles." These cycles comprise the household's *formation* (for example when a couple after marriage acquires their own farmland and sets up an independent dwelling

and production and consumption unit), *expansion* (as new members enter the household, through birth or the arrival of a widowed parent or other relative), *dispersal* (as members move out), *fission* (as the household breaks into two or more units) and *replacement* (as the original household ceases to exist). Some of these stages (fission, replacement) are actually more “moments” than phases, and may occur simultaneously, while households spend longer periods in the phases of expansion and dispersal.

Households with structures more complex than the nuclear form — three-generation households for example — are more common at some stages in the cycle than at others. Differences between societies (or between social classes) in the relative frequency of nuclear vs. extended-family households reflect not so much different cultural types as differences in the length of time households tend to occupy each stage (Fortes 1966; White 1980: 16–22). In the multi-family compounds composed of patrilineal kin in Yen-Liao, Taiwan, Myron Cohen found that tobacco-growing families tended to maintain extended-family structures longer than others, because of their greater potential for economic survival (Cohen 1976).


As noted long ago by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy, every member born into a household first consumes without producing, then starts to contribute to economic activities but still consumes more than they produce, then reaches a point (in youth or early adulthood) where they produce more than they consume, and may later — if surviving to old age — again consume more than they produce (1969: 248). The ageing process, together with culturally determined processes of household recruitment and dispersal, involves households in a series of changes in the number and identities of their members, their age and relationship to one another and their productive capabilities and consumption requirements.

Starting from these elementary facts of life and adding some assumptions about birth rates and the value of an individual’s production and consumption at different ages, the Russian social agronomist A.V. Chayanov (1888–1939) modelled the changing “consumer-worker ratios” of the Russian peasant household in the course of these cycles. He used this model (described in Box 3.3) to

Box 3.3 Chayanov's Model of Changing Consumer-Worker Ratios in the Peasant Family Life Cycle

Chayanov's model starts with a young husband aged 25 and wife aged 20, assigns them a new baby every three years until they have nine children, assumes that all these children survive to adulthood, that children start contributing to the household economy at age 15, and that a female child or adult's consumption and production can be valued at 0.8 of that of their male counterparts. All these assumptions would need to be adjusted to specific realities in different times and places.

Changing consumer-worker ratios in the peasant family life cycle



Based on these assumptions the family's consumer-worker ratio begins at 1.00 on the couple's marriage, rises gradually to 1.94 in the 15th year, then begins to decline as their children begin to contribute work until by the 26th year of their marriage, with nine children between the ages of 0 and 24, it has declined to 1.32; if no further children are born, "as the children grow up the consumer-worker ratio will fall rapidly, approaching unity and reaching it in the thirty-seventh year of the family's existence, provided that none of the sons marry and the old people do not lose their ability to work" (Chayanov 1966 [1925]: 59).

demonstrate that “every family, depending on its age, is in its different phases of development a completely distinct labour machine as regards labour force, consumer worker ratio, and the possibility of applying the principles of complex cooperation” (1966 [1925]: 60).

For Chayanov, these cyclical variations in household labour strength and consumer-worker ratios were a key to understanding variations in farm size. In many rural societies household size and farm size are positively correlated; the causal arrows however can, and often do, point both ways. These ideas triggered a long and often muddled debate between “demographic” and “social” or “class”-based explanations of differentiation in peasant societies, in which Chayanovian and Leninist models are opposed. At the time of Chayanov’s research, in many regions of Russia land was relatively easily available to those who had the necessary labour resources to cultivate it. Household cycles and the expansion and contraction of the household “labour machine” were therefore an important determinant of differences in farm sizes — though for Chayanov not the only one. He acknowledged the co-existence of the “two powerful currents” of social [class] and demographic differentiation processes (van der Ploeg 2013: 74f). In some societies, therefore, household labour strength can be an important determinant of operated farm size, as Chayanov argued for Russia, and of household wealth, as Witold Kula argued for the Polish peasantry: “[Their households] are not larger because they are richer, but on the contrary, richer because larger” (1976: 66). But in the same societies, and many others where landholdings are less flexible, large landholdings may themselves be a cause of larger household size, as wealthy farmer parents tend both to have more surviving children and to keep their adult offspring longer in the household as an extended family, as we note above. Thus, the distribution of household and farm sizes in a community at any point in time is a product of both these currents, and disentangling the social/class and demographic components of the observed differentiation is methodologically a complex task.²

Generational Divisions of Labour

Before the introduction of formal (school) education, work and play were the two main arenas of youthful learning. The widespread involvement of children in economic activity — whether helping parents or working for others or on their own account — is closely related to the emergence of settled farming and pastoralism.

Archaeological work and contemporary studies of foraging (hunter-gatherer) societies suggest that because these societies are relatively efficient in the ratio of food output to human energy inputs, neither adults nor children (male or female) needed to work as hard as they do in agricultural and herding societies. Children in foraging societies seem to play relatively little role in economic activities until their teens, with some exceptions (Lancy 2018: 111–18). It is with the development of settled agriculture, first appearing about ten thousand years ago in some parts of the world and much later in others, that we find work becoming part of the cultural definition of childhood: “The most obvious change that agriculture brought was a reconsideration of children’s utility in work. Much more clearly than in hunting and gathering societies, useful work became the core definition of childhood in most agricultural classes” (Stearns 2006: 11).

The new centrality of work in agricultural childhood and youth also introduced greater intergenerational tensions than had been present in hunting and gathering societies. To get full value from their children’s work, parents “had to retain children’s services until their mid- to late teens ... all agricultural societies developed a strong emphasis on the need to instil obedience in children, and one of the reasons for this was the hope that this quality would last into youth, and provide a rationale for dependent labour in the family economy” (Stearns 2006: 13–14). This is often seen as an important factor in the emergence and persistence of patriarchal, gerontocratic norms and structures in agrarian households and communities; it is also a factor in the emergence of “youth” as a distinct generational category and the prolongation of transition to (social) adulthood as young men and women remain in the parental household long beyond their transition to biological maturity, before marriage and before gaining access to an independent farm.

Adult-youth relations in agrarian households and communities, thus, are based on unequal power relations between the generations. But while harsh discipline is one feature of generational relations within traditional rural households, children and youth are not passive victims of patriarchal structure; they also actively negotiate greater or lesser degrees of autonomy within these structural constraints. Samantha Punch's study of children in the Camacho Valley (southern Bolivia) shows how sons and daughters accept some tasks automatically but also assert a degree of relative autonomy, through strategies of avoidance, coping and intra-household negotiation. As they get older the possibility of out-migration adds another dimension to their search for autonomy (Box 3.4).

Box 3.4 Interdependence Between Generations in Rural Southern Bolivia

In the Camacho Valley, a typical school day involves work both before and after school:

- children wake up between 5.00–6.00 am, put on their old clothes and do a few tasks while their mother makes breakfast, like fetching water and firewood, letting the animals out of their enclosures and feeding and/or milking them.
- after breakfast they wash their faces, change into clean clothes for school and leave about 7.20 am, walking to school which begins at 8.00 am.
- they arrive home from school about 2.00 pm and eat lunch which their mother or an elder sibling has prepared.
- their afternoon tasks may include looking after and feeding animals, helping with agricultural tasks, fetching more water and firewood, looking after younger siblings, washing clothes, or preparing food
- at about 5.00 pm they have a hot drink and a snack
- then the animals have to be brought into the paddocks for the night; this may involve walking quite long distances to round up goats, sheep and cows from the mountainside
- at about 7.00–8.00 pm they have supper, and go to bed shortly after, usually by 9.00 pm

Children carry out many of these chores without question or

hesitation, often taking pride in their contribution to the household. But not all tasks are willingly accepted. Even when parents threaten them with punishment, children develop a repertoire of strategies to handle adult-imposed tasks which they do not want to carry out. One strategy is avoidance: sending a younger sibling to do the job for them, pretending not to hear and wandering off quickly before the request is repeated, or pretending to go and do the job but then just going somewhere else to play with friends. Another is "coping," to make the job more acceptable in their own terms: making their feelings of dissatisfaction openly known, asking a sibling to join them to make the job less boring and more quickly completed, or combining the job with play.

As children get older, they begin to assert a degree of autonomy, underlining the interdependence and negotiability of adult and youthful contributions.

Felicia said to her four children: "Someone has to go and milk the goats. Who's going to go?" The siblings had been assembling their rods to go fishing in the river, and all quickly responded: "not me!" So she chose one of them: "Marco, you go."

Marco (14 years) responded: "no, I'm not going, because yesterday I helped grandfather sow." The children argued amongst themselves and finally 12-year-old Dionisio reluctantly went off; he ran quickly up the hillside, milked the goats and ran back to join his brothers and sister. (Punch 2001: 31)

When Antonio was 13 years old he told his father that he now needed to start earning his own money to be able to buy clothes and save for a second-hand bicycle. His father agreed to give him a small plot of land in return for his help in the fields. Antonio bought peanut seeds by selling a goat that he had been given on his birthday a few years previously. His younger brother helped him with planting and Antonio agreed to give him the harvest from five rows of peanuts. Antonio took pride in his work, which also gave him a sense of control, as he could now choose how to spend his earnings and did not have to wait for his parents to buy him new clothes. (Punch 2011: 156f.)

Most rural young people lack access to land or year-round jobs, so that the available alternative to helping on the family farm

is some form of migrant work. But this can be very intimidating for young people.

Monica (23) moved first to the local town of Tarija, then to the north of Argentina and finally to the capital, Buenos Aires. She acquired her jobs through family contacts and friends, drawing on her own social networks. She describes her first trip to Argentina when she was 17: "At first I didn't like it because I missed my family. I cried a lot and felt very alone, but I stuck it out and stayed. I went because I had always wanted to go to Argentina. I told my parents and my dad let me go." (Punch 2002: 128)

Domingo (14) who works in Pichanal, Argentina, explained "I came to Argentina because in Churquiales you can't earn anything. I've worked lots there [at home] for my family, but they don't pay me. The money is for me and my family." (Punch 2002: 126)

(compiled from Punch 2001, 2002, 2007 and 2011)

Education, De-Skilling and Alienation

As noted in Chapter 1, the generational states of childhood and youth have experienced a prolongation in recent generations. One aspect of this is that each generation spends more years enrolled in school than their parents did. In many rural areas of the world today, for example, we may find grandparents who never went to school or only completed a few years of primary education, parents who completed primary school and maybe lower secondary, while their children are on track to complete secondary school or even some tertiary education.

Before the introduction of formal schooling, rural children had many ways of learning, to acquire the knowledge and skills needed for adult life. In Europe, for example,

peasants and labourers who had little or no schooling were far from being ignorant, depraved, culturally deprived or even illiterate.³ The system of education through "apprenticeship" in the family and the local community did have much to rec-

commend it, besides the freedom to mingle with adults ... it encouraged a less solitary, and hence less stressful, exercise of individual aptitudes. ... And it could readily be tailored to the different career paths that people followed within each family, depending on whether they were male or female, and the oldest son or a younger sibling. (Heywood 2001: 160)

Compulsory education was introduced without much pressure from below. “This does not mean that peasant and working-class families were uninterested in education. Rather, they had their own agenda, which often differed ... from the official one.” Most early education reformers had no problem with the idea that education should reinforce rather than undermine existing social hierarchies and discipline. The motives of parents, in contrast, included “a need for literacy skills in a craft or trade, a desire for religious instruction, and hopes of political emancipation and social mobility” (165–166).

The introduction of schooling was a long drawn-out and uneven process, as shown in the example of France (Box 3. 5).

Box 3.5 Work, School and Alienation in Rural France

Before the introduction of formal schooling, from about the age of 6 children in peasant households could look after younger siblings, fetch water, scare birds from the crops in the field, collect animal dung from the roads, assist an adult with a team of plough animals and be entrusted with *la garde des bestiaux* — minding poultry, pigs, sheep, goats or cattle. The long years of learning *sur le tas* (on the job), watching and helping adults, served as an informal apprenticeship in farming.

Smallholder farmers and farm labourers were among the last groups in French society to send their children to school or to insist on their regular attendance. In the Haut-Dobs region for example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries “children deserted the schools in droves during the summer months and were often absent at other times.”

School curricula were remote from rural realities and local knowledge. Children did not learn about the countryside, its numerous plants and their uses, which were familiar to villagers but

beyond the expertise of teachers. One parent recalled using time truanted from school to learn from a poacher how to move around noiselessly and locate hiding places of game; another lamented that school botany lessons never mentioned the plants that were known to him. School meant to be shut up for five days a week, learning things that had nothing to do with daily life, while anything interesting was happening outside.

In the twentieth century young people's gradual drift into work, characteristic of agrarian societies, yielded to the age set by the bureaucratic state for leaving school and starting work. In the late nineteenth century this was 12 or 13, and after 1936 it was 14. One cost of this transition was "a withdrawal [of children] from the mainstream of the adult world" (Heywood 2007: Ch. 10).

Access to formal, and mainly Western-style, schooling has expanded dramatically since the mid-twentieth century; in the twenty-first century in all regions it is now unusual not to see primary schools in every village and secondary schools, if not in the village, within relatively easy reach. Many rural boys and girls remain in school until their late teens or beyond (Ansell 2015: 309–314; Lancy 2018: 314).

