

# Access to the Fairtrade system: the geography of certification for social justice

ALASTAIR M. SMITH

*A growing body of research and analysis identifies that fair trade practices create opportunities for developing world producers in a manner best described as providing 'shaped advantage', as access to Northern markets is reconfigured to operate under preferable conditions for some producers, but is not necessarily universally expanded and improved. From this point of view, impact potential is first and foremost delineated through the conditions of access to fair trade supply networks. In order to unpack this perspective, the article analyses barriers to entry embedded in the most significant avenue through which producers become involved in fair trade: certification by Fairtrade International. Here it is found that in addition to arguably justifiable restrictions on participation, structured around producer capacity to viably engage in trade, more arbitrary geographical restrictions embedded in the Fairtrade system are also an ongoing and significant barrier to widening impact. This article illustrates the reality of these technical limitations by presenting the mixed experiences of the National Smallholder Farmers' Association of Malawi, and their efforts to use Fairtrade certification as a market development tool.*

**Keywords:** fair trade, Fairtrade International, certification, market access, impact

THERE IS GROWING RECOGNITION that in their current form, fair trade practices offer a form of 'shaped advantage' by which a limited number of developing world producers engage with global markets under more favourable terms. More specifically, the fair trade system is understood to support these producers in 'utilizing enhanced institutional capacity and marketing skills to tap into a growing niche market' (Lyon and Moberg 2010: 8). Based on this perspective, one of the most fundamental factors governing the impact of fair trade is the ability of individual producers, and their wider groupings, to participate in supply chains operating on the basis of associated principles. Where this issue of access has been considered, there is concern that the capacity of producers might be a key variable in their ability to benefit, and that therefore, 'geographic marginality may work against successful participation' (Nelson and Martin 2012: 47). In an effort to specifically address these issues, this article provides an in-depth analysis of the factors governing producer access to Fairtrade International certification and, therefore, the primary means through which participation in fair trade is likely to occur. Although a number of key factors are considered, the article focuses on geographical limitations to the

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*Alastair M. Smith (Alastair.smith@sant.oxon.org) is a Research Fellow at Cardiff School of Planning and Geography, Cardiff, UK.*

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availability of certification, and illustrates this through a case study of the National Smallholder Farmers' Association of Malawi.

### **Fairtrade certification: the falling barriers to participation**

Fair trade began as European and North American organizations, dedicated to improving levels of welfare in the developing world, began to see the purchase of handicraft and food goods from target communities as a tool to practise their wider mission. In contrast to conventional commercial operations, which aimed to maximize the gain of the buyer, these trade practices were specifically structured around conditions believed to be beneficial for producers. At this time, fair, or alternative trade as it was then often referred to, was confined to supply chains operated by socially orientated organizations. On this basis, impact was highly restricted: both to areas of the developing world where such organizations had existing networks, and by the limited market into which such organizations sold their goods. Seeking to overcome these limitations, a partnership between Solidaridad (a Dutch NGO) and a community of Mexican coffee farmers developed a system of third party certification for fair trade coffee (Fridell, 2007: 186–87). First appearing as the *Max Havelaar* Mark, this approach was an innovation as by focusing on the condition of initial purchase, fair trade goods could be commercialized through supply chains under mainstream commercial governance arrangements, including final sale by retailers providing for mass consumer markets (Smith, 2013a). Given the success of this model, it was subsequently reproduced in other European and North American 'consumer' countries (plus Japan). Later, the separate mechanisms of these national initiatives were centralized under the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), which is today known as Fairtrade International (Renard, 2005: 425).

While the requirements of Fairtrade certification are now highly complex, in summary, the system governs certain aspects of the trade relationship between Southern producer organizations and Northern importers. Of importance to the analysis below, Fairtrade requires the payment of a Social Premium in addition to the basic price to fund development investments by the producer organization; in some cases the system also sets minimum prices per unit of goods sold and requires the provision of upfront credit by the buyer (Doherty et al., 2012: 4). For an overview of how an individual product might be certified see Smith (2011: 46–7).

Initially, certification only applied to coffee and was still restricted to collective cooperative organizations of small producers already connected to alternative trade networks. In the UK certification was also focused on supply chains coordinated by small and medium intermediary organizations with a particular interest in promoting welfare in the developing world (Davies, 2007: 465). However, as the certification system grew, the range of products covered has expanded, and in 2012 standards existed for over 300 raw products (Fairtrade International, 2012: 8). Likewise, pushing to expand impact through growing volumes, the Fairtrade system has aimed to involve more commercial operations higher in the supply

chain, and companies that now carry the Fairtrade mark on some of their product lines include: Starbucks, Nestlé, Dole, Cadbury and Fyffes (Meyer, 2013). Given that these companies required larger volumes of products with more consistent quality standards, certification was also extended to products from plantations and other hired labour situations. In addition, in order to account for goods produced with a combination of family and hired labour (Luetchford, 2008), the definition of Small Producers was further revised in 2009 to allow for this (Smith, 2010). For a combination of these reasons, by 2012 Fairtrade International certified products sourced from some 991 producer organizations, and in turn around 1.2 million farmers and workers in the developing world (Fairtrade International, 2012: 3). As a result, in 2012 the retail sales of Fairtrade certified goods generated around €5.5 bn across over 120 countries and 6,000 product lines (Fairtrade International, 2012: 3; Meyer, 2013).

Although the above changes and current mechanisms have greatly expanded producer access to Fairtrade certification, hundreds of thousands of producers in the developing world are still excluded on the basis of their current livelihood capacities (Davenport and Low, 2012: 11). Furthermore, new issues that limit participation by producers have developed. With the increasing involvement of commercial organizations higher in the supply chain, greater emphasis has been placed on the retrospective certification of organizations that already have the capacity to supply goods to mainstream commercial standards (Fairtrade International, 2011b, c); moreover, this requirement is considered to exclude many of the poorest individual producers and their organizations. Although there is some case study evidence that groups with very limited levels of capacity can obtain and benefit from Fairtrade certification (Imhof and Lee, 2007; Ronchi, 2002), senior representatives of Fairtrade International note that 'one of the challenges that we face is that there are a lot of producers around who don't fit into the current model'. Indeed, interviews with senior officials identify that the need to open up access is understood as a fundamental issue of credibility for the organization.

In recognition of the need to make the certification system more accessible, Fairtrade International introduced the Contract Standard. This specific certification is available for producer groups that initially lack the capacity to comply with standard Fairtrade requirements, perhaps because they are not democratically organized. The standard allows such groups to sell Fairtrade certified goods if they meet a reduced set of requirements while working in partnership with a support organization, such as an export organization or an NGO, to build the necessary capacities for full certification (Fairtrade International, 2011a).

Another change in the system that affected conditions of access to certification came between 2004 and 2006 when, following the impetus to expand the volumes of Fairtrade certified goods, there was a shift away from the complete subsidization of producer certification fees by buyers (Hutchens, 2009: 66). As a result, in 2007 applications by producer groups required an upfront payment of €250 and cost around €350 per day for certification audits (Neilson and Pritchard, 2010: 1848). By 2011, coordination and evaluation of an initial application had reached the current (2013) cost of €525 – which covers the administration of the initial application

**Table 1** Basic Fairtrade certification costs for small producer organizations

<i>Number of members</i>	<i>Initial certification fee (€)</i>	<i>Subsequent annual certification fee (€)</i>
<50	1,430	1,170
50–100	2,040	1,610
101–250	2,250	1,790
251–500	2,450	1,970
501–1000	3,060	2,410
> 1000	3,470	2,770