When compulsory schooling has been introduced in rural areas, it has often encountered resistance from both children and their parents. "Schooling seems irrelevant to the lives of children in rural villages — the 'pedagogy' may be atrocious, children may be bored or restless in the classroom, and, most importantly, schooling interferes with children's crucial contributions to the family economy" (Lancy 2018: 215). Where rural children go to school, it does not always displace the arenas of home, work and play but joins them as a (hopefully) additional site of learning (Bourdillon et al. 2010: Ch. 6; Lancy 2018: Ch. 8). As we saw in the case of Bolivia, spending a few hours each day in primary school does not necessarily greatly affect children's work contribution. In contrast, further education involving longer hours and more distant secondary schools may drastically reduce children's work inputs, as well as contributing to their de-skilling in relation to agriculture and other rural survival skills, as an example from Java shows (Box 3.6).

The experience of schooling is highly influential in shaping young people's identities. Since the beginnings of formal school-

Box 3.6 The Prolongation of Childhood and Youth in a Javanese Village

Look, when we were children we used to run around naked — now the children all wear clothes and go to school, and are able to do household chores by the time they are eight years old. (man reminiscing about the 1920s, from the author's field notes October 1973)

Nowadays, in the afternoon or evening after school the children rarely help their parents, they spend their time watching TV. (primary school teacher, 1999, from the author's field notes)

Kaliloro is a densely populated village in Kulon Progo district, Yogyakarta (the southern part of central Java). At the time of my first field study (1972–73) more than one-third of households had no rice fields while a further 40 percent owned less than 0.2 hectares, which at that time was the area needed to produce enough rice to feed a family for a year. All these households were pluriactive, combining farm production and wage-work with various non-farm activities. Based on some oral history work done in the early 1970s and two time-budget studies of children's and adults' work, first in 1973 and again a generation later in 2000, it is possible to construct a fairly reliable picture of changing work contributions of children over three generations.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, very few rural Javanese went to any kind of school. When a *sekolah rakyat* (people's school) was established in villages in the 1920s it became possible for some boys, and a very few girls, to get three years of education in basic numeracy and literacy, Javanese language and some practical skills. School was for only three hours each day and did not greatly interrupt patterns of children's work and play.

My older informants in the early 1970s, recalling their childhoods in the late colonial period (1920s–1940s), mentioned their involvement in many kinds of work. Commonly mentioned were rice planting, weeding and harvesting (mainly girls); maize planting and harvesting (girls and boys); collecting fodder and bathing/grazing livestock (mainly boys); wage work in batik waxing (before its collapse in the 1930s depression) and handloom weaving (1940s–1970s — both of these mainly girls), and various kinds of home-based handicrafts, such as weaving pandanus mats (girls) or split-bamboo mats (girls and boys). Besides these contributions

to farm production and income, children helped with many kinds of domestic work: caring for younger siblings (girls and boys, but mainly girls), fetching water and fuel wood (girls and boys), cooking and other housework (mainly girls). Teenage boys would participate in communal and reciprocal (exchange) labour, sometimes replacing adult men; and children of dependent share tenant or landless worker households were sometimes placed in the households of the landed elite as live-in servants, particularly to work with animals (boys) and to do housework (girls). There was an element of both discipline and patronage in these arrangements.

In the early 1970s, both work and school were considered a normal and proper part of growing up. Virtually all children attended six years of primary school until completion, while more boys than girls attended junior secondary school (often stopping at age 15). But formal education had not yet become disruptive of children's work involvement. Boys and girls of primary school age (6–12) and secondary school age (13–18) made significant contributions in both directly productive and domestic work. Boys and girls aged 6–12 worked for an average of around 30 hours per week; when hours in school are added they were busy with work + school for around 50 hours each week. For teenage boys and girls the gender differences were pronounced: boys spent 39 hours per week in work and a total (work + school) of 58 hours per week, while girls worked for 73 hours per week (as much as their mothers) and were generally no longer in school. Among these landless and small-farm households, more than half of all working hours were contributed by children. Only a minority of these working hours were in agriculture; the importance of children's work lay mainly in their contributions in domestic work, firewood collection, animal care and feeding and (for girls) handicrafts, all necessary tasks in which their contributions freed the labour of adult men and women to engage in agriculture (own farm and wage work), trade and other activities directly productive of income.

By 2000 — a generation later, when these children were grown up and had their own children — education up to age 15 had become virtually universal and the majority of both boys and girls aged 16–18 attended upper secondary; school work (attendance, travel and homework) occupied increasingly more of children's time. Hours of "real" work had correspondingly declined, and this sometimes became a source of tensions between parents and children, although the common parental complaint that children don't help their parents any more is an exaggeration. In the 13–18

age group boys were still contributing 18 hours per week and girls 27 hours per week in various kinds of work, although both boys and girls were spending an average of close to 40 hours per week — which in the West would be regarded as a full-time activity — in school attendance and homework.

While children's work on the farm was not essential, both boys and girls still went to the rice fields at busy periods, particularly at harvest time. During our latest re-study in Kali Loro (2017–18) however, we found that today's teenagers are the first generation who, in many cases, have literally never set foot in their parents' rice fields; the process of de-skilling and alienation from farming is well advanced (White 1976, 2012; White and Margiyatin 2016; White and Wijaya 2019).

ing and the emergence of professional openings in various sectors, young rural people have probably aspired to non-farming futures, and smallholder farmer parents often have the same aspiration for their children. We saw some historical examples of this in Chapter 2. Education itself, as currently practised, contributes to the process of de-skilling of rural youth in that farming skills are neglected and farming itself downgraded as an occupation for those who don't do well in school (Katz 2004). This downgrading of farming futures and of rural life in general is one — but again, not the only — factor in young rural people's apparent aversion to the idea of a farming future, an issue that we consider in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.⁴

On the subject of de-skilling, it is interesting to trace how the idea of the world's young people having a “right to earn a livelihood” has disappeared from international policy discourse. Almost a century ago the young League of Nations, in its Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1924), proclaimed: “The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood ... and must be protected from every form of exploitation.” And again in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): “The child ... must receive a training which will enable it at the right time to earn a livelihood ... and must be protected against every form of exploitation.” This theme however has disappeared in subsequent human rights and child rights conventions. In the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) protection from exploitation is maintained, but

preparation for earning a livelihood is no longer mentioned as a goal of education (White 2005: 324).

The de-skilling of rural youth is made worse by the rigid ideas of many organizations that campaign for the right of children to experience “work free” childhoods, i.e., to complete their childhoods without any experience of the world of work, although various studies have pointed to the value of work in child development and also shown that young people who combine school with part-time work have better chances in labour markets after leaving school (Bourdillon et al. 2010: Ch. 6). Karl Marx abhorred the abuse and exploitation of children under capitalism, but was convinced of the value of part-time work in the lives of children and youth, if combined with education.

We consider the tendency of modern industry to make children and juvenile persons of both sexes co-operate in the great work of social reproduction, as a progressive, sound and legitimate tendency, although under capital it was distorted into an abomination. In a rational state of society every child whatever, from the age of 9 years, ought to become a productive labourer in the same way that no able-bodied adult person ought to be exempted from the general law of nature, viz.: to work in order to be able to eat, and work not only with the brain but with the hands too.

He proposed that the employment of 9–12 year olds, both outside and inside the home, be legally restricted to two hours per day, that of 13–15 year olds to four hours, and that of 16–17 year olds to six hours, and that all employers would be obliged to ensure that children’s work was combined with education for both boys and girls (Marx 1866).

With the de-skilling of educated rural youth comes also a degree of alienation from their families and rural surroundings, as we saw earlier in the historical example from France. Schooling divests families of some of the important functions they formerly held. School, and the age-based peer groups within it, compete with the family for children’s time and involvement, and we see a trend to “increasing

segregation of children from adult society” as children’s activities and adult activities become increasingly disengaged (Hareven 2000: 120). This alienation reflects not only young people’s aversion to helping their parents in farm work, but also their unfulfilled aspirations for a better, more exciting life. In Jaunpur (North India), where today’s youth are first- or second-generation schoolgoers,

parents regularly articulated their relationships with educated youth in terms of a breakdown in communication and respect, and expressed intense disappointment, even bitterness and anger, with their behaviour.... Narratives of failure and disappointment are ... largely about the inability of youth, particularly young men, to secure expected employment and income.... But elders also routinely complain that educated youth resist contributing to household and farming work. Young educated women were described as “wearing fancy clothes” and “not wanting to dirty their hands with cow dung. (Morarji 2016: 228)

In modern Britain, extreme alienation from the land and rural life is reflected in the complaints of teenage girls and boys in a village in the English Midlands. They have no involvement or interest in agriculture and complain about the lack of any chance to earn money in the village, the lack of transport that would allow them to spend time in town, and their exclusion from space to play or hang around as “old geezers” chase them off their land.

[What’s it like here?] Boring. It’s pretty quiet ... There’s no jobs, like, going in the village. You need transport to get out of the village to get a job (Girl, aged 15).

“We can’t go there [a field on the edge of a new housing development]... There’s a big sign up saying KEEP OUT, TRESPASSERS PROSECUTED. We went there once and this guy comes out and starts giving us some verbal” (Boy, aged 13).

“I was walking along with me mates down by the little stream

and this old geezer starts shouting at us ‘GET OFF MY LAND’... Stupid old fool, who does he think he is! It’s just a path by a house” (Girl, aged 14). (Matthews and Tucker 2011: 97–99)

Pluriactivity and Plurilocality

As noted in Chapter 1, one key element in the reproduction and survival of agrarian households — both smallholders and landless workers — is their reliance on a diverse set of activities alongside crop production. Sectoral diversification and spatial mobility — pluriactivity and plurilocality — play key roles in social reproduction, in social differentiation processes and in the life-course of successive generations. In differentiated rural communities large and middle farmers on the one hand, and the near-landless and landless on the other, engage with the non-farm sector in different ways and with different objectives. For a wealthy large-farm or landlord household, agrarian surpluses may be used to invest in relatively more capital-intensive non-farm ventures with correspondingly higher returns (agro-processing, transport, shop keeping, large-scale trading etc.) and the profits from these may in turn be used to invest in further accumulation of land. As in Lenin’s Russia at the end of the nineteenth century these village élites, though a small percentage of households, may control much of the rural economy.

Numerically, the peasant bourgeoisie constitute a small minority of the peasantry, probably not more than one-fifth of the total number of households.... But as to their weight in the sum-total of peasant farming, in the total quantity of means of production belonging to the peasantry, in the total amount of produce raised by the peasantry, the peasant bourgeoisie are undoubtedly predominant. They are the masters of the contemporary countryside. (Lenin 1960 [1899]: 178)

Agrarian surpluses may also be used to finance migration of one or more younger household members (while those without access to surpluses may go into debt to finance a migration), and savings and

remittances from migrant family members may be used to expand landholdings or to provide working farm capital or capital for a non-farm enterprise start-up.

For the landless and marginal farm households, in contrast, it is not capital but unskilled labour that is diverted to non-farm activity, earning very low returns, usually lower than prevailing agricultural wage rates in the struggle to supplement sub-subsistence farm incomes (White 1976). Lenin's description of the livelihoods of the mass of marginal peasant households — "insignificant farming on a patch of land, with the farm in a state of utter ruin ... inability to exist without the sale of labour power ... and extremely low standard of living" (Lenin 1960 [1899]:177–178) — may fit some contemporary situations but not all. Although crop production on very small farms may not itself provide a subsistence income, it can provide a significant part of diversified livelihoods. These tiny farms can be more productive (per hectare) than larger farms and are only sometimes in "a state of utter ruin." Pluriactivity in marginal-farm households can provide good incomes and living standards and does not always or only involve the sale of labour power; it may also involve different kinds of own-account work in petty trade, handicrafts etc.

When young rural men and women migrate on a large scale, often leaving their children in the village to be cared for by grandparents, this creates "hollowed-out" villages and households populated mainly by children and their aged grandparents. This is most vividly seen in many parts of rural China today. Household pluriactivity, both in the village and through out-migration, has long been a feature of rural life in China. China's rapid industrialization has been largely based on cheap labour provided by younger-generation migrants from rural areas. The village still provides an informal security net for the industrial labour force: workers who become sick, unemployed or disabled can return to the village, and the villages take care of those left behind (children, spouses, elderly parents) (van der Ploeg and Ye 2016).

This circular mobility pattern — which we see in less pronounced form in many other countries — has both positive and negative effects on the countryside. Out-migration reduces pressure on the land; migrant remittances help to sustain farming and to improve rural living conditions. The link with farming is maintained over

time. If the urban destination is not too distant, young migrants will return home to help their parents with land preparation and harvesting; others may return when they have accumulated savings and/or when parents die or become infirm and someone has to care for the house and the land. Not all migrants return, but those who do return bring new resources and contribute to rural development (van der Ploeg and Ye 2016: 26, 34). Thus, young people's engagement with non-farm work — whether inside the village or beyond — does not necessarily imply their exodus from farming; it may sometimes be a strategy to make a farming future possible, as illustrated by various examples in Chapters 4 and 5.

On the other hand, migration of young adult men and women creates the “hollowed-out” village and household structures in which “left-behind children” grow up with their grandparents (Ye and Pan Lu 2011; Ye 2011). In a survey of left-behind children in five major out-migration provinces, Ye and Pan Lu found that the care givers were overwhelmingly (69 percent) grandparents, with smaller numbers of stay-behind mothers (19 percent) or fathers (5 percent), and other relatives (4 percent) and a few children who cared for themselves (Ye and Pan Lu 2011: 363). Box 3.7 gives an example of a young girl growing up in such a “split” family.

Box 3.7 Growing Up in a Split Family in Rural China

Yuegang (Szechuan Province) is a typical agrarian village, producing mainly maize, vegetables, citrus fruit and loquat. Farm land availability is very limited, with only 0.5 *mu* (less than 0.1 acre) per person, and about 70 percent of all cash income comes from migrant remittances. More than 80 percent of married migrants have migrated with their partner, leaving their children to be looked after by grandparents.