*Source:* FLO-CERT, 2013c

and is therefore not refunded if application is rejected, although is only chargeable once irrespective of the number of products or commercial functions for which an organization applies (FLO-CERT, 2011: 5). While certification fees now vary significantly by type and size of organization (FLO-CERT, 2013a, b, c), a breakdown of the basic certification costs can be seen in Table 1. Moreover, in 2013 the CEO of FLO-CERT (the organization responsible for inspecting and certifying producer organizations against the standards set by Fairtrade International) estimated the typical cost of Fairtrade certification for a producer group to be €2,520, or €1.44 per farmer/worker (Meyer, 2013). However, those wishing to operate as a trader of Fairtrade certified goods are charged a slightly higher fee of €2,735 as a means to provide a small subsidy for producers on the true costs (Meyer, 2013). In order to further assist producer organizations with certification, Fairtrade International operates a Producer Certification Fund which provides a subsidy of up to 75 per cent for ‘first order cooperatives’ (those formed by the immediate producers of a good) seeking to be become certified for the first time (Fairtrade International, 2011e). In 2012, 131 cooperatives, including in Ghana and Mauritius, received a total of US\$1 m to finance their certification (Fairtrade Africa, 2013). Despite these support mechanisms, however, many criticize the need for poor producers to pay towards the cost of a mechanism that is, in principle, provided for their support and development.

### Geographical restrictions on Fairtrade certification

Despite expansion of the availability of Fairtrade certification, the focus of the Fairtrade system on specific products implies the differentiation of access on geographical terms, and this fundamentally limits the potential impact of the system. To begin with, Fairtrade International specifically highlights that ‘Fairtrade Standards are limited to certain countries. [So] ... only producers in these countries can apply for Fairtrade Certification’ (Fairtrade International, 2011d). However, given the aim to alleviate poverty in the developing world through trade, ‘Fairtrade International defines the countries in which it certifies producers as those countries

with low and medium development status' based on the list provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (Fairtrade International, 2011g: 2). In this case, the broad geographical focus of Fairtrade is based on the perceived need of producers in economically less developed countries, and can therefore be understood as legitimate based on the analysis of 'need' and therefore, social justice. This is significant as other certification systems, such as Fair for Life, are not limited to the developing world and are also available to producers from high income countries (Smith, 2013c).

Within the focus on the developing world, however, there are further geographically defined limitations to the engagement of producers who could arguably benefit from involvement in the system. At the sub-national level in South India, for example, Neilson and Pritchard (2010: 1844) identified geographical limitations to the availability of Fairtrade certification in that, 'Tea estates abandoned and therefore not producing any tea fell outside the gaze of the fair and ethical trade movement' (Neilson and Pritchard, 2010: 1849). Therefore, it is argued that those individuals in the developing world arguably most in need, are not considered by Fairtrade at all. While this point is self-reflexively identified as a harsh evaluation by the authors, it is an important issue for consideration by Northern consumers. The focus on the Southern poor working in livelihoods that produce for wealthy markets certainly violates a needs-based approach to targeting interventions and, for this reason, it is important that participation in ethical consumption does not undermine wider, more encompassing interventions. On a more pertinent level of evaluation, however, there are a number of empirical investigations that have highlighted that access to fair trade markets through the Fairtrade system is often dictated by market and retailer demands rather than producer need (Fridell, 2004: 153). This is found to be the case in supply chains where products are ultimately retailed by supermarkets that have a very specific way in which they wish to construct the brands of their products. For example, when UK supermarket Tesco began buying bananas from the Windward Islands, they overrode the producer organization's internal decision to allocate export quotas equally across islands, instead insisting on sourcing the majority of fruit from Dominica, as this fitted with their branding requirements (Moberg, 2005: 10).

The question of opportunity to obtain Fairtrade certification is important given the primary aim of the movement to develop market access for those developing world producers otherwise less able to benefit from international supply networks. Although the Fairtrade system does not expressly aim to work with those producers that are most in need, the question to what extent this is required for the approach to carry legitimacy has been highlighted by commentators. In the past Fairtrade International was criticized for not having certification available to lower income countries such as Ethiopia, but instead certifying the majority of goods in relatively more wealthy parts of the world such as Mexico (Sidwell, 2008: 11). Although the relevance of this argument has been well countered from a number of angles (Smith, 2009: 30), Fairtrade International has continued to make investments to expand the geographic scope of its operation (see discussion in Smith, 2008: 23). Five years on in 2013, Fairtrade International certification is available in over 70 countries.