Nine-year-old Dongyue has lived with her 68-year-old grandmother since she was two years old and her mother stopped breastfeeding her. Her parents both work in an electronics factory. Eager to save money to build a new house in the village, they took Dongyue's two-year-old brother with them to the city but left Dongyue with her grandmother. Once a year, they return home for about a month at Chinese New Year.

Dongyue spends five days a week in a primary boarding school, one hour's walk from the village. Her grandmother takes on the whole responsibility of agricultural production, domestic work and childrearing. Besides planting their own three *mu* of land with maize, fruit and vegetables she has rented one *mu* to grow canola. Remittances from migration have been partly used for investment in farming; besides Dongyue's tuition fees, farm inputs (seed, fertilizer, pesticide) are the top expenditures. In the busy farm seasons she works in the field from 6 a.m. until evening, postponing dinner sometimes until 9 p.m. She does not join the mutual help groups which have been formed to cope with farm labour scarcity, as she feels too old to offer physical help to others. Dongyue has become an important labour supplement, spending much of her weekends collecting firewood, helping in the field or cleaning the house; she has little time for homework or play. Each Saturday night she goes to a neighbour's house to wait for a 10-minute phone call from her parents, who ask her to study hard and help her grandmother.

In most cases Dongyue and her grandmother have had to depend on each other, finding their way to solve problems in agricultural production, emergency and other family issues; increasingly more households in the village are in a similar situation (Pan Lu 2011).

As we have seen in this chapter, with the introduction of formal schooling children and young people growing up in rural areas are likely to be more (or at least longer) educated than their parents. Education, to some extent at least, has displaced work from its central position in children's lives and identities. Or perhaps more correctly, "school work has replaced other work," as the primary and obligatory work of children is no longer to contribute to the livelihood of the household but to acquire knowledge and skills as defined by schoolteachers (Qvortrup 2001; Bourdillon et al. 2010: 115). At the same time, children may become relatively de-skilled with regard to farming and other everyday competences and relatively more segregated from adult society. In commodified and differentiated rural societies children and young people are, of course, also differentiated in terms of lifestyles and possessions. They are however united in one aspect. So long as they occupy dependent positions in their households, no matter how wealthy or poor their parents, or

how great their prospects of inheriting agrarian resources in future, their state of youth is also, for all practical purposes, a state of landlessness. Less than one in ten young rural people in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and in many countries less than one in twenty, own a piece of land (IFAD 2019: 25).

In the next chapter we explore the dynamics of intergenerational transmission of agrarian resources and the negotiations and tensions surrounding these processes as young people “wait for land.”

Notes

1. These examples are discussed in greater detail in White (1980), on which these pages draw.
2. Among the first attempts to do this were Teodor Shanin's (1972) study of the Russian peasantry from 1910 to 1925, and Carmen Deere and Alain de Janvry's (1981) study of demographic and social differentiation among Peruvian peasants.
3. Where schools did not exist or were restricted to elite children, reading and writing skills were sometimes taught by parents to their children and thus passed down from generation to generation.
4. On the “de-skilling” of rural children and youth see Katz (2004).

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Waiting for Land

Each replacement of the older generation by a member of the new calls into question the existence of the peasant household as previously constituted.... Of special importance are the rules governing inheritance, regulating the passage of resources and their control from the old to the young. (Wolf 1966: 73)

Devolution: Modes of Intergenerational Resource Transmission

As we have seen in previous chapters, agrarian societies are typically sites of patriarchy in both gender and generational relations (Ní Laoire 2002; Stearns 2006). With the development of settled agriculture, there came a tendency for increased fertility and greater numbers of children and young people in agrarian households and communities. This is related to the fact that in non-mechanized agriculture, the capacity to produce is highly dependent on the labour force at farmers' disposal; hence, the need for parents to control their children's work, which in turn is reflected in patterns of harsh discipline and cultural emphasis on respect for the older generation. Some historians have claimed that this explains the rise and predominance of patriarchy in agrarian societies worldwide (Stearns 2006: 11–13). Patriarchy here is understood in its original meaning, as the institutionalized hierarchy of male over female *and* of old over young.

Within these patriarchal structures, however, young people are not always passive victims, but exercise a “constrained agency” (see Chapter 1). Previous chapters have discussed ethnographic studies of “traditional” rural ways of growing up in which children who wish to farm (often male, but in some cases also female) negotiate with parents or other adult relatives for a plot of land to farm themselves

or engage in paid work on the farms of others and control to greater or lesser extent the product of their farming work.¹ But in how many countries and regions is it still possible for young people to access agricultural resources and enter into independent agricultural production and earning in the way that these examples show? One reason why young rural people express a reluctance to farm may reflect their aversion not to farming as such, but to the long period of waiting that they face before they have a chance to engage in independent farming.

This chapter first looks briefly at different modes of intergenerational transmission of agrarian resources, both before and after the death of the resource holder. It then explores the intergenerational and intragenerational negotiations, conflicts and tensions involved in these processes, using case studies from Europe, Africa and Asia. It includes a section on gender, in intersection with generation and class, as a key mechanism of structural exclusion in intergenerational transfers.

Among small-scale agriculturalists and pastoralists — in contrast to shifting horticulturalists and foraging peoples — the intergenerational transmission of resources plays a key role in perpetuating and strengthening inequalities (Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009; Shenk et al. 2010). The character of property in land makes its transmission between generations a “key to the high and persistent levels of inequality seen in societies practicing intensive agriculture” (Shenk et al. 2010: 65). These issues bring us back to some classic studies and debates on intergenerational transmission of agrarian resources, which mainly focused on Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. The work of Jack Goody and his peers on this theme in the 1970s was particularly important (Goody 1971; Goody 1976; Goody et al. 1976).

The transmission of agrarian resources through inheritance (in its narrow sense of transmission after death) is the last phase in an often longer process of transfer of resources from one generation to the next. The larger process, which includes transfers made before death, is known as “devolution” (Goody 1976). Devolution takes a bewildering variety of forms around the world. First, the nature of the rights transferred (various kinds of ownership-like and use-rights) varies from place to place and over time. It can include rights not

only over land and other agrarian resources but also over people, for example wives (as we will see in an example from Burkina Faso in Box 4.1) or slaves. Second, although devolution generally flows in a vertical rather than lateral direction (looking for one or more heirs in the next descending generation, rather than among siblings or cousins in the same generation), there are multiple ways of regulating who in the next generation are eligible as heirs: patrilineal, matrilineal or ambilineal (whether inheritance passes through the male or female line or through both), partible or impartible (whether property can be divided among heirs or devolves undivided to a single heir) and in impartible inheritance, whether preference is given to the eldest or youngest heir (primo- or ultimo-geniture) or simply to a designated heir regardless of birth order.

Inheritance laws and practices are “much more than the transmission of (rights to) material property at death; [they] involve the reproduction of rights, obligations and feelings between relatives as well as the reproduction of property relations, and hence social hierarchies based on gender and class” (Rahman and van Schendel 1997: 239). In looking at patterns and practices of intergenerational transfer we must distinguish “law,” “custom” and actual practice. We must also be aware that “custom” and practice may not only differ from each other but also — however long-standing and entrenched they are claimed to be — change over time. This is well illustrated in Cole and Wolf’s classic study comparing German- and Romance-speaking communities in Italy’s southern Tyrol more than half a century ago. At that time, impartible inheritance with male primogeniture was both ideal and actual practice among the German-speakers, as it was among Bavarians across the border (Wolf 1970), while just a short distance away among the Romance-speakers, inheritance was partible and ambilineal, i.e., sons and daughters inherited equally (Cole and Wolf 1974). Revisiting the German speakers of St. Felix two decades later, Cole was surprised to find the inheritance system transformed from male primogeniture to female ultimogeniture, “and villagers told the ethnographer this had always been their custom” (Hann 2008: 151, citing Cole 2003).

Intergenerational and Intragenerational Tensions

The potential conflict between father and son in Mossi society stems from the structure of that society, especially its system of inheritance. (Skinner 1961: 60)

Intergenerational and intragenerational frictions regarding the transfer of land or other assets from one generation to the next are not new. The desire of ageing parents to keep the household together under their authority by retaining control of family assets, and the competing desire of children to receive their share of these assets, form their own households and attain the status of economic and social adulthood, are such a common feature of agrarian societies that it is surprising how neglected it has been in recent research, with the partial exception of sub-Saharan Africa.

We can find plenty of examples in the history of European peasant societies. The very low *average* life expectancy in these societies should not mislead us into thinking that all or even most parents died early and their land therefore became available to their children while they were still young. Differences in average life expectancy at birth are to a large extent due to differences in neonatal, infant and child mortality, not among those who survive to adulthood. Surviving adults thus tended to live far beyond the average life expectancy in the society, as in this example from fifteenth-century Tuscany.

From the point of view of the younger generation, old people often lived for a distressingly long time. For example, in the rural areas around Florence in 1427, 17.5 percent of the population were more than 57 years old.... Most old men kept a firm grasp on the management of the family farm until they became senile or died. This meant that young potential heirs had to wait around until they were 45 or 50 before they could come into their inheritance. (Watts 1984: 59)

In rural Ireland in the 1930s “even at forty-five and fifty, if the couple have not yet made over the farm, the countryman remains a ‘boy’ in respect to farm work and in the rural vocabulary.” This dis-

cursive “juvenalization” of (biological) adults into their middle age is understandable in view of the alternative, since “at the transfer of land, all vestiges of strict parental control are destroyed ... parents can no longer demand the services of their children” (Arensberg and Kimball 1968: 40). This encapsulates the dilemma of ageing farmers and of their adolescent or young adult children, which in Europe was often resolved by the signing of formal contracts between parents and children.

In addition, there are timing problems. For various reasons, post-mortem succession may not be the best strategy ... it may tempt the junior generation to take it all too violently into their own hands as they tire of waiting to come into their own. ... In Finland, as elsewhere in northern Europe, a common solution to these difficulties has been intergenerational agreements whereby an heir takes over from one or both living parents ... the use of a written contract to effect the *inter vivos* transfer of a farm has a long history. (Abrahams 1990: 157–58)

Elderly people who retained control of the means of production were thus in a position to frustrate the ambitions of youth. Not surprisingly, then, young people regarded their elders with ambivalence. But the attitude was also mutual. When elderly peasants did transfer control of land to their children, they felt it necessary to safeguard their position against the loss of power and livelihood. In seventeenth century Calenberg (Lower Saxony), if legal transfer of the farm to the heir was made during the lifetime of the parents, they made a contract called *Leibzucht*. “The retirement contract usually stipulated that the heir would provide a defined amount of food, shelter and clothing for the retired parents, and it guaranteed them the produce or income from certain parts of the farm” (Berkner 1976: 78). In fifteenth-century Languedoc (France),

special clauses were inserted in the contracts in order to forestall the revolts that were always brewing against the old man of the house. A contract ... specified that the grandfather’s bed was sacred, as was his ration of food. Cursed be the young

couple who would sell the one or reduce the other! And cursed be the grandchild who would sell his grandmother's bedstead and bedspread! (Le Roy Ladurie 1974: 33)

Contemporary examples are rarely so dramatic. Intergenerational tensions are always potentially present and at times may surface in open disputes or conflict, but they are more often masked with silence, avoidance and a normative rhetoric of filial piety and respect for the elderly. One dramatic example of inheritance-related silence and avoidance is provided by Elliot Skinner's study of the Mossi of Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), two generations ago (Box 4.1).

Box 4.1 Father-Son Conflict among the Mossi, in Burkina Faso

Mossi fathers believe that since they are responsible for the birth of their sons, they have the right to command all of their sons' goods and services. Implicit here, but not often stated, is the understanding that the sons, in turn, will inherit the father's goods.

The wives who normally devolve to a man either through inheritance or through marriage partners during the developmental cycle of the extended family are the source of actual or potential conflict between sons and fathers.

Marriage partnerships are arranged between men who establish "friendly" relationships and exchange women as wives. Since it is mainly older men who have women and goods at their disposal and can make "friends," young men usually lack wives. Young men are required to treat their fathers' wives with the greatest respect and formality, but this strict relationship is constantly undermined by the realization by both the boys and the women that some day they may be married to each other. To avoid unnecessary encounters between them, the Mossi practice a system of avoidance.

Mossi fathers are so sensitive about being eventually replaced by their sons that they often resent the boys' growth and development. The first son is the target of this fear and hostility because he is the one who will benefit most from his father's death.... Once when I asked a chief why his eldest son sat far away from him while his younger sons sat near by, he said, "Since he is going to inherit everything I own when I die, why should he come close to me now?"

Although it is considered a sign of filial perfidy for a son to yearn for the death of his father — and no one would openly voice

such a desire — the Mossi say that some young men “just wait for their fathers to die.” The death of a father, whether wished for or not, does give a man wives and property.

Even after death the antagonism between father and son is not laid to rest. [The son] must still indicate that he has not usurped his father’s property and so must ritually leave his father access to it. For example, if a son decides to take over his father’s compound instead of building a new one, he has to close the gate his father used and open one for himself. Similarly, if he takes his father’s wives he must close up the doors in their huts which his father used to use when he went to visit them, and open new doors (Skinner 1961: 56–59).

Turning to less dramatic examples, it seems commonplace — although few studies have explored this — that arrangements for the future transmission of farm land are a taboo subject for discussion between parents and their prospective heirs. In Ireland, where the traditional farm succession model is patrilineal and impartible, Anne Cassidy studied “non-normative” (female) potential farm successors. In three of the four cases presented in detail, although the farmer couple were ageing and their children already young adults, succession had not been discussed. One of Cassidy’s respondents was Aisling, a PhD student in her mid-20s and one of three daughters, whose parents had a dairy farm (Box 4.2).