Furthermore, analysis of the United Nations current list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) shows that all these, apart from South Sudan (which only became an independent state in July 2011), now have some Fairtrade International product certification available to them (Compare: Fairtrade International, 2011g; UN-OHRLLS, 2013).

Despite the widening of Fairtrade's scope, which now includes even small producer organizations (SPOs) in China (Fairtrade International, 2011g: 2), this does not mean that non-needs-based geographical limitations have been entirely removed. For example, although the Producer Certification Fund (see above) provides priority for groups from the Least Developed Countries (LDC) (Fairtrade International, 2011f: 2), there are also additional priorities for the support of certain product types from specific geographical locations (these are outlined in Table 2).

More significantly, however, not all Fairtrade International standards are available in every developing world country, and this is also true for those that are the least developed. Although some product standards are available throughout the developing world, the majority remain restricted by geographical location; a summary of the majority of these, although not all, is provided in Appendix 1.

In some cases, certain products can only be certified for production in certain countries. For example, grapefruit is only certifiable by producers in Mexico, South Africa, and Northern Africa. Although in this situation produce can be organic or sourced from SPOs and hired labour (HL) organizations, in other cases the availability of certification is differentiated by both geography and product characteristics. For example, while only organic raisins from SPOs can be certified in South Africa, SPOs in Southern Asia, Central Asia and South America can also obtain endorsements for conventional raisins. Finally, in some cases, such as pineapple for drying, although organic and conventional produce in Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, South America, South-eastern Asia, Southern Asia, the Caribbean, and most of Western Africa must be from SPOs, HL production in Ghana is also certifiable. In some situations, the unavailability of certification might reflect the lack of production in a particular country. However, in other cases, the lack of opportunity to apply for certification is due to other administrative issues and, in most cases, the need to establish the details of standards that are specific to the country, and is therefore most likely the result of the Fairtrade International system having no established Fairtrade price or

**Table 2** Geographical and product priorities for certification support

<i>Product</i>	<i>Geographical specification</i>
Bananas, organic juices, orange juice, sugar, cotton	All countries
Cocoa	Ecuador, México, Venezuela, Haití, Dom. Republic, Nicaragua, Africa
Vanilla	Madagascar, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea
Dried fruit	West Africa

*Source:* Fairtrade International, 2011f: 2–3

Social Premium for the local context. Where this occurs, however, in principle there is the option for stakeholders to apply for the geographical extension of standards to new countries through one of three possible administrative procedures:

- *Full price research.* The standard procedure which includes a Costs of Sustainable Production analysis and can be used in all cases and for all types of products.
- *Easy entrance.* Applied for new products in existing standards, such as: 1) when the product description, trade characteristics and producer set-up fit into the scope of existing standards; 2) minor products; 3) where risks to using this method are low.
- *Price extension.* Used to fill pricing gaps in existing Fairtrade product standards including between different geographical locations and for calculating organic differentials (see: Fairtrade International, 2011h).

In summary, the above section highlights the ways in which access to Fairtrade certification is restricted by capacity, but also geography and product characteristics; although it is noted that in the case of geographical limitations there are options for flexibility in the current arrangements. In order to illustrate how this situation is played out in producer realities, however, the following section provides a case study of the experience of the National Smallholder Farmers' Association in Malawi. Here it is highlighted that more needs to be done by Fairtrade International to develop a needs-based approach to certification availability.

### **Case study: The National Smallholder Farmers' Association of Malawi (NASFAM)**

Malawi is a landlocked country in southern Africa, currently classified by the United Nations as one of the poorest and Least Developed Countries in the world. In 2012, the Human Development Report ranked the country 170 out of 186 (UNDP, 2012a) – having moved up one place since the previous assessment. The gross national product per capita of Malawi is currently \$774, with 73.9 per cent of the population living below the \$1.25 per day poverty line (UNDP, 2012b). In 2011, growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) slowed to 4.3 per cent from 6.3 per cent in 2010 on account of foreign exchange and fuel shortages, issues symptomatic of Malawi's structural reliance on agricultural exports (suffering from volatile and declining real prices) and imported mineral fuels (African Economic Outlook, 2013). Very little of the country's population lives in urban areas (15.8 per cent), and overall, agriculture accounts for a significant part of economic activity, 70 per cent of which is undertaken by smallholder producers. Although there is emerging evidence that this model is not in itself fundamentally restrictive of economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa (Moyo and Chambati, 2013), Malawian smallholder farmers have been subjected to decades of marginalization (Smith, 2013b: 118–9). From the absorption of present day Malawi into the British Empire, smallholder farmers have been continually hampered by legal restrictions on their activities, and independence in 1964 is only considered to have extended the exploitation of

smallholders (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982). Despite reforms of inefficient state-administered agricultural support and marketing mechanisms in the 1980s, it is widely considered that productivity was not enhanced given a lack of capacity in the private sector (Devereux and Tiba, 2007: 165; Kutengule et al., 2013: 421). Where traders did emerge, they were reportedly mostly unlicensed vendors benefiting from information asymmetries and fixed weights and measures, therefore largely exacerbating a long history of exploitative intermediaries in the agricultural marketing sector (See: McCracken, 1983: 178).

Following the liberalization programme, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded a 'Smallholder Agribusiness Development Project' (SADP) in 1995. The intention was to strengthen smallholder capacity to take advantage of opportunities provided by liberalization, and the success of the programme resulted in the development of a permanent support organization in 1998: the National Smallholder Farmers' Association of Malawi (NASFAM) (Smith, 2013b: 119). Overall NASFAM is a financial trust owned by its approximately 100,000 farmer members, who are organized into local associations, in turn comprising village level clubs containing around 10 to 20 individuals. NASFAM functions practically through two subsidiaries, one of which focuses on capacity building, and the other on the supply of seed and the marketing of members' crops. Given the democratic organization of the overall entity, NASFAM's commercial arm offers a guaranteed market for members' produce at the end of the season and bases prices derived from cost of production analysis (Smith, 2011).

Given the historical reliance of individual farmers, and the country as a whole, on a narrow range of agricultural crops (primarily tobacco), one of NASFAM's primary aims is to facilitate diversification (Smith, 2013b). Speaking about the issues at the macro level during an interview, NASFAM's Commercial Manager summarizes that:

We need to move away from the traditional exports, tobacco 500, 600 million dollars, that is more than half of the FOREX, I think, and a sane country should be running away from that situation. We can still maintain it at 600 million but that shouldn't be 50 percent of our exports. We need to look at how we can create a 300 million export market, a 200 million, a 100 million et cetera.

Another agricultural commodity traditionally exported by Malawi is groundnuts, or peanuts, as they are sometimes known. However, alongside increasing international competition, Malawian production was cut out of Europe following the discovery of a widespread aflatoxin infection in the mid-1990s. This is a by-product of a ubiquitous fungus which grows on a wide range of Southern commodity foods, and is encouraged by poor husbandry, particularly for example, when producers moisten nuts to facilitate shelling. However, due to its carcinogenic nature, detection of aflatoxin understandably prompted stringent regulation from the traditional import markets in Europe. Unable to deal with the problem without support, Malawian exports to the continent crashed entirely until NASFAM identified fair trade practices as one possible means to restore this previously lucrative export sector.



More specifically, partnering with a mission-driven fair trade organization (TWIN Trading, based in London, UK), NASFAM worked to certify the Mchinji Area Smallholder Farmers' Association (MASFA) as a producers cooperative, and the commercial company as a registered exporter. Through this relationship, NASFAM benefited from support to address the aflatoxin risks and also developed new trade relationships with major UK supermarkets (Smith, 2013b: 120–21).