Box 4.2 An Irish Daughter’s Farm Succession Dilemma

Among her family, Aisling positioned herself as having the greatest sense of responsibility towards the farm’s future and would not countenance selling the land. She had a strong relationship with the farm in early childhood and regularly helped out, including driving tractors and feeding animals. As she grew older her interest in spending time on the farm began to wane ... [but] as an adult her interest in the practical side of farming began to re-emerge due in part to a looming sense of responsibility towards the holding. She did not appear to have an issue with the idea of being a farmer because of her gender but rather because she had no personal interest in taking on this role.

Any possible plans for the farm were complicated by the fact that her elderly grandmother who lived on the holding was deeply

immersed in the functional life of the farm and would be distraught if changes were to take place. The succession issue appeared to shadow her, with an impact on decisions about where she might live and work.

I suppose I don't know if I have such a huge interest in farming as such ... but at the same time the thought of like ...the farm being left there and nothing happening to ... it's just left there and not being worked anymore. I'd just hate the thought of that too.

This dilemma was complicated by her family's refusal to discuss the future of the farm despite Aisling's repeated attempts to engage them on the subject. Instead, they appeared to prefer postponing the decision to an indeterminate date (Cassidy 2019: 243–245).

In another case, Joan — one of three daughters of cattle- and poultry-farming parents and a university student — had been assigned the label of the “farmer” by her “mildly authoritarian” father in her childhood, and she had done all kinds of tasks including those normally categorized as “men's work.”

Joan had a somewhat complicated relationship with the farm. ... Although she has moved away to attend university she continued to be involved [in helping on the farm] largely because of a sense of guilt and to repay her parents for financially supporting her education. Despite being the likely candidate to succeed, Joan does not know who her parents should leave the land to, because neither she nor her sisters want to take it on. She felt that she would be the most likely one to succeed because of her role as the “farmer.” However, she did not want it and ... she would not take over the farm.

As in two of the other families, succession had not been discussed. Despite this silence Joan did feel that her father would want the farm to be kept in the family. (Cassidy 2019: 245–46)

In 2015, a pilot project offered advice on farm succession to dairy farmers in a dairy farming region of southeastern Victoria

(Australia). In several cases, the ageing farm couple seemed unable to communicate with their children about their hopes and fears around the farm succession and needed the project advisor's mediation to learn about their children's aspirations.

I've got a plan that I wanted to get out of the dairy by the time I turn 70, which is four years away, and [I needed] to find out whether either son — I've got two sons — would want to take over the farm. (Greg, Case 1)

I was conscious of the fact that as a family we'd never really talked about [our children's aspirations in relation to the farm]. (Simon, Case 10)

You have to be upfront and you have to think about things that maybe some people don't want to think about really... It's very easy to put it in the too hard basket. (Anne, Case 10)
(Santhanam-Martin, Bridge and Stevens 2019: 263–64)

Tensions revolving around young men's and women's access to land become felt, as may be expected, mainly when land frontiers are closed and young people no longer have the opportunity to clear land for new farms and depend on parents and lineage or community elders for access to land. Julian Quan describes changes in intra-family land relations in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa as young would-be farmers face constraints in access to land: "Limitations in young people's access to land, land concentration, and land sales and allocations outside the kin group by older generations can become highly problematic where alternative livelihoods are not available, and can trigger wide social conflicts" (Quan 2007: 57). These tensions are further accentuated with agrarian commodification, as parents and elders have the option of selling or leasing out land rather than passing it on to the next generation. An example of such a conflict in Côte d'Ivoire was briefly mentioned on the first page of this book and deserves more detail here (Box 4.3).

Kojo Amanor (2005) provides a similar example from south-eastern Ghana, where young people, frustrated at the difficulty of obtaining land now that so much of it had been given over to the

Box 4.3 Intra-Family Land Conflicts in Abure Communities of Côte d'Ivoire.

In Abure society, the kinship system is matrilineal and rights and duties related to land and other property are transmitted within the maternal family. The norm is that on a landholder's death "inheritance goes in priority to the uterine brothers of the deceased until the exhaustion of this generation, then to the uterine nephews." In fact, it is the family council that designates the heir (Kouamé 2010: 129), and this is marked by "strong contestation surrounding the question of succession to the role of family heir" (127). The heir has no right to sell inherited land, but can delegate use-rights within the matrilineage.

The rise of pineapple cultivation from the 1950s onwards led to an influx of Burkinabe labourers and smallholders leasing land on fixed payment or sharecropping basis; the right to lease out land for cash is the prerogative of the heir, but those enjoying use-rights can lease out their plots on sharecropping contracts. The leasing out of family land is a source of intra-family tensions between elders and "youth," both because this reduces the land available to them to farm and because they do not get a fair share of the lease income. "Youth" here is not a matter of biological age, and can include both household heads and unmarried men (133 n.8).

When the old men give us land, it is too small. They prefer to rent more to the Burkinabes rather than to let us work it...

When the old men rent the land, they take this money to provide for their daily needs and to sleep with girls. (134)

In 2001 conflicts broke out between Abure young men and the Burkinabe tenants. The young men proclaimed a ban on the leasing of land to foreigners, destroyed pineapple plantations and planted red flags on plots being prepared for a plantation as a warning that if the plot were to be planted, it would be destroyed (136).

Ghana Oil Palm Development Company, engaged in night-time harvesting of oil palm kernels: they argued that the land belonged to them anyway and was taken away unfairly, so they had a right to harvest the fruits. Succeeding phases of the rise and subsequent decline of agricultural frontiers have affected labour migrations and

the valuation and commodification of land, leading to social conflicts between autochthones and migrants, chiefs and commoners, youth and elders, and between family members. In the initial phase, land was plentiful and labour scarce. As agriculture expands and migrants flow in, sales of land are increasingly replaced with leasing and sharecropping arrangements. Then as the frontier declines and surplus labour emerges among labour migrants and family youth,

the chiefs and elders ... can now play off migrant labour against the local youth ... youth are increasingly dependent upon elders for land, since they cannot go out and clear virgin forests ... and they are no longer guaranteed access to family land. This leads to conflicts and friction between local youth and migrants.... This eventually leads to a crisis.... Migrant labourers move away to newer frontier areas.... The local youth also withdraw their labour services from family farms, since they are not guaranteed a share of the property they have created through their labour. They increasingly work as labourers and sharecroppers, outside of their family land ... farming becomes an individual pursuit and sharecropping replaces the transmission of land between family members. (Amanor 2010: 106–07)

In commodified smallholder settings, cash leasing or share tenancy contracts between parents and their adult children seem to be common, as in the case of Yaya from the village of Kaliloro in Java (Indonesia) (Box 4.4).

Box 4.4 Yaya, a Sharecropper on Her Father-in-Law's Land

Yaya, an orphan from age five, started paid work at age 12 but was helped by her employer to complete vocational secondary school. After finishing school she left the village, working in various urban jobs and returned to the village when she was 20 to marry Jarwo. She is now 24 and has a son aged four years. Yaya — who is for all practical purposes the farm manager — has no land of any kind in her own right and depends completely on access to her father-in-law's land. He owns only 700 m² (0.07 ha) of irrigated rice land,

but as head of the neighbourhood he has access to 0.6 ha. of village-owned land in lieu of salary.

After she had been married for two years and had learned farming skills helping in her father-in-law's fields and working for wages on other farms, he offered them the use of 1000 m² of his salary-land, which previously had been cultivated by a neighbouring tenant. And besides this, since becoming too sick to farm, he has asked them to take on cultivation of his own 700 m² field, which he inherited from Jarwo's grandfather. They do all the work on this plot and provide all the cash inputs, but hand over the entire harvest without getting a share. This year, he has allowed them to become share tenants on another 700 m² plot from his salary-land, as he was not satisfied with the previous tenant.

"So," she explained, "we have three plots altogether, all of them from Jarwo's father." They cultivate a rice-farm of 0.24 ha, but receive only the harvest from the 1000 m² plot (which they do not sell but keep for their own use), half of the money from the sale of the harvest from the share-tenanted 700 m² and nothing from the third plot of 700 m². Yaya clearly does not find this arrangement fair: "We do all the work and pay all the costs, but when we join the harvest we only get a 1/6 share of what we harvest, like the other harvest workers, that's 3–4 kg of rice. But what can I do, I can't protest" (field notes from the "Becoming a young farmer' research project).

Intersections of Gender, Generation and Class: Structural Exclusions in Intergenerational Transfers

We have lived through centuries of deciding farm succession mostly on grounds of tradition rather than suitability or aptitude. Maybe now is the time to draw on and reward all the families' resources and that means counting in the daughters. (Schwarz 2004: 222)

Are you suggesting that women be given rights to land? What do women want? To break up the family? (India's Minister of Agriculture, responding to Bina Agarwal's submission to the Indian Planning Commission on Land Reform, June 1989, quoted in Agarwal 1994: 281)

Gender is a key mechanism of structural exclusion in intergenerational transfers. Virtually all UN member states have ratified the UN's 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which stipulates that men and women must have "the same rights ... in respect of the ownership, management, acquisition and disposition of property" (Article 6[h]). But in many (not all) countries "women suffer extreme prejudice in succession and inheritance; they are likely to succeed only when 'normal' systems for intergenerational transfer of property rights break down" (Symes 1990: 280). The UN Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that in developing countries today, women comprise only 20 percent of all landholders and when they do control land, they tend to have smaller plots of lower quality land (FAO 2011).

In eastern Twente (The Netherlands), farmers maintained a system of impartible inheritance long after state law had decreed equal rights for all siblings (Hann 2008: 150, citing de Haan 1994). Like the Cole and Wolf re-study mentioned earlier in this chapter, this again reminds us to distinguish "lawyer's law" and "living law" (actual custom and practice). In her landmark study *A Field of One's Own* Bina Agarwal underlined the need to distinguish between "legal" and "social" recognition of claims to land, between recognition and its enforcement, and between land ownership and effective control of land. By "control" she understands women's ability to take decisions regarding the use and disposal of land, to manage its cultivation themselves and to dispose of its produce: "None of these forms of control is guaranteed to a woman by virtue of legal ownership alone" (Agarwal 1994: 19, 292).

A comparative study of inheritance laws and practices in seven African and Asian majority-Muslim countries² shows the complex nature and interaction of law and custom. While Muslim inheritance laws on the one hand tend to discriminate against women — often interpreted as prescribing that daughters should inherit half the share of sons — progressive interpretations say that these laws actually were introduced to protect women's rights, recognizing women as competent heirs who can inherit property absolutely in their own right and providing a safeguard to widows and children against complete disinheritance. But within countries where such laws for-

mally prevail, actual practice may range from providing daughters with equal shares (as in parts of Indonesia) to pressuring or driving daughters and widows out of their share of the inheritance (as in parts of Bangladesh) (Khan 2016).

Gender-based exclusion from access to land often persists even when national laws and religious rules on land and inheritance prohibit it. In the Muslim village of Monglarpapa, Bangladesh (where state laws on inheritance depend on religion), inheritance follows the Hanafi system of partible inheritance, individual property rights and inheritance on the basis of kinship or marriage but ignores it in one respect: it does not acknowledge the right of women to inherit land, acknowledging only “women’s inheritable entitlement to maintenance.” “Women ‘inherited’ and ‘owned’ land merely in a symbolic way, as a token of their lifelong right to maintenance. They were not supposed to take possession of it” (Rahman and van Schendel 1997: 264).

In most parts of Indonesia both male and female heirs can inherit land and other family property, but there are notable exceptions, such as West Manggarai district, Flores, where women cannot inherit.³ In a village in this district, Grace (33 years old, married with a four-year-old daughter) describes the insecurity she faces as a young woman farmer, being completely dependent on the consent and good will of her male kin — particularly her two younger brothers — for access to land (Box 4.5).

Box 4.5 Grace, a Young Woman Farmer Without Land Rights

Grace began helping in the rice fields when she was almost 10 years old and still in primary school. After completing Lower Secondary School she had a job in [the district capital] Labuan Bajo for two years, as a waitress in a café. This was her only experience of migration. When both her brothers moved away from home she returned to the village to live with her parents. Besides helping with various kinds of farm (rice field) work, she also worked for wages on other farms.

Grace’s husband comes from Ruteng, in the neighbouring district. In contrast to Java and many other regions of Indonesia, women in Manggarai do not have inheritance rights to their parent’s

land, or the house, and according to local custom women should move to their husband's village after marriage.

However, a woman can sometimes get access to the family's land if the father asks her to remain in his village after marriage (so the husband then moves to her village), or if she agrees to marry a cousin (in order to preserve the lineage). But she can only access land in these ways if her father and all her male relatives agree. This is what happened in Grace's case. She manages both *pekarangan* (residential land) and a 0.5 hectare *kebun* (mixed garden) planted with candlenut and coffee, given by her father. She agreed to her father's request to remain in the village after marriage, and her two brothers agreed that their father could give her use-right to a part of their land (1875 m² of rice fields), which belonged to her youngest brother Roni. He was willing to release the land because he is living far away in Bali. "I was given the land to farm immediately, but not as owner; I was given it because I was not given permission to leave the village."

She cultivates the land on a share-crop basis and the harvest is shared between her parents, Roni and herself. Her father provides part of the cultivation costs, while she provides the other costs and labour up to harvest, and her brother Roni makes no contribution. Grace uses all of her share for her own household's consumption.

Grace does almost all the work of rice cultivation, from making the nursery, sowing and transplanting, to applying fertilizer, weeding and harvesting. Her husband is normally employed as a construction worker and only occasionally helps in the garden or the rice fields. The *kebun* doesn't need much work, as the candlenut and coffee trees are decades old and only require work at harvest time.

Grace has no expectation of buying land, either for farming or to build a house, as land prices have risen very fast in the past ten years. She is also aware that local custom allows her brothers or uncles to re-claim the land that was given to her, once her father has passed away. This is what has made her to try to secure her gift of land from her father, part of which they have used to build their house. She has prepared a letter, confirming the gift (*hibah*) of land by her father, to be signed by herself, her father, her husband, her two brothers as witnesses, and the village head. Three of the signatures are on *meterai* (duty stamps) to make the document legal. The signing of the document must be accompanied by a traditional ceremony, as a gesture of thanks to her father and also as a means of preventing possible conflict in future. According to Grace, such a certificate of *hibah* is something new in the village;

when it's complete, she will deposit one copy in the village office. So far she has only made the certificate for the gift of residential land and does not yet have a plan to make another certificate for the *kebun*; she gave priority to securing the residential land, being worried that her brother might change his mind and throw her out of the house. "Land is important for us women, as most of us here are farmers and it's not possible to farm on others' land. There was a woman farmer who cultivated another man's rice-field, but when she got good yields, the landowner claimed the land back" (Ambarwati et al. 2019).

The barriers to young women's entry into farming may be material, institutional and ideological, including the "gendering" of farming in local and national discourse and agricultural politics. Ruth Liepens (1998) provides a model example of discourse analysis of gender narratives surrounding agriculture in Australia and New Zealand, based on interviews and written texts. The first narrative involves "constructing farmers and farming via a hegemonic masculinity that portrays physically strong men completing outdoor work and often struggling with the physical environment." The second key narrative of masculinity is found in agricultural politics, where a small group of male agricultural leaders are "positioned as 'masculine' owing to their assertive and vocal leadership enacted from politically powerful 'pinnacle' positions." A third narrative involves the portrayal of women in subservient association with the hegemonic masculinity of the first narrative, involving "notions of femininity based on marital and kinship relations, caring work, and domestic spaces" (374). As an Australian farmers' organization president told the researcher: "I don't personally like the idea of women out in the field. Women make a very significant contribution ... [if] the home operates efficiently, everything operates efficiently. Their role in the home, on the phones, as the go-fers is well managed and a lot of them do the books. Theirs is a supportive structural role" (378). But there is also an emerging alternative narrative which constructs the "woman-farmer" differently, recognizing "the fact that women farm, and thus are (or can be) involved with heavy machinery, physical labour and business management activities.... Despite the encouraging possibilities that result from such developments ... discourses in conventional

farmer organizations and rural print media are slow in representing these women” (375).

Caitriona Ni Laoire (2002) described the “emergence (or resurrection) of a more open and flexible type of masculinity” among young Irish male farmers. The “resurrection” qualification may be important. In many societies, efforts to promote new constructions of the independent woman farmer are in fact re-asserting elements of rural women’s autonomy which were eroded in earlier processes of formalization (of land titles, farm credit channels, circuits of agricultural knowledge etc.), as we have seen in some of the examples of agrarian transformation in Chapter 2.

In the Saiss plateau of Morocco, the continuing power of gendered norms and constraints may be seen in young people’s aspirations. While young men hope to become agricultural innovators, developing organic farms or fruit farms for export using the new potentials of drip irrigation, young women see no future for themselves in farming, instead hoping to establish a bakery, tailoring or other business and/or to marry and live in the city with an extra house in the village (Bossenbroek 2016: 118).

Given what we have seen in this chapter about the difficulties or impossibility of access to farm land while still young, it is not surprising that so many young rural people migrate, being reluctant to engage in long years of agrarian “timepass” (Jeffrey 2010), working for parents or other elder relatives. Who wants to wait until they are 40 or 50 years old to be a farmer? (White 2012: 14). But young people’s out-migration not should automatically be assumed to reflect a permanent, lifetime abandonment of rural life, agriculture or the possibility of a return to farming; it is an open question, a matter for research.

Many examples in this chapter show older and younger generations in competition or unspoken tension over access to land. As Jonathan Rigg and colleagues rightly remind us, there may equally be cases where intergenerational relations reflect interdependence rather than competition, and older and younger generations cooperate in farm management and in the best deployment of their labour (Rigg et al. 2019: 12). In Chapter 1, discussing the issue of “ageing farmers” we raised the possibility that the ageing of smallholder

farming populations is not necessarily a simple matter of young potential successors being unwilling or unable to start farming, or their parents being unwilling or unable to stop. Drawing on field research in three villages in northeastern Thailand, Jonathan Rigg and colleagues suggest that we can no longer — if we ever could — neatly pigeonhole rural people into “farmers” and “non-farmers.” These categorizations, they argue,

gloss over the way in which many farm households are multifunctional. ... Focusing on full-time ageing farmers hides from view the way in which farming is, in practice, undertaken often by an assortment of kinfolk, sometimes at weekends or evenings, as they juggle lives and livelihoods. ...

Across rural developing Asia ... most households and many individuals work across the farm and non-farm sectors, over the week, between the seasons and through the life course. ... This is normal rather than exceptional. (Rigg et al. 2019: 4, 9)

Their description of an “ageing farmer household” brings the point home (Box 4.6).

**Box 4.6 An “Ageing Farmer Household”
in Ban Lao, Northeastern Thailand**

The household is headed by Mae Suk Watthana, a 75-year-old widow who told us that she was the household head and the farm manager of nine *rai* (1.44 ha) of rice land, which remained registered in her name. On paper, she was just the sort of ageing farmer seen as “problematic” by many policy makers and some scholars.

She was not, however, alone in her endeavours. A divorced son and a widowed daughter helped on the farm as did Mae Suk’s grandchildren. But, as Mae Suk was keen to stress, she had to “lead” or show the way in the business of farming.

These two kids of mine work in factories. They go to work as usual [but also] work on the farm in the rice farming season. [They] take days off from work to farm rice when it’s needed.

She had bought a walking or hand tractor to help with the

farming, and this was mainly used by a grandchild who had been injured in a road accident and could not hold down a full-time job.

This case ... emphasizes the limitations of simply categorizing Mae Suk as an “ageing farmer.” The first point concerns how farm work articulates with other activities. Mae Suk may ostensibly be the only full-time farmer in this household, but ... she draws on the labour of her children and grandchildren, and there is quite a complex choreographing of work through the week and between the seasons. This is possible partly because the labour-intensive aspects of farming have been mechanized but more importantly we do not see a professionalization of farming. Younger household members often continue to maintain a link with the land and farming. Small farms have not been amalgamated into larger holdings. In our [research] villages and across Thailand and much of Asia, most farms, like Mae Suk’s, are just a hectare or two (Rigg et al. 2019: 10).

The mass out-migration of rural young men and women, and their reported aspirations for non-farming futures, do not necessarily mean the death knell for smallholder farming in the next generation. The next chapter explores these issues further, looking forward and asking “who wants to be a farmer?” in the present age.

Notes

1. Two examples, from Indonesia and Bolivia, are at the beginning of Chapter 1; for an example from Zimbabwe, see Reynolds (1991).
2. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Senegal, Togo and Mali.
3. In the nearby district of Bajawa — like West Manggarai, a majority Roman Catholic district — with its population predominantly from the matrilineal Naga ethnic group, it is men who cannot inherit.

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Who Wants to Be a Farmer?

I never want to be a farmer, ever... It is better to become a factory worker; I don't have to work under the heat, it is not dirty. The wage can be used to buy a cell phone, clothes, cosmetics, bags or other things needed by a teenager. It can be saved for parents, too. — Miss S, 19-year-old migrant job-seeker in the industrial area of Bekasi near Jakarta (Leavy and Hossain 2014: 25)

Driss doesn't reject farming, but wants to go elsewhere to pursue his life-project, far away from the eyes and the control of his father and family and the community. [Currently] he farms with his brothers on his father's land and under his authority... "I want to go to another region... I'm so fed up with this situation. I just want something for myself, something I can rely on. My own project, my own money." — Driss, 29-year-old agriculture graduate in the Saiss region, Morocco (Bossenbroek et al., 2015: 344–45, 347)

When asked what you do, don't say *nalima tu* ["I am just farming"]. Say, "I am a farmer!" — Adhiambo, female farmer, western Kenya. *Nalima tu* depicts a subdued life in meagre smallholder farming and posits ... the unproductivity and unattractiveness of the occupation, and the disdain of the wider society towards farming. "I am farming!" [is] a statement made with boldness, pride, and self-approval, reflecting a sense of ingenuity and the possibilities of a financially independent livelihood through farming. (Mwaura 2017: 1310–11)

In this chapter we return to questions raised in Chapter 1. Will smallholder farming or industrial farming be the basis of future agricultures, and will future rural generations have, or want to have, a

part in those futures? The first section of this chapter explores young rural people's aspirations and tries to further deconstruct their apparent aversion to farming futures. We then turn to rural young people's ("constrained") agency, as reflected both in their individual mobility and pathways out of (and sometimes back into) farming and in their involvement in movements of collective action. The book concludes with a brief recapitulation of the initiatives needed to promote a generationally sustainable revitalization of smallholder farming.

Future Generations, Future Agricultures

It is hard to envision rural and agricultural futures and the possible place of smallholder farming within them, in any part of the world, with any degree of certainty. These futures will depend, partly, on the vagaries of climate change or climate breakdown and the adaptive capacities of farming systems and those who depend on them. But they will also depend, to a great extent, on the outcome of the "battle for the future of farming" (Weis 2007): the ongoing struggle — sometimes violent, but mostly silent, even unnoticed — for control of land, farming and agri-food chains, between different modes, scales and principles of farming. These outcomes will likely have different trajectories in different regions.

Historically, as discussed in Chapter 2, when regimes have allowed or encouraged the emergence and dominance of large-scale agricultural holdings, sooner or later subsequent regimes have broken up these holdings in favour of more efficient smallholder farming, opting for economic development and social peace. In the 1980s and 1990s some scholars were even confidently predicting the end of the era of plantation agriculture (Francis 1994: 199), but in recent decades corporate land acquisition and large-scale farming on plantation lines have not declined, but expanded rapidly. In many sub-Saharan African countries "medium-scale" commercial farms (between 5 and 100 hectares, and particularly between 10 and 100 hectares) using wage labour and owned by "urban-based professionals or influential rural people" are expanding rapidly, and the share of land in small-scale holdings (under 5 hectares) is declining (Jayne et al. 2016: 197).

Future-gazers thus contemplate, at the one extreme, a future of increasingly dominant corporate, industrial, energy-intensive, monocrop, planet-warming agriculture and linked agrifood chains. At the other extreme, “re-peasantization” scenarios (van der Ploeg 2009) envision the persistence, resurgence and growth of small-scale alternatives, not always clearly defined but marked by more ecologically rational and socially just systems of food production and farm-to-consumer networks, which their proponents claim can effectively provision the world.

One thing is certain. If there is to be a future for farming styles, technologies and rural economies driven not by corporate profits but more by the interests of smallholder livelihoods and ecological benefits, there has to be a new generation of (would-be) smallholder farmers willing to take up the challenge. These two issues feed into, and feed on, each other: sustainable smallholder farming requires new generations of (would-be) smallholders, while new generations of rural youth will turn away from agriculture if they do not see a prospect of sustainable smallholder-based livelihoods and welfare. The next section explores what we know about young people’s engagement with their futures, as reflected in their reported “aspirations.”

Engaging with the Future: Rural Youth Aspirations

What do young rural men and women want, and how do they envisage their futures?

Samuel Schielke describes how men in their early to mid-twenties in a northern coastal Egyptian village express frustration with both the lack of economic prospects and the monotony of their lives (Box 5.1)

Box 5.1 Boredom and Despair in an Egyptian Village

Najib: “Every day is like the other. And you have to work a lot for little money, you work and work, but you cannot get forward.... That’s why everyone wants to emigrate.... If they could, everybody here would leave, everybody. Nobody would stay.”
Tawfiq: “Every day is predictable, there is no change. Everyone

suffers from it — there is no one here who is happy and satisfied.”

Young women’s lives are relatively more confined — they cannot sit in cafes or play football — but they do not complain about boredom as much as young men.

Nazli (a young mother): “They [young women] are busy all the time: make breakfast, dress the kids, school, private tutoring, clean, cook, wash, and at the end of the day you are so tired that you just fall asleep. Their life may be boring and repetitive, with every day like the other, but they have no time to be bored.”

It is not monotony as such, but unfulfilled aspirations, that generate boredom.

[Monotony] is turned into intense boredom and despair by the presence of strong but unfulfilled aspirations for a better and more exciting life. The increasing connectedness of the village with global media and migration flows offer imaginaries and prospects of a different, more exciting life, of material wealth and of self-realization. Village life becomes measured against expectations that by far exceed anything the countryside or the nearby cities have to offer. (Schielke 2008: 255–58)

Aspirations may be seen as “drafts of a desired future” (Bossenbroek, van der Ploeg and Zwarteven 2015: 344), ways in which young people engage with their imagined futures. They lie somewhere on the continuum between vague dreams on the one hand, and more concrete expectations, objectives, goals or plans on the other (Quaglia and Cobb 1996). Policy discourse tends to assume a linear relationship between aspiration and action (or inaction) and to see aspirations instrumentally, as something to be manipulated. For Arjun Appadurai, poor people’s lack of a “capacity to aspire” underlies their inability to “find the resources required to contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty” and to instigate change (2004: 179). For the World Bank (2014), children and young people in poor households (and/or their parents) are often stuck in “aspiration traps,” when “poverty stifles hope” that education

will help them out of poverty; and besides lacking aspiration, they are also said to be prone to too high hopes, aspiring unrealistically to scarce salaried civil-service jobs and showing an aversion to more likely futures, such as farming and other manual work. It seems that, in the eyes of the policy world, young people can never get their aspirations right. The danger of such instrumental discourse around aspirations is that it ignores or downplays structural constraints on individual agency, “casts individuals and social groups as responsible for their own futures, and attributes failure to progress to a ‘poverty of aspirations’” (Brunel 2018: 1). In this way, young people’s “failures in relation to work, income or security are seen as [their] own inabilities rather than part of structural political-economic shifts or neglect” (Naafs and Skelton 2018: 4).