Despite this particular success, however, the limitations on access to Fairtrade certification began to become apparent to NASFAM as they developed an interest in extending involvement to other associations. To begin with, although the investment in Fairtrade certification for MASFA showed good returns in the long term, the cost of this process was not easily shouldered. Moreover, interest in certifying a second association at Mzimba stalled due to a lack of funds to cover the costs of certification. In reference to this case, a senior manager explained during an interview that 'we have an association, a very productive association – we just don't have on any of the budgets around 3,000 Euros to certify them. We have already paid a bit for the audit, [although] if we don't certify this year, we'll have to start [again] from scratch'.

Given the imperative to diversify exports, NASFAM's management also identified advantages in obtaining fair trade markets for another of its core products: Kilombero rice. A long-grain variety of brown rice, Kilombero is eaten alongside maize as a staple food in northern Malawi, although, given its versatile and aromatic nature, the product was considered an excellent candidate to become a high value export for Europe (Smith, 2011: 125 & 143). Although funding was an issue, it was also understood by management that certification would be impossible. This was because, as can be seen from Appendix 1, only producer groups located in Thailand, Laos, India, and Egypt can readily apply for certification for certain varieties of rice. Therefore, before certification could be applied for, it was necessary to arrange for the product standard to be extended to Malawi (using one of the procedures outlined above). However, despite approaches made to the regional Fairtrade Liaison Officer to initiate the extension process, no mention of these possibilities was made. Moreover, the request was met with the response that nothing could be done until the next Fairtrade International price review meeting, although no preparatory measures were ever suggested. In this case, it was the view of a number of direct stakeholders, and unconnected informants working in the area more generally, that Fairtrade capacity to support producers with such issues in this region was currently lacking. An alternative interpretation, however, is that although exports were already under way to Scotland in the UK, the costs involved in geographical extension were not viewed by Fairtrade decision-makers as an appropriate investment (Smith, 2013a).

Irrespective of the cause of the lack of engagement by Fairtrade International, there is concern among stakeholders in the incipient supply chain that despite efforts to develop physical capacity for export, the work to create the market in the UK is placed at a disadvantage without the ability to obtain Fairtrade certification. During interviews, stakeholders identified their efforts as working very much in line with the principles of the fair trade system. One interviewee working with a partner NGO to NASFAM noted that the rice 'is from smallholder farmers

through a reputable smallholder organization so the general framework is there', which as mentioned above, includes that producers are members of a democratically organized organization through which they negotiate yearly prices based on the costs of production. Furthermore, the UK-based importer of the Kilombero rice pays NASFAM Commercial an export price which reflects the internal price setting dynamics, and also covers the export costs. Indeed, at the time of research, the importer had made it a point of principle not to negotiate on the price requested, and this resulted in a price in excess of the minimums stipulated under Fairtrade standards for other countries. Despite these practices, however, there was concern among stakeholders that without Fairtrade certification to recognize them, end consumers and intermediary retailers may not understand the ethical credentials of the product. This is because stakeholders, including a representative of TWIN Trading, recognize that 'the challenge with all of these things when you are talking about consumer branding, is ... [that] people only have so much head space'. For this reason, although there is acceptance that great progress has been made selling to consumers particularly attuned with the broader fair trade message – such as those with a long association with fair trade or networked through church groups, etc. – it would be much harder to successfully engage with more mainstream markets. Indeed, action research highlights that even those members of the fair trade movement with more significant knowledge are often reluctant to break away from their reliance on the Fairtrade mark in understanding what constitutes a legitimate fair trade product. It is for this reason that stakeholders working with NASFAM to build the Kilombero rice supply chain feel that '[this] is where the major market is', and therefore that Fairtrade International certification would be of great significance to expand the impact of their work.