The main source of evidence on young rural people’s aspirations is interviews with young people — whether in sample surveys, orchestrated focus group discussions or more qualitative and free-ranging conversations — sometimes supplemented with interviews with older rural residents asking about their hopes (or fears) for their children’s futures. Reviewing five multi-country surveys of young rural men’s and women’s aspirations, together covering thirty-four countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America plus eight transitional European countries,¹ I found that they all point to the same general conclusion. When asked some version of the question “what would you like to do when you grow up?” young rural people overwhelmingly answer that they hope for a secure, salaried white- or blue-collar job, and equally overwhelmingly put farming futures far down on the list, if mentioned at all (White 2018b: 10–16). But what does this actually mean? Where do young people’s reported aspirations come from? We may know little about how young people’s aspirations are generated, but it is clear that they are produced relationally, “in interaction and in the thick of social life” (Appadurai 2004: 67). When young people are asked these questions by adults, in formal interview contexts or in the presence of their peers in focus-group discussions, their answers are often subject to social acceptability filters and may reflect not so much their considered individual visions and hopes as dominant norms about universally acceptable, “worthy” futures (Zipin et al. 2015: 236).

In summary, these studies conclude that young rural people overwhelmingly express an aspiration for secure, formal-sector jobs. When gender differences are taken into account, young women express an even stronger aversion to agricultural futures (Elias et al. 2018). But the aversion of both young men and women to farming and rural futures is more strongly expressed in formal interview and focus-group contexts than when individuals can express their views anonymously. In one SMS² survey of 10,000 young men and women (ages 18–35) in twenty-one African countries, almost one-quarter of respondents claimed to opt for a more secure rural/agricultural life. When the same surveys asked “what would make farming an attractive option for you?” farming emerges as a possible option, but only if land and inputs are available and if farming is at least partly commercially oriented and combined with other income sources in pluriactive livelihoods. Young people’s desire for an independent economic existence and freedom from dependence on parents is strong, and they express a clear understanding of the generational and other constraints which make access to land and to successful farming difficult or impossible, at least while they are still young. Finally, even if some of them are interested in commercial farming, young people express little interest in other kinds of entrepreneurial futures³ (White 2018b: 16).

The apparent aversion of young rural men and women to farming and to rural futures as explored in these surveys may be thought to be something new, but we should be careful about such assumptions. Today’s rural youth undoubtedly have wider horizons than their parents and grandparents did. But it is reasonable to suppose — though difficult to prove, given the lack of research among previous generations of rural youth — that current generations of adult farmers and farm workers also had some idea of a better, non-farming future when they were young, at least if they had access to formal education. We have seen some historical evidence of this in Chapter 3. Young people’s aspirations, as noted in Chapter 1, are not reliable indicators of their adult futures. This was certainly the case with the young teenage boys and girls I studied in a Javanese village in the early 1970s. Many of them have since become farmers and are now the parents and grandparents of the young people in the same

village, whom we are currently studying as part of the Becoming a Young Farmer project (White and Wijaya 2019).⁴

Gilda Sentías Portilla's (2018) study of rural youth confronted by rapid expansion of large monoculture plantations in southern Laos is a welcome antidote to common assumptions that young rural men and women are not interested in rural futures and all want to move to the cities to achieve modern lifestyles. Young people may migrate for temporary jobs, but they tend to prefer to return to their villages, where it is now possible to "seek out and enact a rural modern lifestyle." The plantation concessions have opened up some employment options for young men and women, who may not be interested in long periods of unpaid work on parental farms but still envisage farming as a likely occupation in future, even if not their ideal choice.

Writing on postwar Sierra Leone, Krijn Peters argued that "the dislike [of agriculture] of rural youth is not focused on agriculture as such, but on their vulnerability, in village conditions, to exploitation by local elites and gerontocrats." He describes young rural people's troubled relationships with local elders who exercise control over customary courts, land, agricultural labour and the allocation of marriage partners in this highly gerontocratic society.

The point is that the African rural setting is not only inhabited by landowning peasants, but increasingly by numbers of young people who lack the basic modalities even to be peasants. Marginalized by "customary" institutional exactions, first begun under colonial rule and maintained by rural elites ever since, ... [young people] cannot even mobilize their own labour to work the allegedly abundant land, since this would be vulnerable to extraction from them by marriage payments and court fines for infringements of a traditional code of behaviour regulated by elders. (2011: 224–25)

In other situations rural youth who see possibilities for themselves in a revitalized, modern smallholder agriculture may run up against parental conservatism. At the beginning of this chapter we saw Driss, the 29-year-old Moroccan agriculture graduate, expressing his frustration at parental blockage of his ambitions for a modern

farming life in the Saiss region, where tube wells and drip irrigation have opened up new opportunities for export production of fruits and vegetables. Driss encapsulates the experience and frustrations of many young rural people who aspire to a modern rural farming life but cannot escape patriarchal control (Box 5.2)

Box 5.2 Frustrations of a Young Moroccan Would-Be Farmer

Driss sees his future self as an independent farmer, responsible for his own farming project and up-to-date with the newest crops and technologies. But currently he farms with his brothers on his father's land and under his authority. They cultivate three hectares of irrigated onions and potatoes, and the remaining ten hectares are cropped with rainfed cereals. "If my father says that we have to cultivate four hectares of onions, I cannot refuse or contradict him."

In 2009, he succeeded in convincing his father to install drip irrigation and explained how he expected to achieve his fruit tree project: "I rented one hectare from my father and also paid him for the water to irrigate the tree seedlings." Driss had hoped to transplant the 9,000 fruit tree seedlings to the rest of the land. But he was not able to convince his father of this and was forced to sell the seedlings. He had thus run up against the will and authority of his father. This situation deeply frustrates him: "I want to go to another region.... I'm so fed up with this situation. I just want something for myself, something I can rely on. My own project, my own money" (Bossenbroek et al. 2015: 344–45, 347).

Similar frustrations emerged among young-generation men and women in Brazil's landless worker movement (MST) in land occupation settlements where land had been distributed to individual households. Young men and women, if they stayed in the settlement, worked as unpaid helpers on the family farm. In Semente, 18-year-old David and 16-year-old Laura explained:

(David) If you live with your parents and work in the fields, come harvest time, you still don't receive any money. All of it goes to the father, the *chefe da familia*. ... The only income I get is when I work in the *roças dos outros* [other people's fields]. The pay is really low ... and the work is very heavy

... I want a different future you know, to become someone in life.

(Laura) Yes, I work every day, but I do not have my own *renda* [income]. Because we share a roof, all of us have to help out. That is what a family is, no? (Gurr 2017: 105)

There is a clear contrast between these settlements of individualized peasant farming and the smaller number of MST settlements that have opted for collective farming. In the collectivized settlement of Copavi, all workers aged 14 and older are entitled to wages, although those younger than 18 receive only about half the wage, with the rest going to their parents. Their work contributions are thus formally recognized, they have some independent income, and at age 18 they can become full associates and stakeholders in the cooperative (Gurr 2017: 74).

Voting with their Feet: Plurilocality in the Life-Course of Rural Youth

Most of the world's labour migrants (both domestic and international) are young people, pushed by the unavailability of appropriate jobs — or farm land — at home and the desire to escape dependency on parents and other elders, and pulled by the hope of better opportunities and “becoming someone” in the usually urban destination regions. Young rural people's mobility now extends to all social classes and (in most countries) genders. One important (and neglected) issue is whether young people's migration away from rural areas and farming is a permanent or a part-lifetime process; we need to explore further the phenomenon of cyclical, part-lifetime movement between places and sectors.

One key distinction among young farmers which needs to be further explored is that between the “continuers,” the successors who take over their parents' or other relative's farm, and “newcomers,” who are not from farm backgrounds but find a pathway into farming — thus “voting with their feet” in the reverse direction. The increasing number of newcomer farmers in such countries as Canada, Spain (Monllor 2012) and Japan (McGreevey, Kobayashi and Tanaka

2018) and the financial and institutional support which they often receive in the process of “extra-familial” succession (van Boxtel, Hagenhofer, and Handl 2016) underline the need to go beyond a narrow focus on the children of existing farmers. There is a strong supposition that “newcomer” farmers are likely to be innovators and more critical of mainstream farming practices.

But we should also make a distinction between “early continuers” and “late continuers.” Late continuers are those who first leave the parental farm to engage in other work (whether inside or beyond the village) and return to farming later in life as land becomes available. In many countries, the majority of young farmers nowadays are late continuers, who have returned to the village and taken up farming after a period of migration. In many rural regions today “village” (and also “farm”) can become for young people the place where you grow up, which you will leave in search of urban employment, but where you may later leave your children in the care of their grandparents and where you may later return to be a farmer yourself, when land becomes available and urban work has provided some capital for improvements.⁵ This highlights the importance of a life-course perspective in the study of young people’s aspirations and their move out of, and perhaps later back into, farming. Three case studies, from China, Burundi and Indonesia, illustrate this pattern of young people’s movement out of and then back into farming (Boxes 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5).

Box 5.3 From Migrant Work to Apple Farming in Hebei Province, China

Forty-three-year-old Zhang Changchun is the youngest farmer in Sanggang, a village in China’s Hebei Province. What made him take up farming at age 37 when most youth have migrated to urban areas, leaving only the older generation and some of their grandchildren in the village?

Before Zhang started his organic apple farm — he is the only apple farmer in this and the surrounding villages — he worked as a transporter for a local mining company, and for some time as an urban migrant worker. Born in the countryside, he always cherished the freedom and autonomy to manage his own production and life as a farmer.

Six years ago, Zhang exchanged the land allocated to his

household and the land he rented for one single 0.27 hectare plot of land and planted the first apple trees. He bought a computer and spent a lot of time learning from the internet, and also visited other apple farms to learn about apple growing.

Last year was the first harvest, yielding an income of only 1000 yuan (about US\$150). This year the income rose to 9000 yuan (US\$1350). "Everybody kept saying that it was impossible to grow apples. I took it up as a challenge." He and his wife continue to grow vegetables for home consumption between the apple trees, and he has also leased 6 hectares of the adjacent hillside to plant chestnut and walnut trees. "It's not easy for young people to do this. In the first few years the apple farm needs a lot of capital and there is no income. This is difficult for the young who do not have much capital and also have to support their elderly parents."

With his part-time job in the mining company, Zhang was able to earn a moderate income for his family and also for apple farm investment. The first two years he invested about 30,000 yuan (about US\$4500). Initially he was unsure about organic farming but has now grown confident about its potential and is very optimistic about the future. Marketing has not been a problem; Zhang relies mainly on informal networks to get the word out to middle-class consumers about his tasty organic apples.

He now plans to return part-time to the transporting work while his wife takes care of the farm. He hopes that when he is old his daughter, who now works in a nearby town, will take care of him and the farm (abridged version of an unpublished case study from the Becoming a Young Farmer project, written by Sharada Srinivasan, Pan Lu and Ben White).

Box 5.4 Migration and Farming Aspirations in Rural Burundi

In rural Burundi, in a village where one-third of young men and more than half of all young women do not expect to inherit land, two-thirds of the young men interviewed by Lidewijde Berckmoes, and a smaller number of young women, had at least once made the difficult and dangerous journey to Tanzania to earn income; more than half had made the trip "often" or "very often." Most of them went without papers and risked jail, menace by the local population and having their earnings taken by police or soldiers patrolling the border area. The young look for non-farm opportunities, both

locally and in Tanzania, not to replace but to complement farming, and indeed to make farming a possible future.

We want a future as farmers, but if we would have other activities to help, that would be better because farming is not enough [young man].

For the boys that will soon become adults, it is possible you are with seven boys in one family. They will all have to share the same plot of land. So if you are a boy without a profession you cannot find money to buy land [young man].

Yes, the soil is no longer fertile and there are climatic changes. Therefore we are looking for a profession to combine with farming [young woman].

If there was an organization to help us learn a vocation, we could work and have money to buy land before the others do so and there is no more land [young man]. (Berckmoes and White 2016: 298, 305–06)

Box 5.5 After Migration: Young Share Tenants in Java, Indonesia

Watinah and Santoso come from small-farmer families in Kaliloro village (Yogyakarta, Java). They both completed secondary school and frequently helped their parents in the fields. Watinah's parents owned 600 m² (0.06 ha) of *sawah* [irrigated rice terrace] while Santoso's parents were landless share tenants. While still young they both migrated for work. After leaving school Watinah worked in a shoe factory in Tangerang [West Java] for eight years until she returned to the village to marry. Santoso first stayed in the village, helping his father on the farm and working as a casual labourer, before becoming a travelling salesman in Jakarta. Before marrying, he bought a very small plot of *sawah* (300 m², = 0.03 ha) with the help of a bank loan. Returning to the village, they say, was the natural decision to make when they wanted to form a family. "Life in the city is very expensive, our earnings were hardly enough to live on, and certainly not if we have children." They now have one daughter, in junior secondary school.

Santoso's father had obtained a large (1.0 ha) share tenancy

from an absentee owner. As soon as the young couple returned to Kaliloro they began to farm their tiny plot of *sawah*, and help Santoso's father on the larger tenanted farm. At first, the work was evenly divided between father and son, and the father often shared the harvest (paddy and/or cash) with him, after delivering the landlord's 50 percent share. Since 2010 however Santoso has completely taken over the cultivation, as his father is too old to work. Watinah helps with planting, weeding and harvesting. They still give their parents a share of the harvest, in kind or cash. Watinah meanwhile has been given 300 m² of *sawah* by her parents, who are over 75 years old and have divided the land among their children. Watinah then rented this land out, receiving Rp. 2 million [about US\$150] for a four-year lease, and gave all this money to her mother.

Having a relatively large farm to cultivate, Santoso and his wife are one of the few couples in the village with no other (non-farm) source of income, besides their one cow and three goats. They both say they intend to continue farming, as they now have some land of their own and also a sizable tenanted area. But they don't expect their daughter to become a farmer, as she has never helped in the fields and knows nothing about farming; a steady job in the city, they say, would be better for her (unpublished case study from the Becoming a Young Farmer project, written by Hanny Wijaya and Ben White).

As we have seen in Chapter 1, youth studies see young people as actors in social, economic and political renewal, rather than as passive objects of adult control and socialization. But we also recognized young people's "constrained agency," meaning that young people's individual and collective agency is always subject, in lesser or greater degree, to the constraints of structures. Young people's mobility between places and sectors and their role in larger movements of collective action, which we consider in the next section, may be seen as concrete manifestations of this interplay between agency and structures.

Rural Youth and Collective Action

While class is a fundamental category of analysis for agrarian politics, it is essential to understand how it intersects with oth-

er social identities, such as race, ethnicity, gender, generation, nationality, religion and place. (Edelman and Borrás 2016: 2)

Before, I did not really know what the MST *is*. I thought it was just something for my parents. But this experience, to come to Brasília, to contribute to the movement, this has been very special for me. I have learned what it is to be a militant, to sacrifice myself for the MST. — Isabel (17), Paulo Freire land reform settlement, Brazil (Gurr 2017: 183)

Young people's relationship to politics is complex (Ansell 2015: 231), and the role of young people and youth-adult interactions in social movements remains "a social science mystery" (Scott and Artis 2005). Young people have certainly influenced national politics in many parts of the world at different times (Ansell 2015: 231), but policy work on youth tends to treat young people as objects of policy and instruments of development rather than as active subjects and as citizens with rights. An example is the "demographic dividend" approach to youth and development, where policies try to take advantage of the current "youth bulge," seeing youth as an instrument of economic growth rather than youth welfare and generational justice as ends in themselves or as the rights of young people. Instrumentalizing the world's youth in this way parallels the tendency to instrumentalize women in arguments for gender equality based on "economic efficiency" rather than gender justice (on this, see Berik 2017).

It is generally agreed that there has been a widespread decline in youth participation in formal political organizations and party politics and that "young people around the world increasingly do politics outside the formal political sphere, through social movements, voluntary services, identity organizations, urban cultures, militant movements and everyday life" (Ansell 2015: 233–34). Contemporary conceptualizations of the "policy process" may not capture the realities of youth politics, given the growing importance of "alternative, non-civic forms of politics, often driven by disenfranchised youth ... who are excluded from and opposed to formal politics" (te Lintelo 2011: 12).

Compared to available studies on youth as “makers” and “breakers” in urban political movements and upheavals (Bayat 1997; Abbink and van Kessel 2005; Honwana and de Boeck 2005), there have been few explorations of rural young people’s involvement in movements for agrarian renewal. Comparing young rural people’s involvement in social movements in Brazil, Egypt and Nepal, Krishna Ghimire noted that “the degree to which rural youth as a category is, by itself, able to initiate or lead social movements, is an area of considerable debate” (2002: 62).

As we have learned from the experience of gender-based movements, organizing themselves and joining existing organizations or movements are not mutually exclusive options for young people, and both may be necessary. Young people should not be only channelled into youth-based organizations, as that may result in marginalization from adult political processes. They and their interests need also to be represented in adult organizations and movements, from the local to national levels.

Nearly all agrarian movements, local, national and international, face the problem of ensuring a generational rotation that replaces their largely male pioneer leaders — the heroic founding fathers of the movement — with a more diverse and youthful group (Edelman and Borrás 2016: 87). The world’s two most iconic large-scale peasant movements, La Vía Campesina at the global level and the landless agricultural workers’ movement MST in Brazil, both actively encourage youth participation in congresses, marches, schools for agroecological farming and other more political training activities. They are both concerned about the tendency for the next generation (the children of peasant activists) to abandon the movement and rural life. Melinda Gurr describes how Tania, an elderly MST leader, spoke to two thousand sons and daughters of MST settlement pioneers in a soccer stadium, at the Festival of Arts of the MST Schools of Land Reform.

Youth of the MST, I have a few important questions for you. First of all, do you want to stay in the countryside? Do you want to leave the countryside? Why? We of the MST need absolute clarity on these matters. We need to know why the

youth are leaving the settlements. *Why?* Is it because you don't have enough teachers in your schools? Is it because you think work in the fields is heavy? ... Think about it. If you leave the countryside, whose interests does it serve? Is it in the interest of the people and your families? Why do you think your parents camped out for so many years and suffered under the black plastic tarps waiting for a piece of land to work?

The website of La Vía Campesina proclaims: “[Our] youth’s articulation is in the struggle to sustain the youth farmers and peasants, woman and man to stay in the rural areas of the world and to return to farming and working the land.” La Vía Campesina regularly hosts Youth Assemblies at its international conferences. The fourth Youth Assembly Declaration (2017), besides endorsing LVC’s various general standpoints, suggests that there is much work to be done on youth inclusion.

Patriarchy and age discrimination restrict our visibility and participation in decision-making processes....

We struggle for the democratization of our societies and full participation of youth in political and decision-making processes. We must ensure that within our own organizations and movement youth are able to develop leadership skills.

There is no food sovereignty or justice without feminism and equality of all peoples. We must recognize and respect diversity of all forms, including race, gender, sexuality and class. We will root out patriarchy and discrimination wherever it exists. We commit to the difficult work of evaluating ourselves and the ways in which we may perpetuate patriarchy and racism.

We need to know more about how these youth-inclusive ideals fare in practice in the generally hierarchical, centralized, patriarchal and heteronormative setting of MST and many of LVC’s member organizations and movements. This was a main focus of Melinda Gurr’s study of youth and politics in MST. At the local level, as already suggested earlier in this chapter, there are differences between those

MST settlements that have opted for individualized family farming and the smaller numbers that have opted for collective farming. In the family-farm settlements, young men and women continue to struggle with patriarchal and gerontocratic familial dynamics; where conditions at home do not foster their personal autonomy, tendencies to out-migration are more pronounced. In the collective settlements, in contrast,

collective land tenure, wage labour and communal governance fostered conditions that disrupted rural patriarchy and empowered youth, whether or not they were part of heteronormative nuclear families. ... Collectivization therefore provides us with an alternative scenario to the supposedly inevitable separation of young people from farming. (2017: 256)

And at regional and national levels, young people's participation in congresses and rallies has some potential impact on the movement itself.

As most MST leadership sought to embrace and mobilize youth ... youths took advantage of this opening in ways unimagined by their elders. ... Youth showed themselves willing to articulate deeply felt critiques about age, gender, race, and sexuality asymmetries within the movement, to challenge the movement from within, and thus to be a force that may help the MST to become even more transformative and democratic in the future. ... Testing the bounds of acceptable conduct within the MST, they appropriated movement discourses to bolster their own emergent socialist youth subcultures. ... The MST *became their social movement too*, in ways unanticipated by the first generation. (258–59)

Young rural activists may well be more interested in embracing alternative ways of living and organizing, rather than simply pursuing policy changes through mainstream policy processes (Ansell 2015: 234). Such initiatives may be inspired by larger national or international movements, but in the absence of these, may be spontaneous and local. In Chapter 3 I describe the changing lives of teenagers in

the Javanese village of Kaliloro, “the first generation who in many cases have literally never set foot in their parents’ rice fields.” Box 5.6 describes how they decided, on their own initiative, to engage in collective farming.

In much of the world we may expect in future to see more globalized, more networked, more open and collaborative forms of youth activism than in the past. This principle underlies many

Box 5.6 A Young People’s Collective Farming Project in Java

In all Indonesian villages there are state-sponsored youth groups called Karang Taruna. These groups are expected to be active in organizing sports, preparing for the national Independence Day festivities, etc. But in 2017, in one corner of the village, the leader of the local Karang Taruna group (himself a share tenant and former migrant, now in his 30s) encouraged the younger members to apply to rent a plot of rice land from the village government and experiment with collective farming. He wanted to find a way for these teenagers to learn the basics of farming, to be ready for the time when they may also decide to return from migrant work and become farmers. “With this collective farming project, these teenagers who have never worked in the fields will know how to plant and do all the other tasks.... If they don’t make a success of life in the city they’ll certainly come home, and then what work is there for them except to become a farmer?” Despite initial opposition from the village government they lobbied until they got their way and came in large groups to plant the rice, to weed it and to harvest it. They were proud that despite their lack of experience, their harvest was no smaller than those of the neighbouring farmers. By 2019 they were into the fourth planting season and looking for other opportunities to earn some income together. Meanwhile, other Karang Taruna groups in Kali Loro are beginning to follow their example.

This gives some reason for optimism that despite their de-skilling and relative alienation from farming, it is not farming as such that these young people are allergic to. They do not want to spend their young adulthood helping their parents in a position of dependency, and maybe in future they do not want to farm in the same ways that their parents farm. But they — or at least some of them — are willing to consider other styles of farming for the future (White and Wijaya 2019).

local rural youth initiatives. The food sovereignty movement in the Basque region, for example, creates new social and political spaces, including local “agro-assemblies” and *gaztetxes*, social centres created by young people for cultural activities, educational workshops and other initiatives. Some *gaztetxes* have established small sub-groups focusing specifically on food production (Box 5.7).

Collective initiatives of young rural men and women may experience many barriers to their autonomy and transformative potential, both in family and community and in their own organizations and movements, as well as at regional and national levels. The struggle for political recognition, greater autonomy and a stronger place in agenda setting is therefore by necessity a multi-sited and multi-level activity and may encounter patriarchal and gerontocratic opposition at all these levels.

**Box 5.7 The Ortuondo Gaztetxe
on the Outskirts of the City of Bilbao**

The Ortuondo *gaztetxe* was formed by a group of thirteen youth — all male students or unemployed members of the local youth assembly movement, with no previous agricultural experience — who became increasingly interested in gardening for self-provisioning as a path to transformation. Their initial actions involved occupying sufficient land to create a dozen gardens. Subsequently, as a result of on-going collective reflection on their experiences, they then opted to escalate their involvement by seeking to create a way of life that would go beyond capitalism. The group’s goal was to build a communal economy outside of the capitalist market, based on sharing what they produced.... This goal, however, is not without contradictions. Throughout their experience, the group faced tensions in reconciling the needs of the individual and the collective....

The idea is to create a communal space disarticulated from the logic of the market ... however they are conscious of the difficulty of totally emancipating from such logic and monetary exchange, and carry out a mixed formula ... of producing a certain amount for the communal space and another for the market (which provides them with resources to cover costs and some money for each member’s subsistence), with the hope of eventually broadening the communal economy. (Etxagibel and Desmarais 2017: 5–6)

One of the many unknowns in contemplating smallholder and rural youth futures is the impact on young people, and on smallholder farming, of the global surge of extreme right and authoritarian populist forces, which often have strong support in rural areas (Scoones et al. 2018; Faulkner et al. 2019: Ch. 6). These movements typically rely for their support on cross-class alliances of both urban and rural poor. Although taking different forms in different places, “the substance is always essentially the same — the mythology, the ‘imagined’ communities, the hocus-pocus of blood and soil mysticism,” and “in every case, the aim is to construct a mass popular movement of the Far Right capable of assuming state power. Once in power, the drive is towards authoritarian control over the whole state apparatus ... and the use of this control ... to crush dissent and democracy,” as social democracy capitulates to neoliberalism and corporate power (Faulkner et al. 2019: 251).

The contradictions between young people’s expanding, digitalized global horizons and their shrinking economic prospects may propel them in different directions: towards movements of progressive renewal, towards disengagement or towards reactionary and violent populism (Scoones et al. 2018: 5). In many countries, state-sponsored youth organizations aim to tame youth aspirations and channel them in ways that suppress autonomous political mobilization. The absence of strong, independent youth movements promoting young people’s priorities and agendas may lead frustrated and marginalized youth into apathy and demobilization or into reactionary populist organizations, sometimes with a religious frame, such as Indonesia’s Pemuda Pancasila and the Islam Defenders Front (Hasan 2016). In short, we should neither assume young rural men and women to be inherently progressive, inherently reactionary or inherently apathetic: “more useful are concrete analyses of the role of young people in different social movements and political events” (Harvey, Roberts and Dillabough 2016: 467).

A Future for Smallholder Farming?