## Conclusion

There is an emerging view that fair trade offers 'shaped advantage' to a limited selection of developing world producers who benefit from improved levels of market access and supply chain conditions. In many ways, the potential for impact within these arrangements has grown significantly as the fair trade movement has developed from a very small collection of closed trade circuits, to gradually penetrate conventionally operated systems of commercialization. This has been largely facilitated by the development of the third party certification system now administered by Fairtrade International. Although the initial geographical and product scope of this system was significantly limited, this has expanded considerably to the stage where over 300 product categories are available across the developing world. Within this development, however, this article has identified variables that continue to limit the potential for producer involvement. Some of these are located in the characteristics of producer communities themselves – and range from the broad nature of livelihood activities to the capacity with which these are carried out. Beyond basic eligibility, significant factors limiting access to Fairtrade certification are the ability of producers to meet the required quality standards and also

afford the new costs of certification (which have been introduced as a perceived imperative for overall expansion of the system). However, in addition to these, this article has highlighted that at the current time, many of the Fairtrade standards are not immediately applicable to all geographical regions, either in their entirety or under certain physical and social conditions of production (being restricted to organic/conventional production, or supply by hired labour/small producer organizations in certain countries).

To some extent, these limitations on impact potential are recognized by Fairtrade International, which has therefore developed supportive mechanisms designed to refine the opportunities for access. For example, the introduction of a Contract Standard aims to help producer organizations lacking capacity to comply with the full requirements immediately, and the Producer Certification Fund subsidizes those unable to meet the financial costs involved. Beyond the existence of these mechanisms, however, it is not clear to what extent they reduce the barriers to entry. Indeed, although the documentation of the Fairtrade system highlights three means by which product standards can be geographically extended, the case study of NASFAM indicates that there is likely to be a gap between discourse and lived producer experience. This is a significant issue, as, given the growing demand for goods specifically certified by Fairtrade International in core consumer countries, producers unable to access certification feel greatly disadvantaged.

As a result of the above analysis, it is suggested that more work be done to understand the degree to which poor producers are isolated from participation in the Fairtrade system for reasons that run counter to a needs-based approach to certification availability. Where this is found to be the case, it will be important for Fairtrade International to continue to expand the geographical scope of its certification. Indeed, increasing levels of access will be an essential part of developing the Fairtrade system from a marketing and developmental niche, to an increasingly meaningful part of a wider movement for fairer international trade.

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## Appendix 1 Geographical scope of certification by product characteristics

Product category	Applicable to:	Product category	Applicable to:	Product category	Applicable to:
Almonds in shell	Pakistan (CP)	Apples	South Africa (conventional, SPO/HL), South America (C&O, SPO/HL)	Apples for drying	Eastern, Central and Western Asia (C&O, SPO), South America (organic, SPO), Pakistan (conventional, CP), South Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)
Apple Juice	South Africa (SPO/HL)	Apples for juice	Eastern, Central and Western Asia and South Africa (conventional organic, SPO/HL)	Apples for processing	Eastern, Central and Western Asia and South Africa (C&O, SPO/HL), South America (C&O, SPO/HL)
Banana	See original source (due to complexity)	Dates for drying	Tunisia and Egypt (C&O, SPO)	Fonio (C&O)	Western Africa (SPO)
Grapefruit	Mexico, South Africa, Northern Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Lemons	Argentina (C, SPO/HL), Egypt (C&O, SPO/HL), South Africa	Lemons for processing	Peru (O, SOP/HL)
Limes	Brazil (C, SPO/HL), Dominican Republic (O, SPO/HL), Caribbean, Egypt Mexico, Western Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Lycchees	Eastern Africa, Southern Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Lycchees for processing	Eastern Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)
Mangoes	Thailand (C, SPO/HL, Nam Dok Mai variety only), Central America, Caribbean, South America, South Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Mangoes for processing	Southern Asia, Western Africa, Eastern Africa, South-east Asia (C&O, SPO/HL), Peru (O, SPO/HL)	Mangoes for drying	Southern Asia, Western Africa, Eastern Africa, South-east Asia (C&O, SPO)
Mangoes for juice	South America, Caribbean, Southern Asia, Eastern Africa, Western Africa, (C&O, SPO/HL), South-east Asia (C, SPO/HL)	Mangoes for pulp	Cuba, Brazil (C, SPO/HL), Western Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Marula for processing	Africa (C&O, SPO)