Throughout the world, young people are standing up to the capitalist neoliberal system. ... If young people do not defend themselves and if they don't work together, then no one will do it for them! (La Vía Campesina 2014: 2)

As suggested at the beginning of this book, the future of smallholder farming depends on the emergence of a new generation of young men and women interested in farming. But the emergence of a generation of young (would-be) farmers depends in turn on the prospects of a revitalized smallholder farming sector. Smallholder farming is subject to many kinds of threats. These include the onward march of corporate industrial agriculture and agribusiness domination of agrifood chains; the chronic neglect of smallholder farming by governments,⁶ often including their toleration or promotion of large-scale land grabs and resulting smallholder dispossession; new risks and calamities due to climate breakdown; the global surge of the extreme right, in alliance with corporate capital; and within the surviving smallholder sector the threat to generational sustainability as farming populations become older and young people increasingly turn away from farming. While this book has focused on the last (generational) problem, it is important not to forget these other threats.

The young activists of La Vía Campesina may be right to argue (see the quotation at the beginning of this section) that young people must take their futures into their own hands and not expect others, including governments, to do it for them. On the other hand, governments should not be let off the hook in relation to their obligation to provide employment and livelihoods for rural youth and to live up to their claims to support smallholder farming. The same goes for the international organizations concerned with agriculture, food and rural development.

In May 2019 the FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization) and IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), the two United Nations organizations concerned with food and agriculture, launched the United Nations Decade of Family Farming 2019–2028. The UN Decade — culmination of a process beginning in 2014,

“the UN Year of the Family Farmer” — aims to strengthen political commitment for the support and empowerment of family farmers. This goal also echoes the UN Resolution on the Rights of Peasants and Others Working in Rural Areas, which was adopted by the UN just half a year earlier (UN 2018). One of the seven pillars of the UN Decade’s Action Plan is to “support youth and ensure the generational sustainability of family farming” (FAO and IFAD 2019: 30–33). A few weeks later, in June, IFAD launched its 2019 *Rural Development Report: Creating Opportunities for Rural Youth*. This report aims “to provide the kinds of analysis that can inform policies, programs and investments to promote a rural transformation that is inclusive of youth” (FAO and IFAD 2019: 6).⁷

Within the family of United Nations organizations we see many of the same contradictory policies towards smallholder farmers that we find at the national level in many countries. On one hand, various laws, regulations, initiatives and powerful discourses call for the support and protection of smallholder farming, but are not implemented, while on the other hand, policies tolerate or even support large-scale land grabs, the dispossession of smallholders, corporate penetration of agriculture and agrifood chains, and earth-warming models of agriculture and other economic sectors. To date, neither the UN Decade documents nor the IFAD report mention, even once, the threat to family farming caused by the march of large-scale capital acquiring huge areas of land, replacing smallholder farmers with earth-warming industrial agriculture and also increasingly dominating the upstream and downstream points in agrifood chains. This threat is the elephant in the room, which everyone knows is there but nobody wants to talk about. IFAD’s vision of futures for rural youth is based in a model of “rural transformation” originally elaborated in an earlier report in which the functional shift from self-employment to wage employment — in other words the decline of smallholder farming and other forms of small-scale production — is “a fundamental characteristic of rural transformation” (IFAD 2019: 15, citing IFAD 2016).

In confronting the potential generational crisis in smallholder farming, it is important to seek ways to overcome tensions and rigidities in the intergenerational transfer of agrarian resources, particularly regarding access to farm land while still young. In the large parts of

the world where social security and state pensions for the aged are absent or inadequate, land has a crucial social security function; the needs and interests of older generations of smallholders must not be sacrificed. There are many examples of government and NGO programs aiming to promote the transfer of land between generations (not necessarily between parents and children) and to provide young would-be farmers with access to unused or public land at low cost.

The following examples are all discussed in the FAO-IFAD-CTA's (2014) *Youth and Agriculture* report.

In Burkina Faso the organization Songtaab-Yelgre negotiates with village chiefs and elders to provide women with access to land for shea butter production. In Ethiopia's northern Tigray region the NGO REST rehabilitates barren hillside lands with soil and water conservation infrastructure, so that these lands can be allocated to landless youth. In Mexico the government's Rural Entrepreneur and Land Fund program assists young people to acquire underutilized former common lands and also provides incentives to older farmers to transfer land to the younger generation, providing welfare schemes for their retirement. The Egyptian government makes reclaimed desert land available to young graduates, and several thousand young people have obtained land in this way. They are not allowed to sell their farms, and many have become successful in commercial vegetable production. The Taiwan Council of Agriculture launched a Small Landlords, Large Tenants program in 2008, aiming to encourage elderly farmers to lease their land on a long-term basis to young farmers and to farmers' organizations; within two years 8,000 elderly owners of small plots had been matched with about 700 young generation tenants. In South-West Uganda the agro-trading company RUL signs short-term lease agreements with elderly land-owners who have no plans to use their land in the coming twelve months and communicates the availability of the land to current or prospective young farmer groups; these groups should have at least eight members aged 18–35, three of whom must be female, to be able to apply for the lease (FAO-IFAD-CTA 2014).

In Spain, the Catalanian School for Shepherds teaches young people sheep-herding skills and organic agriculture practices and helps new entrants to access land and/or work opportunities by

matching them with potential sellers or established peasants looking for labour (Eco Ruralis 2016: 21). In Japan, where only half of the ageing population of smallholder farmers have identified a successor, there is now a notable influx of young people into agriculture, generously supported by government programs aimed at preventing farmland from falling into disuse. Young prospective farmers can receive tuition-free training at agricultural schools, interest-free loans and stipends of about US\$15,000 per year; local government offices offer “matchmaking” services to place new farmers in communities with available land, housing and agricultural advisors “to ensure that these new farmers and their families segue into rural community life as seamlessly as possible” (McGreevy, Kobayashi and Tanaka 2018: 1–2). Similar matching initiatives to facilitate extra-familial farm succession are commonplace in various European countries (van Boxtel, Hagenhofer and Handl 2016; Korzensky 2019; Cassidy, Srinivasan and White 2019).

Initiatives aiming to support young would-be farmers should include both continuer and newcomer farmers (as explained above), both male and female, and should take into account the characteristic patterns of youth trajectories today, especially their multidirectional mobility and pluriactive livelihoods combining farm and non-farm incomes. In promoting rural wage employment within and outside the agrifood sector, governments also need to become more active on the demand side. This can include, for example, active youth labour market programs, such as provision of public sector jobs in socially useful work and meaningful apprenticeship or other work-experience programs. And finally, making rural spaces attractive places for young people to live and work requires a creative imagining of rural futures and the place that young men and women can find in these futures.

In this short book I have barely scratched the surface of the complex links between class, gender and generational relations in agrarian households and communities. But I hope I have shown the relevance and importance of the generational angle in the study of agrarian change. Generation is both a fundamental axis in the ways resources are distributed and an instrument of discursive power and thus an element in the constitution and dynamics of agrarian political economic structures (Ansell 2016: 323–25).

The world's young rural men and women are potentially a powerful force in the revitalization of smallholder farming. A serious commitment to smallholder farming futures and their generational sustainability means first of all substantial government support, provision and protection of smallholder access to emerging markets and access to value added, not only on the farm but also in the upstream and downstream activities in agrifood chains. It means the curbing, and where necessary the reversal, of land grabs and the near-monopolies of large-scale agribusiness, including "grabbing land back" through local or national agrarian reforms. Within this general agenda, a generationally sustainable revitalization of smallholder farming means recognizing young people not as instruments of development and growth, but as subjects, actors and citizens. It means providing land and other agrarian resources to young men and women would-be farmers while respecting the interests and needs of the older generation. It means creative promotion of opportunities for young rural men and women to engage in farming and investment in infrastructures making rural areas attractive places for young men and women to live and work.

Notes

1. The five studies surveyed are: Leavy and Hossein (2014), OECD (2017), data from the Overseas Development Institute's Global Evidence project <<http://www.gage.odi.org>> provided by Nicola Jones, Elias et al. (2018) and the SMS survey reported in BMZ (2017) and Melchers and Büchler (2017). Further details are given in (White 2018b: 10–16).
2. SMS (short message service): text messaging with mobile phones.
3. By this they mean non-farm businesses. Commercial smallholder farming may also be regarded as an "entrepreneurial" activity.
4. The research project *Becoming a Young Farmer: Young People's Pathways into Farming in Four Countries* (China, Canada, India and Indonesia) is funded by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).
5. See for an Indonesian example, Koning 2005).
6. With some notable exceptions, for example Japan and some European countries. In some other countries "neglect" is a euphemism, as states permit or encourage large-scale dispossession.
7. Despite the obvious links between the two themes (the future of family farming, and of rural youth), and that they originate from the same

organization, the UN Decade documents don't mention the IFAD Rural Youth report, and vice versa. A similar hiatus could be seen a decade earlier in the World Bank, whose *World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation* hardly mentioned agriculture, while the *World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development* hardly mentioned youth (World Bank 2006; World Bank 2007). The two teams of specialists may be aware of each other's existence, but do not seem to communicate, like ships passing in the night.

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Glossary

- agrarian differentiation:** the tendency, driven by commodification, of petty commodity producers (smallholders) to divide into classes and the emergence of asymmetrical tenancy and/or wage-labour relations between them
- agrarian reform:** comprehensive reforms including both land redistribution and programs to support beneficiaries with the inputs and institutions needed for sustainable smallholder farming.
- bridewealth:** property passed on marriage from the groom's kin to the bride's kin. This may be accompanied by labour (bride service).
- class** (in agrarian contexts): a social group identified by its position in social relations of production and its relations with other classes.
- commodification:** the process that results in the elements of production and reproduction being produced for, and obtained from, market exchange, making them subject to its logic, disciplines and compulsions.
- cottar:** (Scotland) a peasant or labourer who occupies a cottage and sometimes a small holding of land, usually in return of labour services. See also **crofter**.
- crofter:** (Scotland) a small tenant on a sub-livelihood holding, paying rent to a (larger) tenant farmer. See also **cottar**.
- developmental cycles** of domestic groups: the formation, expansion, dispersal, fission and replacement of domestic groups ("households") and their changing age and labour composition in the course of these cycles.
- devolution:** (in this book) the distribution of property from holder to heir, either before or after death. See also **inheritance**.
- enclosure:** the expropriation and privatization of land or other resources previously held as commons, involving dispos-

session of its former users. See also **land grabs**; **primitive accumulation**.

gender: the culturally assigned behaviours and meanings attributed to the social categories of men and women and the relations between them, in all aspects of social activity, including access to resources, rewards or remuneration for work, and the exercise of authority and power.

generation: (in this book) the socially (politically, culturally) constructed relationships between individuals and groups in society based on their “social” age or life-course status.

gerontocracy: the structured power of the elderly (often elderly men, see *patriarchy*) over younger generations.

households: economic units based on common residence. These domestic groups comprise distinct and only partly overlapping units of production, consumption and accumulation, which include the possibility of surplus transfer mechanisms between members based on hierarchies of age and gender. Households often coincide with, but are analytically distinct from, “family”: they may also comprise hired servants and other non-kin.

indenture: a labour contract in a system of unfree labour which binds the labourer to work for a specific employer for a fixed period. Workers usually enter indenture contracts in return for a cash advance or remission of debts.

inheritance: the handing over of property (rights in objects) or social position after death, generally to the next generation but sometimes also laterally to siblings. See also **devolution**.

intersectionality: the interaction of multiple forms and relationships of subordination, inequality and identity, e.g. class, gender, ethnicity, generation.

labour regimes: the different modes of recruiting/ mobilizing labour and organizing it in production, and the social and political conditions which make it possible to enforce these relationships.

land reform: the reallocation of property or rights in land, usually with some explicit notion of the intended beneficiaries. Reforms can involve reallocation to small farmers or

landless workers, nationalization, collectivization or de-collectivization. **Redistributive land reforms** are usually defined more restrictively as programs that redistribute land rights from large private or corporate owners to small peasant farmers and landless workers. See also **agrarian reform**.

land grab: the large-scale appropriation of land or land-related rights and resources involving dispossession of their previous users by corporate (business, non-profit or public) entities. See also **enclosures**.

matrilineal descent or inheritance passes from a mother to her children. Matrilineal societies were often thought to be **matriarchal**, but it is now recognized that men may be economically and politically dominant in matrilineal societies and that women can have high status in patrilineal societies.

matriarchy: the dominance of women as a class over men.

matrifocal kin or social relations are centred on the mother or on women generally. Most commonly used in reference to the matrifocal household, which is structured around the mother and in which the father is absent or plays a limited role.

patriarchy: the structured/institutionalized dominance of men as a class over women and of old over young generations. Often associated with patrilineal societies, but patrilineality is not a necessary condition for male dominance.

patrilineal descent or inheritance passes from a father to his children. See also **matrilineal**.

peasants: petty commodity producers in agriculture, whose production is (partly or wholly) oriented to the market but based on non-commodity resources and relations.

primitive accumulation: the process by which non-capitalist social formations are transformed into capitalist ones, in particular the separation of workers from direct access to the means of production, most notably land through enclosures that dispossess smallholders and turn land into private property and capital. See also **enclosures**; **land grabs**.

reproduction: securing the conditions of life and of future production from what is produced and earned now. See also **social reproduction**.

smallholder farming: refers to the manner and “scale” of the farm operation, rather than its size (acreage), where owner or tenant farmers themselves manage and work on the farm, often mainly with the help of family members but not ruling out the use of hired workers.

social divisions of labour: the assignment of different categories of people to different activities according to the positions they occupy in structures of social relations, notably class, gender and generational relations.

social reproduction: the material and discursive practices which enable the reproduction of a social formation (including the relations between social groups) and its members over time. See also **reproduction**.

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Ben White is Emeritus Professor of Rural Sociology at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague

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