<i>Product category</i>	<i>Applicable to:</i>	<i>Product category</i>	<i>Applicable to:</i>	<i>Product category</i>	<i>Applicable to:</i>
Nectarines	Argentina (C, SPO/HL), Southern Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Oranges	Argentina, Egypt (C&O, SPO/HL), Morocco, South Africa (C, SPO/HL)	Oranges for processing	Peru (O, SPO/HL)
Papaya	Brazil, Eastern Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Papaya for juice	Eastern Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Papaya for drying	Eastern Africa (C&O, SPO)
Papayas for processing	Peru (O, SPO/HL)	Passion fruit for juice	Eastern Africa, South America, Eastern Africa, South-eastern Asia (C&O, SPO/HL)	Passion fruits for processing	South America, South-eastern Asia (C&O, SPO/HL)
Peaches	Argentina, Southern Africa (C, SPO/HL), Southern Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Pears	South Africa (C, SPO/HL), South America (C&O, SPO/HL)	Pears for drying	South America (C&O, SPO)
Pears for juice	South America (C&O, SPO/HL)	Pears for processing	South America (C&O, SPO/HL)	Pineapples incl. for processing	Eastern Africa, Western Africa, Middle Africa, South America, South-eastern Asia, Southern Asia, Caribbean (C&O, SPO/HL)
Pineapples for drying	Eastern Africa, Middle Africa, South America, South-eastern Asia, Southern Asia, Caribbean, Western Africa except Ghana (C&O, SPO), Ghana (C&O, SPO/HL)	Plantains incl. for processing	Central America, South America (C, SPO/HL)	Plums	South Africa (C, SPO/HL)
Quinoa	South America (C&O, SPO)	Rice	Egypt (C&O, SPO)	Rice, Black and White 'petit poussin'	Laos (C, SPO)
Rice, glutinous (white)	Laos (C, SPO)	Rice, Mandarin (conventional)	Laos (SPO)	Rice, normal long grain (C&O)	Benin (SPO)



Product category	Applicable to:	Product category	Applicable to:	Product category	Applicable to:
Rice, traditional varieties from Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka (O, SPO)	Rice (conventional & organic)	India (CP), Pakistan (SPO), Thailand (SPO)	Seed cotton (C&O)	South America, Central America, Northern Africa, Eastern Africa, Western Africa, Middle Africa (all SPO), Southern Asia (SPO/ C)
Soft citrus	Argentina, South Africa (C, SPO/HL), Northern Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)	Table grapes	Egypt, Namibia, South Africa, Chile, Central America (C&O, SPO/HL), India (C, SPO/HL)	Wine grapes	South Africa, North Africa, South America, Georgia Lebanon (C&O, SPO/HL)
Walnut	Central Asia, South America (C&O, SPO), Pakistan (O, SPO)	Argan oil	Morocco (C&O, SPO)	Coconut	Windward Islands, South America, West Africa (C, SPO/HL)
Coconut for drying	Worldwide except Oceania (C&O, SPO)	Coconuts for processing	Worldwide except Oceania (C&O, SPO/HL), Oceania (C&O, SPO)	Shea butter	Western, Eastern and Middle Africa (C&O, SPO)
Apricots, dried	Pakistan (C&O, CP)	Mangoes, dried	Western Africa except Ghana (C&O, SPO), Ghana (C&O, SPO/HL)	Papaya, dried	Eastern Africa (C&O, SPO)
Passion fruit juice	South America (C&O, SPO/HL)	Pineapples, dried	Togo (O, SPO)	Dried plums	World Wide (C&O, SPO), South Africa (C&O, SPO/HL)
Raisin	South Africa (O, SPO), Southern Asia, Central Asia, South America (C&O, SPO)	Tomatoes, dried	Burkina Faso (C, SPO)	Wild Apricots, dried	Pakistan (C, CP)

Note: Abbreviations show types of standards that are available: C = contract, O = organic, SPO = small producer organization, HL = hired labour  
Source: data from Fairtrade International, 2011a